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Introduction
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Private equity (PE) is an asset class, which draws more and more the investors’ attention. Since
its emergence in the 1980s, the PE business has immensely grown. In the most recent statistics,
the total global deal value has reached 582 billion USD in 2018 (Bain (2019)). Although the
PE industry has taken a strong hit during the dotcom crisis and the global financial crisis, the
deal value has already tripled again since the last crisis. The reasons for this strong growth
are manifold: In the past, PE performed exceptionally well. The downside of the asset class’
illiquidity was compensated by a consistent level of high returns. This performance driven pull
of capital into PE was amplified by a lack of new investment opportunities with comparable
returns. Especially the worldwide low interest rates during the last few years and a pessimistic
prospect on increasing interest rates in the future strengthen the PE market.
However, the huge capital inflow led to the problem to find attractive investment targets.
The dry capital in the PE industry has increased drastically, indicating that general partners
(GPs) struggle to find attractive investment targets. It has reached a peak of 2 trillion USD in
December 2018 (Bain (2019)).
The huge demand to invest in leveraged buyouts and the scarcity of attractive investment
targets brought up demand-driven higher company prices with higher multiples. Consequently,
PE investors as limited partners (LPs) worry about the performance of their investment and
have a closer look to the investment selection of the GPs.
Especially the dominance of secondary buyouts (SBOs) with a share of more than 50 percent
of all financial buyouts (PitchBook (2018a) leaves a lot of questions with the LPs regarding
the attractiveness of these investments. An SBO is a financial buyout in which the portfolio
company is sold from one PE firm to another one. At a first glance, LPs argue that investing in
an SBO is only costly passing-the-parcel without acceptable value creation. From a theoretical
point of view, this type of buyout is indeed not intuitive. The portfolio company should have
been optimised by the GP during the primary buyout (PBO). Thus, there should be only little
value creation potential left for a second investor (Wang (2012), Jenkinson & Sousa (2015),
Bonini (2015)). On the other hand, Degeorge et al. (2016) state that value can still be created
if other value creation gaps are exploited through complementary skill sets. Achleitner & Figge
(2014) argue that value creation is only possible if the portfolio company could not have been
optimised during the PBO. Therefore, it looks like a chance that SBOs might perform well
under limited circumstances but it does not explain why investments in SBOs are so dominant
nowadays. Even if the high share of SBOs is driven by missing investment alternatives, from
a rational point of view GPs would not participate in SBOs if they were not worthwhile.
Somewhat in contrast to the money-burning incentive proposed by Degeorge et al. (2016),
Jenkinson & Sousa (2015) argue that GPs still require a reasonable deal track record for further
fund raising. Thus, GPs would not invest in SBOs if they were as bad as the money-burning
hypothesis claims.
Hence, this all leave us with the question about the performance of SBOs. If the performance
of SBOs would be really as good as the high share of the total buyouts insinuates, it should be
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investigated what the drivers of this performance are. Understanding the performance related
indicators LPs as well as GPs would have a rational pattern to evaluate the attractiveness of
SBOs.
The doctoral thesis consists of the following three essays: Secondary Buyout Performance
(Eschenro¨der (2019)), Performance Dependency of Secondary Buyouts on Primary Buyouts
(Eschenro¨der and Hartmann-Wendels (2019)), and Risk of Financial Distress in Secondary
Buyouts (Eschenro¨der and Hartmann-Wendels (2019)). The first essay has been the product of
my own work only. Professor Hartmann-Wendels participated in the conception of the second
and third essay. Still, I independently collected and evaluated the data set, carried out all the
calculations, and structured and formulated the essays myself.
Based on an empirical analysis this dissertation contributes to find out the constellations,
in which SBOs perform well. The first essay focuses on the general performance differences
between PBOs and SBOs and examines in which situations SBOs may be worthwhile. The
second essay explains how to engage in a successful SBO by displaying the dependency on the
preceding PBO and the required action taken by the SBO investor. Lastly, the third essay
analyses the risk of financial distress in PBOs and SBOs. It analyses the different risk profiles
and answers the question whether SBOs are riskier than PBOs. These three essays offer a
principle grid of indicators which determine the performance of SBOs.
The empirical analyses are based on an uniquely assembled dataset consisting of 295 UK based
portfolio companies undergoing back-to-back buyouts. Their PBO entry is no earlier than
1996 and their SBO exit no later than 2017. The sample of buyouts is retrieved from several
data providers, such as Capital IQ, Thomson Reuters Eikon, Prequin, and Mergermarket,
and includes private data from a large German fund-to-fund manager. The dataset includes all
information of the balance sheet and the profit and loss accounts at entry and exit of both, PBO
and SBO, enabling in-depth analyses on fundamental data. Additionally, deal characteristics
and the economic environment, in form of both the macroeconomic environment and a peer
group of non-PE-backed companies, are also considered.
The first essay (Eschenro¨der (2019), Secondary Buyout Performance) digs deep into the perfor-
mance differences between PBOs and SBOs rather than analysing their interaction and value
drivers. With the ongoing search for the best investment opportunities of GPs, Degeorge et al.
(2016) argue that investing into SBOs is costly for investors. However, this claim only holds if
GPs have a perfect choice between investing in PBOs and SBOs, i.e. that a sufficient amount
of potential PBO targets is available in comparison to potential SBO targets. As shown by
the increasing levels of dry capital, GPs struggle to find suitable investment targets. Whereas
SBOs provide a possible solution to missing investment opportunities, they may be the only
sensible opportunity as potentially good PBOs are not available anymore. In this essay, the
performance of SBOs is analysed, whilst considering this dilemma.
The in-depth analysis of SBOs and their preceding PBOs reveals new insights about the effective
performance of SBOs. Different to the isolated view on SBOs, without considering the previous
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PBOs, in this apples-to-apples comparison the performance evaluation is done by evaluating
the SBOs’ performance compared to its preceding PBOs of the exact same company. The full
sample analysis signals that, by tendency, PBOs perform better than SBOs. SBOs, however,
prove as very sensible investment opportunities when the investment environment is considered.
The underperformance is strongly driven by size and time effects and, interestingly, diminishes
in the time period after the financial crisis. The analysis of the data show that in recent times
SBO do not perform worse. Assuming that most good PBO targets are already taken off the
market, well-selected SBOs perform much better than the remaining worse performing PBOs.
Thus, in the current market environment, the performance of SBOs indicates that SBOs can
be attractive investment target.
After knowing that SBOs are not necessarily worse-performing, the second essay (Eschenro¨der
and Hartmann-Wendels (2019), Performance Dependency of Secondary Buyouts on Primary
Buyouts) analyses how to improve the performance in SBOs. The essay analyses how the value
is created in SBOs depending on their preceding PBOs. The performance during the SBO
is evaluated by considering the portfolio company’s previous development during the PBO.
Picking up on the assumption that SBOs only collect the low hanging fruits (e.g. Achleitner et
al. (2014)), several indicators of potential PBO targets are identified that contribute to a better
performance of an SBO. This essay provides a indicative guideline for the further performance
improvement of an SBO which meets one of these selection criteria.
Most of the previous studies on SBOs find that SBOs in general significantly underperform
PBOs (e.g. Achleitner et al. (2014)). However, a few studies find that SBOs do not necessarily
underperform in certain situations (e.g. Degeorge et al. (2016)). In this empirical analysis,
different value drivers of PBOs and SBOs are indentified. PBO investors expand the portfolio
company, improve their profitability and improve the degree of innovation. Although, SBO
investors further streamline the company, in form of profitability improvements, they do not
also expand the company as much to create value and rather focus on efficiency gains. Further
on, SBO investor should seek companies that expanded and improved their profitability margins
during the PBO more than comparable public firms. On the contrary, companies with lower
efficiency gains and worse returns on assets during the PBO compared to their competition
are more suited for SBOs. Conditional on these indications, SBO investors indeed need to
focus on similar measures to create further value but they need another approach to improve
these measures. For example, whereas PBO investors increase profitability through margin
improvement, SBO investors focus to enhance the profitability by increasing the return on
assets.
From the performance point of view, SBOs are identified as promising targets for GPs. However,
it might be different with respect to a risk-adjusted view. The third paper (Eschenro¨der and
Hartmann-Wendels (2019), Risk of Financial Distress in Secondary Buyouts) concentrates on
this topic by analysing the risk of financial distress in PE and its difference among PBOs and
SBOs. The risk of financial distress in PE is measured by using the Altman Z-Score. Risk
drivers are identified for both PBO and SBO. Based on these findings guidance is provided on
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how to control risk in PBOs and SBOs.
The risk of PE transactions might be perceived as very high. This perception can, among other
factors, be traced back to the high leverage involved in leveraged buyouts. Kaplan & Stein
(1993) find that too much debt causes the capital structure to enhance the costs of financial
distress. In combination with the finding of Axelson et al. (2013), who find that GPs use too
much debt in their buyouts, this assumption can be justified. However, if the risk was as high
as generally suggested, SBOs would not be an interesting investment target and, hence, GPs
would not invest.
Interestingly, PE investors reduce the risk in the portfolio company more than comparable non-
PE-financed companies. Furthermore, SBO investors reduce the risk significantly more than
PBO investors in order to prepare an exit to non-financial buyers. However, the risk is driven
by different indicators among buyout rounds. For example, the leverage does not affect the risk
development during PBOs, whereas a higher leverage increases the risk of financial distress in
SBOs. We find that GPs do not focus on the risk level in a specific buyout round, however,
SBO investors are able to reduce the risk more in distressed companies compared to PBOs.
The findings of these essays indicate that investments in SBOs are likely to perform well. Per-
formance and risk of these investments are not significantly different to PBOs if GPs understand
the different approaches to optimize the portfolio company and use the appropriate drivers to
create further value. The negative stigma of the SBOs’ underperformance can be disproved.
However, it is necessary to point out that GPs need some more understanding of the appropri-
ate skill sets and the knowledge of the working drivers to create additional value in an SBO.
At a first glance, the results of the analyses give some guidance to GPs where the potential
drivers for value creation can be found. Lastly, the findings also contribute to the big picture
that SBOs are indeed a worthwhile investment, which is not in conflict with the high share of
SBOs in the total buyout market.

Chapter 2
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2.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis private equity (PE) faced a tough time with a weak deal flow and
low company valuations. Since this dip in activity and performance the PE market grew
significantly (Figure 2.1). Besides a small setback around 2012 the volume of leveraged buyouts
(LBOs) shows a steadily increasing trend and the growing appetite for PE investment is shown
by the increase of raised capital of PE funds (Figure 2.2). The raised capital puts an eminent
pressure on the general partners (GPs) to find attractive targets with promising potentials for
value creation and, therefore, to achieve the expected and promised excess returns.
Figure 2.1: European Buyout Deal Volume
Source: Based on PitchBook (2018a).
Note: The graph shows the total deal volume of buyouts in EUR (billions) and the share of SBOs on the total
deal volume.
Figure 2.2: European Dry Capital of PE funds
Source: Based on PitchBook (2018a).
Note: The graph shows the amount of PE funds’ capital raised and the cumulated dry capital in EUR (billions).
The share of SBOs on the total deal volume is plotted on the right Y-axis.
During the life time of the fund GPs aim to improve the acquired portfolio companies financially
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and operationally. After having optimsed the value of the company, the portfolio company is
exited. This exit can be executed either as an initial public offering (IPO), a trade sale to a
strategic buyer or as a sale to another PE investor. IPOs often follow a lengthy and regulated
process in which the outcome is difficult to predict and, thus, may not be in line with the typical
well-structured PE investment process. Moreover, IPOs only seem to be superior to other exit
channels when the equity markets are hot (Wang (2012), Jenkinson & Sousa (2015)). The trade
sale of the portfolio company to strategic buyers tends to achieve a lower sales price compared
to the sale to financial buyers (Achleitner & Figge (2014)). This exit might also be quite lengthy
due to internal and external business procedures of the strategic buyer (e.g. antitrust filings,
approval procedures). In contrast, a sale to a PE investor could be a win-win situation for the
selling PE firm and the buying PE investor. The mindset and the objective of the investors,
the dealing structures, and decision-making processes are similar, which supports a smooth
and fast deal execution. In this case, the portfolio company is moving from a primary buyout
(PBO) to a secondary buyout (SBO). SBOs have gained a lot of attention from practioners and
academics. Meanwhile, SBOs represent more than 50 percent of all buyout deals.
The reasons to engage in an SBO from a buying perspective are not that obvious. The un-
derlying portfolio company should have been optimised, and only limited potential to create
additional value is left for another consecutive financial investor (Wang (2012), Jenkinson &
Sousa (2015), Bonini (2015)). Degeorge et al. (2016) show that there still are possibilities to
create value through additional skillsets of the consecutive financial sponsors. Achleitner &
Figge (2014) argue that, if the portfolio company has not been fully optimised throughout the
lifetime of the primary buyout (PBO), additional value creation might be possible. Jensen
(1989) states that PE simply promotes a superior organisational structure than non PE-backed
companies and this also leads to an ongoing better performance. Although these findings may
explain the existence of SBOs in principal, they do not necessarily explain why SBOs have be-
come increasingly popular and the share of SBOs is growing for years. This trend is triggered
by two main effects. First, the raised capital of PE is drastically increasing. Therefore, more
investments need to be made and attractive targets as PBOs simply cannot suffice the demand
to invest. Second, SBOs might not perform as adversely as assumed so far when compared over
time. Figure 2.2 reveals an aggregated correlation between the dry capital and the share of
SBOs on the total buyout volume. It shows that fund raising steadily grows, whilst dry pow-
der also increases. This development indicates that PE firms have problems finding adequate
targets and that they may try to expand their pool of potential targets by considering SBOs.
However, it is more than ever necessary to scrutinize how the expected level of excess returns can
be maintained by this high portion of SBOs. Therefore, this paper is dedicated to empirically
examine the performance of SBOs by answering the following questions:
1. Is the performance of SBOs really worse or at least not better than the performance of
PBOs?
2. Are SBOs means of last resort or is it still attractive to invest in SBOs?
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Regression analyses on the total sample signal an underperformance of SBOs compared to PBOs
in general. However, the underperformance is not consistent in all areas of PE investments.
Subsampling shows that the underperformance in certain areas is driven by the progress of the
portfolio company’s business cycle. The underperformance used to be more pronounced before
the financial crisis. In the current environment PBOs and SBOs do not perform significantly
different from another. However, GPs do not have a perfect choice between investing in good
PBOs and comparable SBOs. Faced with the choice of investing in PBOs or SBOs, GPs should
focus to invest in good SBOs rather than in the remaining bad PBO targets as those SBOs
develop much better in most aspects.
By answering the above mentioned questions, this paper contributes to the literature in several
ways. First, the dataset for general performance analyses is superior in several ways compared
to previous studies. This paper is able to use a dataset of consecutive buyout rounds rather
than a random selection of buyouts for the performance evaluation of SBOs. The dataset used
in this paper does not only have the most observations in this setup but is also more recent,
which allows to consider the latest developments of SBOs. The analyses use considerably more
performance variables and perform a variety of additional robustness checks. Second, this paper
analyses how the performance differences are driven and finds that the performance depends
on the size of the portfolio company and the time of investment. Third, to my knowledge, it
is the first paper that applies percentile regressions to get a more representative view on the
performance distribution of PBOs and SBOs. These analyses provide arguments as to why the
share of SBOs is that high and put the share in context of the current development of the PE
market.
The next chapter discusses the literature in the research areas of PE and in particular SBOs. In
Chapter 2.3 the data sample and the calculation of the variables are presented. The summary
statistics provide further insights into the dataset and are the base for further empirical anal-
yses in the following chapter. Several robustness checks are performed in a separate chapter of
this paper. The conclusion finishes the paper.
2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 PE Performance
After the acquisition of portfolio companies, PE firms aim to improve acquired companies both
operationally and financially in order to create higher value throughout the holding period.
When the PE business first started, GPs relied solely on the concept of LBOs in which the re-
turn on the invested capital is increased drastically by loading up the company with great debt
levels. At this early time of the PE business, Jensen (1989) states that LBOs make use of high
proportions of debt of approximately 60-90 percent of the total capital. Korteweg (2010) con-
firms this result by stating that GPs set a high leverage as optimal capital structure. Achleitner
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et al. (2010) further show that, especially for large companies, GPs implement high leverage
as the optimal capital structure. It is assumed that agency costs are reduced as managers
are incentivised to perform well (Jensen & Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986)). After loading up
the portfolio company with debt, the manager needs to generate sufficient cash flows to cope
with the increased interest payments and, eventually, the repayment of the loans. Wright et al.
(1994) further recognize that high levels of debt require more rigorous monitoring to ensure less
risky operations. Despite greater default and liquidation risks of portfolio companies, interest
rates can be deducted from the tax exposure and thus create tax shields. These tax shields
affect the performance positively (Lerner (2011) Wright et al. (2009), Kaplan & Stro¨mberg
(2009)).
This strategy works well when the financial markets allow the easy improvement of capital costs
by increasing leverage. However, when debt markets overheated, PE firms needed other means
to realize their outperformance (Matthews et al. (2009)). Consequently, PE firms focussed
on the improvement of their operations by increasing the efficiency and profitability of their
investments (De Fontenay (2014)). Operational engineering is provided in several forms, such
as sales expansion, cost cutting, production development, add-on acquisitions or restructuring
(Acharya et al. (2012), Lee et al. (2001), Wright et al. (2001)). These measures often come along
with the hiring of experts for skill transfer into the company (Wright et al. (2009)). PE firms are
able to strongly improve the operations of their portfolio companies compared to their non PE-
backed peers, such as increasing the operating sales margin and the cash conversion (Kaplan
(1989), Smith (1990)). Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) find that the total factor production of
PE-backed companies improves more than of non PE-backed ones. Further, they find that
less labour and capital is needed to achieve a certain level of output. The management of
inventory and working capital can be improved more in PE-backed companies as well (Wright
et al. (1992)). These improvements of portfolio companies often come at the expense of higher
capital expenditures and research and development costs (Bruining et al. (2005)). Whereas
the mentioned findings all describe the development during the holding period, other research
finds that PE investors tend to invest into less structured companies with inferior monitoring
practices and a generally worse management (Cuny & Talmor (2007), Wright et al. (2001)),
showing that GPs aim to find potentially large value creation gaps to exploit them.
Improvements in the areas of financial and operational engineering describe the intrinsic value
creation of the company. According to Perembetov et al. (2014), value creation is achieved by
51 percent operational engineering, 31 percent financial engineering, and 18 percent multiple
effects through negotiation and market timing. Kaplan (1989) shows that portfolio companies
outperform their non PE-backed peer group, which is confirmed by other studies as well (Lehn &
Poulsen (1989), Weir et al. (2005), Groh & Gottschalg (2008), Guo et al. (2011)). However, Guo
et al. (2011) show that PE-backed companies do not necessarily perform better than non PE-
backed companies, already indicating that the performance difference may have changed over
time. Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009) even find an underperformance of PE when considering
risk-adjusted returns.
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2.2.2 Performance SBOs
As PE aims to find and exploit value creation gaps, those gaps should be closed during the
holding period of the PBO. This assumption puts the performance of SBOs in question. In the
following, the literature on SBO performance is presented, and it is further discussed whether
SBOs are worthwhile investments.
The evidence about the financial leverage of SBOs is rather mixed. Achleitner & Figge (2014)
postulate that GPs generally use, by and large, the same skill set throughout both buyout
rounds and thus the only way to create additional value during the second buyout round is by
increasing the leverage. In contrast, Wang (2012) points out that PBOs should have applied an
efficient financial engineering and thus have found an optimal capital structure, which should
not be changed during the SBO. Empirical analyses strongly differ according to the construction
of the dataset and the underlying working market conditions. Whereas some papers observe a
greater leverage in SBOs than in PBOs (Achleitner & Figge (2014), De Maeseneire & Brinkhuis
(2012)), others do not find a significant difference (Arcot et al. (2015), Bonini (2015)). However,
the tendency of these studies’ findings is to increase the leverage rather than decreasing it. The
results may be traced back to the fact that the probability to engage in an SBO is significantly
higher when the underlying company possesses a great debt bearing capacity (Achleitner &
Figge (2014)). Apparently, GPs select their companies according to the ability to absorb the
forthcoming gearing.
Picking up on the theory about exploiting the value creation gap of a company, there are
several reasons why the full value creation could not have been completed during the PBO
(Achleitner & Figge (2014)). Firstly, the fund that incorporates the portfolio company has a
limited lifespan. When the end of the fund lifetime is about to be reached, GPs are forced to
sell the portfolio company early (Jenkinson & Sousa (2011)). Secondly, some GPs may not be
able to fully exploit the whole value due to missing knowledge and skills. Another GP with
complementary skill sets may be able to add further value by focusing on other parts of the value
creation (Wang (2012)). Degeorge et al. (2016) even find that complementary skill sets can
lead to an outperformance of SBOs compared to PBOs. These skill sets include specialisations
in industries, technologies and geographies (Rigamonti et al. (2016)) or advancements in the
different stages of the business cycle of the company (Jenkinson & Sousa (2011)). Lastly, when
GPs need to raise capital for new funds, they may wish to sell some portfolio companies to
realise the return on those investments (Jenkinson & Sousa (2011), Wang (2012)). The realised
performance can be used for marketing purposes in upcoming fund raisings. It may also happen
that there is less improvement potential left within this buyout round towards the end of the
holding period. Despite the above mentioned explanations of further value creation potentials,
Achleitner & Figge (2014) argue that most value drivers have already been implemented during
the PBO and, thus, only little additional value can be created during the SBO. Other research
finds that portfolio companies, in general, have better organisational structure compared to non
PE-backed companies (Jensen (1989)). This observation could imply that SBOs may perform
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just as well as PBOs as the company structure and the general PE-mindset are the base for
further value creation. Rappaport (1990), however, argues that the structural benefit is a one-
off effect and that the structure of the portfolio company should eventually turn back to its
former, non PE-backed form.
The findings, so far, show that the performance of SBOs tends to be worse compared to PBOs.
Most authors, such as Achleitner & Figge (2014), find an underperformance of SBOs relative
to the PBO performance. Degeorge et al. (2016) state that, generally, SBOs have low average
returns when potential targets are acquired with buying pressure. However, they also show
that without buying pressure SBOs are able to perform just as well as PBOs. Still, as buying
pressure is omnipresent, Axelson et al. (2013) show that GPs may be incentivised to invest into
lower performing portfolio companies to receive fees on the invested capital.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Explanation of the Sample
Many studies about SBOs face three essential problems regarding their datasets. First, the
number of observations is often very small. This feature is also in the nature of PE studies as the
number of deals is relatively low compared to other investment types. Also, the data availability
for those deals is quite limited as the companies are taken private and in many countries it is
not mandatory to publish the portfolio companies’ financial accounts. Furthermore, due to the
definition of SBOs, quite a long time period is necessary to analyse those deals. This restriction
significantly limits the availability of closed deals’ data within a specific period of time. As a
large number of SBOs have been executed recently, only few observations are analysed over
the last decades. Second, in order to solve the aforementioned problem of limited sample size,
many studies aim to include as many SBOs as possible and thereby creating a mismatch in the
data outline. These studies often compare and analyse very heterogeneous companies across
the two buyout rounds, making isolated regressions very difficult. Lastly, PE studies suffer a
lot from survivor bias when only public data providers are considered, since only successful
deals may be published. Companies, which have been liquidated or had a poor development
over the investment horizon, might not be listed in these data bases. As a result, PE-backed
companies often outperform non-PE backed companies according to these studies.
The underlying dataset of this paper focusses on the PE market in the UK. First of all, it is
assumed that the UK market is a good proxy for the overall PE industry of developed countries.
The PE market in the UK has the highest activity in Europe in terms of quantity of transactions
and deal volume, which in turn is the second most active continent after the North American
market (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2019)). More importantly, in the UK also private companies
need to publish their financial accounts regularly. This fact ensures a good level of detail for
the analyses of the financial and operative performance.
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In order to compile the initial list of companies that underwent at least one financial buyout,
I searched several data providers such as Capital IQ, Thomson Reuters Eikon, Prequin, and
Mergermarket for all PE transactions that were labelled financial buyout and secondary buyout.
To avoid the charge of an underlying selection bias in this sample, I further used non-public
data from a large fund to fund manager, which also include underperforming investments.
The analysed companies have their SBO entry earliest in 1996 because most data providers
started their search engine for PE transactions in 1996. The latest year for the transaction
date is 2017. Analysing the fundamental data of the underlying portfolio company, a sufficient
amount of time is required between the exit date and the time of the analysis for the company
to publish its accounts. Even after a very quick turnaround of the company, a company requires
at least one year to publish its results after the exit. Thus, the total initial list displays all
available transaction dates of financial buyouts in the UK from 1996 to 2017. Afterwards, all
financial buyouts other than SBOs were eliminated by individually looking at the timeline of
the transaction for these companies. This procedure is important as the analyses are based on
the direct difference between PBOs and the consecutive SBO rather than between two different
SBOs. I end up with the company names that underwent an SBO and the accompanying date
of the SBO entry, and, thereby, due to the construction of the dataset, the exit date of the
PBO. In the next steps, I collected the entry date of the PBO and the exit date of the SBO.
Therefore, I retrieved the list of PBO and SBO exits from the same data providers and matched
those lists with the initial existing list. However, for most observations at least one of the dates
was still missing. In case of missing dates, I hand-collected the dates from news reports, the
deal publication of the PE firms, and the portfolio companies’ website. Those companies for
which no clear PBO entry date or SBO exit date could be identified, have been eliminated from
the dataset.
After knowing the three transaction dates of the companies, I retrieved the fundamental data
for these companies at the time of the respective transaction. There are three sensible and
consistent ways on which financial statements can be chosen for the purposes of the analysis.
The first possibility is to capture the whole investment period, i.e. using fundamental data
from before the entry date and after the exit date. This method has the advantage of capturing
the whole treatment effect of the underlying buyout. However, if the time span between the
transaction date and the financial statement is too long, there might be some other, unwanted
non-treatment effects in the observations. Second, it is possible to capture less independent
effects of the treatment, i.e. using the financial statements after the entry date and before the
exit date. The problem with this method is that some quick adjustments may have already
happened and, thus, the development throughout the treatment cannot be observed. As an
example, the implementation of leverage happens at the beginning of the investment period, and
it is assumed that the leverage is reduced over the time of the investment period (Phalippou
& Gottschalg (2009)). Lastly, it is possible to choose the financial statements that are the
closest to the actual transaction date. This method allows to minimize the disadvantages of
the first two possibilities because the time difference between the financial statement and the
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
A
N
C
E
O
F
S
E
C
O
N
D
A
R
Y
B
U
Y
O
U
T
S
15
Table 2.1: Variable Overview
Name Description
Company Specific
Valuation Growth The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate in valuation.
Sales Growth The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate in sales.
Total Assets The portfolio company’s total assets including all fixed assets and current assets at the time of the respective transaction.
Equity Growth The portfolio company’s valuation compound annual growth rate.
Employees The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate in number of employees.
EBITDA Margin Growth The development of the EBITDA margin between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
EBIT Margin Growth The development of the EBIT margin between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
Profit Margin Growth The development of the profit margin between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
Return on Equity Growth The development of the return on equity between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
Return on equity is defined as profit over equity.
Return on Assets Growth The development of the return on assets between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
Return on assets is defined as EBITDA over total assets.
EBITDA Employees Ra-
tio Growth
The development of the EBITDA employees ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding
period. This variable is defined as the EBITDA over number of full-time employees.
Current Ratio Growth The development of the current ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
The current ratio is defined as receivables over current liabilities.
Cash Ratio Growth The development of the cash ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. The
cash ratio is defined as cash over current liabilities.
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Table 2.1 Variable Overview – continued from previous page
Name Description
Inventory Sales Ratio
Growth
The development of the inventory sales ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding
period. This variable is defined as stocks over sales.
Receivables Turnover Ra-
tio Growth
The development of the receivables turnover ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding
period. The receivables turnover ratio is defined as sales over debtors.
Working Capital Growth The development of the working capital ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding
period. The working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and current liabilities.
Leverage Ratio Growth The development of the leverage ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
The leverage ratio is defined as liabilities over equity.
Operative Leverage The development of the operative leverage ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding
period. The operative leverage ratio is defined as liabilities over EBITDA.
Deal-Specific
SBO Dummy Dummy variable that indicates whether the deal is a secondary buyout. Variable is equal to one when the underlying deal is a secondary
buyout.
Holding Period The time (in years) the investors holds the portfolio company during the first and second buyout, i.e. the time difference between the
first and second transaction date and the time difference between the second and third transaction date.
GICS Dummy Dummy variables that indicates the industry classification of the portfolio company. The classification is based on the 8-digit sub-
industry GICS code.
Holding Period The amount of time (in years) that the portfolio company is held in the fund’s portfolio.
Company Age The age (in years) of the portfolio company at time of the investment entry.
PE Firm Age The age (in years) of the financial sponsor at time of the investment entry.
Macroeconomic
Inflation Rate The annual inflation rate in the UK at time of the buyout entry.
Credit spreads The difference between the Moody’s BAA bond index and the UK government bond
Employment Rate The proportion of employed working people on the total number of working people at time of the buyout entry.
GDP Index The GDP index with 1996 indexed at 100.
Note: The table above presents all measures that are used in this study. All of those ratios are calculated for the portfolio companies during both PBO and SBO. The
excess developments are computed as the development difference to the close peer group. The table shows both company-specific data and deal-specific data.
CHAPTER 2. PERFORMANCE OF SECONDARY BUYOUTS 17
transaction date on average is smaller compared to the other methods. Hence, the average
treatment effect should be isolated in the best possible way and thus serves well for this study.
For that purpose, I checked the availability of financial statements for the years closest to the
three transaction dates. For many cases the balance sheet and profit and loss statement were
published, however, only in rare cases also the cash flow statement was available. Therefore,
I retrieved the full financial statements available and additional information on the number
of employees. Table 2.1 explains the variables that have been used and calculated in this
study. The final dataset consists of 295 portfolio companies, equalling 590 PE deals and 885
transactions with the financial and operative development during the buyouts.
2.3.2 Calculation of the Relevant Variables
This study compares and analyses the difference in performance measures between PBOs and
SBOs. For that purpose, performance needs to be defined. The term performance indicates
some form of development over a period of time of a specific operational or financial variable.
For that purpose, I calculate the change of the underlying performance measures considering the
time spent on achieving that change. The variables, for which both nominator and denominator
stay positive throughout the time of the observation, are calculated with the compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) measure,
CAGRi,t(X) = (
xi,t
xi,t−k
)1/k − 1 (2.1)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the holding period
of the investment.
In this study, I calculate the variables company value, sales, total assets, and number of employ-
ees with the CAGR. The measure company value was not retrieved but internally valued with a
valuation approach using trading multiples (for reference see Eschenro¨der & Hartmann-Wendels
(2019)).
The other category includes those variables that may be negative or positive during the buyout.
For those variables CAGR is not a sensible measurement as one cannot differentiate between a
negative and positive development. Thus, I calculate the annual average development as
Growthi,t(X) = (
xi,t − xi,t−k
t− k ) (2.2)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the holding period
of the investment.
This paper does not only investigate which buyout round generally performs better, but also
which buyout round performs better compared to its close peer group. In this way, the economic
environment can be included and interpreted as well. In order to capture the development of
the competition, the excess development of the underlying variables is calculated. Bonini (2015)
uses this approach as his base measurement of performance. In this paper, it rather acts as
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additional information and robustness check. The excess development is calculated as follows:
di,p = (xi −mp) (2.3)
where xi is the performance indicator x for company i and m being the median of the perfor-
mance indicator of peer group p.
The identification of the close peer group is, therefore, crucial to gain reasonable insights for
this measure. This means that every company is matched with non PE-backed companies that
share similar characteristics with the underlying portfolio company. The pool of potential peers
is retrieved from Compusstat database and includes only listed companies, as the performance
of these companies can be tracked well throughout time. All public companies are either from
the UK or the US for several reasons. The perfect peer for our UK sample should be from the
UK as well. However, when the number of close peers within the country of interest is limited,
a country with similar characteristics can improve the comparison by providing more potential
peers (Schreiner (2009)). Especially for large companies, it is hard to find a perfect fit and thus
the range of companies should be enlarged. For all those potential peers, the same fundamental
data are retrieved as it has been done for the sample companies. Like Guo et al. (2011), this
study applies a pre-performance matching, i.e. finding a peer group before the activity begins.
Due to the setup of this consecutive data set the matching is done twice, once before the PBO
and once before the SBO. I adjusted the peer group between the two buyout rounds, as in many
cases the investment period may take a long time and the peer group that was a good match
at the beginning of the PBO may not be a good comparison at the time of the SBO.
Out of the pool of potential peers, the five closest companies are identified. Unlike Barber &
Lyon (1996) who apply an industry-size-year matching, I include the company’s profitability
as well for two reasons: First, ceteris paribus a company should develop differently when it
operates at a very high profitability compared to a company that generates losses from year to
year. Second, as this study also analyses the development of profitability, the peer group should
have a similar starting point to enable good comparison. This approach is also suggested by
Bhojraj & Lee (2002). Thus, the peer group is listed in the same year as the entry year of
the buyout. As the performance is tracked throughout the holding period, the peer company
needs to be still listed in the year of the buyout’s exit. As proposed by Alford (1992), the
companies should have a similar size and, therefore, the total assets should not deviate by
more than 50 percent from the portfolio company. Profitability, measured as EBITDA over
total sales, should not deviate by more than 25 percent and should have the same sign. The
industry match is done based on GICS codes as they perform very well among the common
industry classifications (Bhojraj et al. (2003)). I follow the procedure of Alford (1992) to start
with the most detailed classification. If there are not enough matches, then the next level of
classification code is considered. If more than five matches have been identified, I select the five
peers with the smallest difference in size. Five peers seem to be a reasonable choice for a good
peer group size because it is seen as neither too small nor too large (Bhojraj & Lee (2002),
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Pereiro (2002), Schreiner (2009)).
After the identification of the closest five peers, the performance indicators are calculated like
it was done for the sample companies. For all performance measures the median of the peer
group is calculated to set the benchmark for comparative performance. The median provides
a smoothed performance development and is, therefore, a common choice for benchmarks.
Winsorisation is often used before the analyses to cope with potential outliers. After plotting
several developments, it was quite clear that several outliers exist in the dataset. Robust
regressions with MM-estimations showed deviations from the original regression, indicating
that there might be outliers that distort the results of the regression. For that purpose, I
followed Jenkinson & Sousa (2015) and applied a five percent winsorization level.
2.4 Performance Difference between PBOs and SBOs
2.4.1 Variable Selection
The empirical analysis uses various variables that measure operational and financial perfor-
mance. In this study, these variables are grouped into clusters that analyse a similar category
of performance. Using several clusters containing similar measures has mainly three reasons.
First, as the observed companies operate in different industries, it may be sensible to look at
several performance measures that are more suitable for certain industries. Second, the general
idea is to cluster several variables in order to explore trends rather than specific measures.
Third, these clusters provide further robustness to the underlying study.
The first cluster covers all these variables that pertain to company growth, i.e. they are prox-
ies for company expansion. The first variable is the growth of the company’s valuation. The
overall value development of a company is commonly referred to as a company’s performance.
Further, the development of all underlying variables ultimately determines the company value
and thus provides a good indication about overall performance of a company. For some pur-
poses, however, it might be interesting to go into more detail and thus analyse the drivers of a
certain development. The development of total sales, for example, is crucial to every company
for several reasons. Increasing sales represents a growing market and/or market share, both of
which might be beneficial to the company. I further analyse the development of equity because
it provides a less volatile view on the past performance than the profit and loss statement. To-
tal assets and the number of employees describe the resources of a company. Some companies
require a high degree of total assets, e.g. heavy machinery, whereas other companies are very
focussed on the labour activity, e.g. marketing agencies. For that purpose, I analyse these two
means of resources as they build the fundament of company growth.
The second cluster describes those variables that measure the profitability of a company. Gen-
erally, there are two categories. The first category belongs to those variables that explain the
operative earnings in relation to the achieved revenues, namely EBITDA margin, EBIT mar-
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gin, and profit margin. The other category describes those measures that show the operative
earnings in relation to the sales of the company. All three variables of the first cluster are
independent of the resources to reach the operative earnings. It foremost analyses how the
company manages its overall costs. The EBITDA margin is ideal for analysing the clear oper-
ating profitability without considering the effects of high depreciation and amortization. The
EBITDA per employee is meant to capture the profitability in relation to the required work-
force for companies that have a greater exposure to labour markets. The EBIT margin further
includes a deduction of depreciation and amortization to assess the amount of assets that were
necessary to reach that certain earnings. Especially when looking at different industries, e.g.
asset based industry and service providers, it may be interesting to look at both measures to
provide a better comparability according to the importance of depreciation and amortization
to the operations of a business. Lastly, it is necessary to look at the profit margin, as this
measure also incorporates the interests and taxes. Whereas it is assumed that there are only
limited possibilities to change the effective tax rate, PE investments often go along with high
leverage and, thus, the interest payments should be considered for a comprehensive study of its
overall performance. In contrast, the measures for return on assets and return on equity are
also necessary to analyse because they put the achieved earnings in relation to the company’s
size. These variables provide a different perspective as balance sheet items generally are less
volatile than positions in the profit and loss accounts. Thereby, it is crucial to differentiate
between equity returns and assets returns because financial engineering may drastically inflate
the total assets.
In the third cluster, I analyse other variables that are operatively relevant but have a rather
indirect effect. The current ratio and the working capital both describe the relation of current
assets to current liabilities. Whereas the current ratio describes the proportion of current assets
to current liabilities, the working capital ratio describes the difference between current assets
and current liabilities in relation to its total assets. These liquidity ratios demonstrate the short
term ability to meet obligations and thus are relevant for the risk perception of a company.
The cash ratio may also be relevant for high risk investments as it conservatively calculates the
ability to directly repay short term obligations with cash and cash equivalents. The inventory
sales ratio describes the efficiency of a company to sell off its inventory. Reducing the necessary
average inventory for achieving a certain sales number should usually lead to a cost reduction
and consequently to an improved profitability. The receivables turnover ratio is analysed to
further understand how effectively the company is able to collect the receivables outstanding
and turning it into sales. This is ultimately important when considering cash flow generation
for portfolio companies.
The last cluster covers the measures for leverage. Applying financial engineering is one of the
key components of PE value creation and thus needs to be analysed. Firstly, profitability may be
increased due to tax shields. Secondly, the return on equity to investors may be improved. For
these reasons, I analyse both the financial and the operative leverage, i.e. both the proportion
of liabilities to equity and the proportion of liabilities to operative earnings, respectively. To
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Table 2.2: Cross Correlation Table
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Valuation CAGR 1.000
(2) Sales CAGR 0.205 1.000
(3) Total Assets CAGR 0.080 0.220 1.000
(4) Equity Growth 0.024 -0.145 -0.240 1.000
(5) EBITDA Growth 0.103 0.511 -0.071 0.115 1.000
(6) Profit Growth 0.092 0.287 -0.136 0.186 0.895 1.000
(7) Current Ratio Growth 0.014 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 1.000
(8) Cash Ratio Growth -0.001 -0.062 -0.092 0.012 0.041 0.048 0.008 1.000
(9) Inventory Sales Growth -0.304 -0.402 0.034 -0.002 -0.205 -0.211 0.001 -0.008 1.000
(10) Receivables Turnover Growth 0.015 0.626 -0.086 -0.001 0.812 0.664 -0.002 0.051 -0.042 1.000
(11) Working Capital Growth -0.014 0.060 0.023 0.009 0.045 0.037 0.044 0.353 -0.019 0.006 1.000
(12) Leverage Growth 0.003 -0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.009 0.002 -0.004 0.002 1.000
(13) Operative Leverage Growth -0.047 -0.259 0.055 -0.406 0.038 0.107 -0.001 0.048 0.006 -0.041 -0.044 -0.025 1.000
(14) log(Total Assets) -0.022 -0.084 -0.288 0.101 -0.067 0.003 -0.013 0.080 -0.027 -0.049 -0.002 0.070 -0.056 1.000
(15) log(Holding Period) -0.115 -0.134 -0.212 0.074 0.000 0.012 -0.019 0.173 0.030 -0.022 0.176 0.000 0.011 -0.050 1.000
(16) log (Company Age) 0.030 -0.064 -0.107 0.017 0.014 0.039 0.021 -0.013 0.002 0.049 -0.079 -0.013 -0.005 0.138 -0.088 1.000
(17) log(PE Firm Age) -0.085 -0.039 -0.058 0.030 0.039 0.036 -0.069 -0.027 0.050 0.024 -0.038 -0.017 -0.007 0.112 0.006 0.018 1.000
Note: The table above shows the correlations of all relevant variables used in this study. Most of the correlations are not relevant to this study as most of the variables
are not in the same regression at the same time. The relevant correlations do not raise concern about multicollinearity.
22 CHAPTER 2. PERFORMANCE OF SECONDARY BUYOUTS
further check the robustness, I analyse the net of cash measures for both financial and operative
leverage. Multicollinearity for all observed data should not be an issue as can be inferred from
the correlation matrix in Table 2.2. Also, the variance inflation factors do not signal any
concern.
2.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.3 shows the results of the summary statistics for the final dataset of 590 buyouts
and provides first insights into the underlying data sample. The statistics are split into three
categories. Firstly, the full sample is displayed. Afterwards, I present the data of PBOs and
SBOs individually. In order to recognize initial performance differences between the PBO and
SBO, Wilcoxon ranksum test and nonparametric equality-of-medians tests are performed. The
first part of the table shows the investment characteristics about the buyouts themselves. The
second part of the table illustrates the development of the chosen variables over the holding
period of the buyout.
The portfolio companies are held approximately 54 months on average, which is in line with
Achleitner & Figge (2014). Interestingly, neither the mean nor the median holding period are
significantly different among PBO and SBO, indicating that the structure and process of the
two buyout rounds is quite similar after all. Per definition of the dataset, the investment year
and the company age at the time of the investment are significantly different from each other,
as the consecutive SBO will occur later than the PBO. More importantly, the mean and median
of the investment year are both around 2007 and 2008, which means that quite a lot of deals
may have taken place around the financial crisis, arguably the roughest time within this sample
for PE activity. The average company age is with about 28 year quite mature, however, the
high standard deviation clearly shows that the buyouts in this sample do not necessarily target
a specific company age. The financial sponsor’s age does not differ significantly across buyout
rounds, however, with a slightly higher mean and median for PBOs.
In terms of performance, a lot of variables are significantly different among PBOs and SBOs.
For those variables that explain the expansion of a company, the growth of valuation, sales,
and total assets are significantly higher in PBOs than in SBOs. The other variables in this
cluster are not significantly different across buyout rounds. In terms of the development of
profitability, the first insights indicate that PBOs are able to improve the profitability better
than the consecutive SBOs because four out of six possible measures are significantly greater for
PBOs. Lastly, the financial leverage is not significantly different between the buyout rounds,
only operative leverage seems to be different. Generally spoken, it seems that, if there is a
significant difference in performance, PBOs perform better than SBOs.
2.4.3 Methodology
This study is based on the performance analysis of consecutive deals of the same portfolio
company. Due to that setup, the underlying dataset is arranged as panel data and, thus,
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Total PBO SBO
Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs
Panel A: Information at Buyout Entry
Years Held 4.10 2.55 4 590 4.06 2.44 4 295 4.15 2.65 4 295
Start Year 2005.30 4.34 2005.50 590 2003.05 3.71 2003 295 2007.55*** 3.73 2007*** 295
PE Firm Age 25.74 32.11 19 590 28.41 36.52 20 295 23.06 26.80 18 295
Company Age 27.69 34.24 17 590 25.48 34.28 15 295 29.90*** 34.10 20*** 295
Total Assets 94496 346381 26967 590 65561 145865 19987 295 123432 466274 36442 295
Panel B: Information about Growth during Buyout
Valuation 1.23 0.46 1.17 590 1.24 0.48 1.17 295 1.23 0.45 1.15 295
Sales 1.18 0.24 1.11 590 1.23 0.26 1.16 295 1.14*** 1.14 1.09*** 295
Total Assets 1.18 0.23 1.13 589 1.22 0.25 1.18 295 1.13*** 0.20 1.09*** 294
Equity Asset Ratio 0.11 0.18 0.06 590 0.12 0.18 0.07 295 0.95 0.17 0.06 295
Employees 1.10 0.18 1.06 539 1.12 0.19 1.07 265 1.09 0.16 1.05 274
EBITDA Margin 0.05 0.12 0.02 589 0.08 0.13 0.03 295 0.03*** 0.10 0.01*** 294
EBIT Margin 0.04 0.10 0.01 590 0.06 0.11 0.02 295 0.02*** 0.09 0.01*** 295
Profit Margin 0.05 0.11 0.01 590 0.06 0.12 0.02 295 0.03*** 0.11 0.01*** 295
Return on Equity - 0.19 0.30 - 0.01 588 - 0.00 0.29 0.00 294 - 0.03 0.31 - 0.01 294
Return on Assets - 0.00 0.06 - 0.00 589 0.00 0.05 0.00 295 - 0.01 0.06 - 0.00 294
EBITDA/ Employ-
ees
1.59 9.16 0.40 538 2.81 9.05 1.27 265 0.41*** 9.12 - 0.02*** 273
Current Ratio 0.08 0.39 0.03 589 0.08 0.37 0.35 295 0.08 0.41 0.02 294
Cash Ratio - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 589 - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 294 - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 295
Inventory Sales Ra-
tio
- 0.00 0.01 - 0.00 590 - 0.00 0.01 0.00 295 - 0.00 0.01 0.00 295
Receivables
Turnover
- 0.29 1.32 - 0.05 584 - 0.38 1.38 - 0.13 294 - 0.20 1.25 - 0.06* 290
Working Capital - 0.05 0.10 - 0.03 589 - 0.04 0.10 - 0.02 295 -0.07*** 0.11 - 0.04*** 294
Leverage Ratio 2.62 32.33 - 0.059 590 3.49 37.08 - 0.07 295 1.76 26.79 - 0.05 295
Net Leverage Ratio 2.36 28.56 - 0.024 590 3.26 33.48 - 0.04 295 1.46 22.62 - 0.02 295
Operative Leverage - 5.04 77.75 - 0.09 589 4.08 68.58 - 0.11 295 - 14.20 85.12 - 0.08 294
Net Operative
Leverage
- 5.13 75.84 - 0.06 589 3.72 66.47 - 0.06 295 - 14.02 83.38 - 0.06 294
Note: The table above presents the summary statistics of 295 companies with their development during the PBO and the consecutive SBO. The summary statistics
shows the data distribution of the whole dataset, and the PBO and SBO, seperately. It also presents the difference for all analysed variables between the PBO and
SBO, measured by Wilcoxon ranksum and non-parametric median tests. The significance levels for the mean difference and median difference test between PBO and
SBO are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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a panel regression model is used. This may be advantageous as unobserved effects may be
explained to a greater degree. The model is defined as follows.
yit = α + β ∗Xit +  (2.4)
where α is the y-intercept, β is the coefficient of the firm-specific variable X for firm i at trans-
action date t.  is the error term of the regression.
I use a random-effects model as the Hausman-test yields statistically indifferent estimates on
the 10 percent level (Hausman (1978)). The modified Wald test suggests heteroskedasticity in
the regression models. Thus, in order to counteract potential heteroscedasticity, I use robust
Huber-White-sandwich estimates of variance.
For all clusters of target variables, the same independent variables are used. The only variable
of interest is the SBO dummy variable. This variable identifies the difference in the performance
measure between PBO and SBO. Total assets are used to control for the company size. Similarly,
the company age is included in the regression to control for the advancement of the business
cycle. Further, I include the holding period as all measures in this study are expressed as
developments over time. The PE firm age is used to express the degree of experience that the
involved financial sponsor brings with the investment. Controlling for leverage ratio is rather
important in leveraged buyouts as the leverage at entry of the investment indicates the debt
bearing capacity and, thus, the opportunities of the underlying investment. The GDP index,
the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and credit spreads account for the macroeconomic
environment. Lastly, I control for time and industry effects.
2.4.4 Results
Table 2.4 reports the results of the random-effects regression analysis for all those variables
that represent company expansion. The specifications (1) to (5) use the dependent variables
company value CAGR, sales CAGR, total assets CAGR, equity growth, and employees CAGR.
The specifications (6) to (10) use the same variables but computed as an excess measurement
compared to its peer group of public companies. Out of the mentioned six dependent variables,
two are significant, namely sales CAGR and total asset CAGR. Both specifications have a
negative coefficient for the SBO dummy, showing that SBOs have a significantly lower sales
growth and total assets growth over the investment horizon. The same is true for the equivalent
excess measures. PE firms may not wish to increase total assets any further during the SBO
as they may try to use the high level of assets more efficiently. Further, the expansive sales
strategy cannot be continued for the second buyout round as the momentum may be gone or
the short-term potential has been used up (Acharya et al. (2012)).
Table 2.5 reports the results of the random-effects regression analyses for those variables that
represent the change in profitability and efficiency of the portfolio companies. The specifications
(1) to (6) use the change in EBITDA margin, EBIT margin, profit margin, return on equity,
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Table 2.4: Development of Growth Variables
Normal Excess
Valuation Sales Total As-
sets
Equity Employees Valuation Sales Total As-
sets
Equity Employees
SBO -0.035 -0.053* -0.062** -0.019 -0.014 -0.042 -0.069** -0.078*** -0.012 -0.015
(0.45) (0.02) (0.00) (0.27) (0.42) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.46)
log(Total Assets) -0.031* -0.035*** -0.060*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.028* -0.030*** -0.053*** -0.031*** -0.020***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Holding Period) -0.095** -0.101*** -0.068*** 0.014 -0.041*** -0.056 -0.085*** -0.054*** 0.018 -0.024
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.07)
log(Company Age) -0.034 -0.042*** -0.024* -0.003 -0.031*** -0.020 -0.042*** -0.029** -0.007 -0.031***
(0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.64) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00)
log(PE Firm Age) -0.020 -0.009 0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.024 -0.010 0.009 0.007 -0.007
(0.23) (0.28) (0.37) (0.30) (0.46) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.36)
Leverage Ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.18) (0.62) (0.67) (0.97) (0.69) (0.68) (0.96) (0.31) (0.94) (0.82)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 1.744*** 1.904*** 1.897*** 0.384*** 1.563*** 0.611** 0.800*** 0.789*** 0.279** 0.483***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Overall R2 0.107 0.230 0.239 0.146 0.158 0.098 0.213 0.206 0.143 0.125
N 590 590 590 590 539 590 590 590 590 539
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications show the different measures representing the development of the portfolio
company’s growth variables. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1%
and *5%.
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Table 2.5: Development of Profitability Measurements
Normal Excess
EBITDA
Margin
EBIT
Margin
Profit
Margin
RoE RoA EBITDA/
Employee
EBITDA
Margin
EBIT
Margin
Profit
Margin
RoE RoA EBITDA/
Employee
SBO -0.047*** -0.030** -0.027* -0.047 -0.006 -2.791** -0.047*** -0.029** -0.026* -0.059 -0.008 -2.709*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.13) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.18) (0.03)
log(Total Assets) -0.008* -0.008** -0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.060 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.035
(0.01) (0.00) (0.29) (0.82) (0.94) (0.83) (0.19) (0.12) (0.95) (0.60) (0.88) (0.92)
log(Holding Period) -0.015 -0.014* -0.010 0.015 0.002 -0.635 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 0.022 0.003 0.824
(0.06) (0.03) (0.19) (0.47) (0.60) (0.32) (0.56) (0.32) (0.81) (0.30) (0.38) (0.33)
log(Company Age) -0.017*** -0.012** -0.012* -0.004 0.000 -0.401 -0.016*** -0.010** -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.180
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.76) (0.92) (0.28) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.86) (0.73) (0.71)
log(PE Firm Age) -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.016 -0.001 -0.281 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.016 -0.002 -0.025
(0.29) (0.54) (0.52) (0.15) (0.50) (0.42) (0.39) (0.62) (0.75) (0.15) (0.41) (0.96)
Leverage Ratio -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.001
(0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.35) (0.05) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.30) (0.12)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.267*** 0.260*** 0.174** -0.191 0.008 6.471 0.160** 0.173*** 0.097 -0.194 0.008 -5.193
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.78) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.18) (0.76) (0.39)
Overall R2 0.178 0.164 0.118 0.055 0.064 0.088 0.159 0.146 0.102 0.058 0.071 0.073
N 590 590 590 588 589 538 590 590 590 588 589 538
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications show the different measures representing the profitability development
of the portfolio company. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and
*5%.
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return on assets, and EBITDA per employee as dependent variables. The specifications (7) to
(12) inherit the same dependent variables as in the previous specifications, again measured as
the excess development compared to its peer group. Out of the aforementioned six variables four
have significant coefficients, namely the development of the EBITDA margin, the EBIT margin,
the profit margin, and the EBITDA per employee. The significance is given for both the normal
and the excess measures. The first three variables are all earnings figures in comparison to the
realised sales. All of these variables are significant and negative. The SBO dummy’s coefficient
becomes smaller from the EBITDA margin development over the EBIT margin development
to the profit margin development. Firstly, these results show that the companies’ profitability
clearly develops better during the PBO than during the SBO. Secondly, the effect decreases
the less emphasis is put on operational costs. This insight shows that PBO investors seem
to concentrate on the reduction of operational costs more than SBO investors. As expected,
depreciation and amortization will increase more strongly during the PBO as the total assets
CAGR is also significantly higher during the PBO, thus reducing the difference in EBIT margin
between PBO and SBO. The development in profit margin during SBOs is not as strong as
during PBOs, indicating that PBO investors may experience higher interests due to possibly
greater leverage or SBOs may not necessarily be better at reducing their effective tax rate.
Lastly, the development of EBITDA per employee is worse during the SBO than during the
PBO. This result should be driven mainly from the greater EBITDA development rather than
through reduction of employees as the coefficient of employee CAGR among buyouts is not
significant.
Table 2.6 represents other operational measurements that may have an indirect effect on the
profitability and efficiency measures of a firm. The specifications (1) to (5) use the change in
current ratio, cash ratio, inventory sales ratio, receivables turnover ratio, and working capital
as dependent variables. The specifications (6) to (10) use the same dependent variables as in
the previous specifications, measured as excess ratios compared to its peer group. In these
specfications, none of the SBO coefficients are significant.
Table 2.7 shows the results for all regressions that are related to leverage. The specifications
(1) to (4) show the regressions with leverage ratio, net leverage ratio, operative leverage ratio,
and net operative leverage ratio as dependent variables, respectively. The specifications (5)
to (8) use the same variables as the previous specifications as dependent variables, this time
excess measures compared to the close peer group are used. Out of the four coefficients, the
net operative leverage ratio is significant and negative. SBOs experience a slighter growth in
net debt in relation to its operative earnings. Although the EBITDA development in SBOs
is weaker than in PBOs, as can be inferred from the previous analysis, SBOs seem to need
less debt for achieving certain operative earnings. They perform better at cash conversion, as
can be inferred by the significant difference between the operative leverage ratio and the net
operative leverage ratio.
Overall, SBOs underperform in several measures with respect to expansion, profitability, and
operative leverage compared to PBOs. Although there are also other measures with insignificant
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Table 2.6: Development of Operational Measurements
Normal Excess
Current
Ratio
Cash Ra-
tio
Inventory
Sales
Ratio
Receivables
Turnover
Working
Capital
Current
Ratio
Cash Ra-
tio
Inventory
Sales
Ratio
Receivables
Turnover
Working
Capital
SBO 0.021 -0.004 -0.000 0.156 -0.016 0.048 -0.002 -0.001 0.072 -0.018*
(0.61) (0.77) (0.71) (0.25) (0.07) (0.30) (0.93) (0.41) (0.68) (0.07)
Log(Total Assets) -0.006 0.011** 0.000 0.075 0.007* 0.008 0.015** -0.000 0.143** 0.013***
(0.57) (0.01) (0.65) (0.05) (0.03) (0.56) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Holding Period) 0.017 0.054*** 0.000 0.046 0.045*** 0.027 0.061*** 0.000 0.076 0.049***
(0.54) (0.00) (0.64) (0.61) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.71) (0.51) (0.00)
log(Company Age) 0.016 0.003 0.000 -0.026 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.055 -0.006
(0.32) (0.64) (0.81) (0.62) (0.18) (1.00) (0.76) (0.77) (0.42) (0.17)
log(PE Firm Age) 0.013 -0.002 0.001 -0.059 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.076 -0.001
(0.36) (0.65) (0.09) (0.23) (0.88) (0.20) (0.43) (0.37) (0.23) (0.72)
Leverage Ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.91) (0.86) (0.82) (0.98) (0.80) (0.67) (0.84) (0.87) (0.92) (0.80)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.101 -0.262*** -0.012* -0.392 -0.198*** -0.224 -0.319*** -0.016* -0.806 -0.286***
(0.59) (0.00) (0.01) (0.53) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.02) (0.31) (0.00)
Overall R2 0.046 0.131 0.063 0.060 0.162 0.054 0.117 0.065 0.074 0.153
N 589 589 590 584 589 589 589 590 584 589
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications show the different measures representing the developments of the
operational measurements of the portfolio company. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications
are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Table 2.7: Development of Leverage Variables
Normal Excess
Leverage
Ratio
Net Lever-
age Ratio
Operative
Leverage
Net Lever-
age Ratio
Leverage
Ratio
Net Lever-
age Ratio
Operative
Leverage
Net Lever-
age Ratio
SBO -0.571 -0.624 -1.463 -1.562* -0.608 -0.662 -1.450 -1.537
(0.23) (0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10)
log(Total Assets) 0.088 0.065 0.092 0.059 0.134 0.108 0.127 0.048
(0.51) (0.61) (0.68) (0.77) (0.33) (0.42) (0.63) (0.85)
log(Holding Period) -0.270 -0.318 -0.863 -0.487 -0.244 -0.283 -1.344* -0.434
(0.40) (0.31) (0.10) (0.31) (0.46) (0.38) (0.03) (0.48)
log(Company Age) 0.173 0.180 -0.189 -0.154 0.193 0.202 -0.056 0.016
(0.34) (0.31) (0.53) (0.58) (0.31) (0.27) (0.88) (0.96)
log(PE Firm Age) -0.113 -0.107 0.046 0.040 -0.169 -0.152 0.151 0.187
(0.51) (0.52) (0.87) (0.88) (0.34) (0.38) (0.66) (0.57)
Leverage Ratio -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.114 -0.686 -0.560 -0.410 -1.415 -1.053 -0.893 -1.273
(0.61) (0.75) (0.88) (0.90) (0.53) (0.63) (0.84) (0.76)
Overall R2 0.079 0.080 0.062 0.065 0.079 0.080 0.062 0.072
N 590 590 589 589 590 590 589 589
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications show the different measures representing the leverage development of the
underlying portfolio company. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1%
and *5%.
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coefficients, SBOs generally have the tendency to underperform rather than to outperform
compared to PBOs.
2.4.5 Size Effect
In order to test for potential size effects, I perform subsampling according to the total assets
of the portfolio company, i.e. differentiating among small, medium-sized, and large corpo-
rates. The small subsample consists of the smallest 25 percent, the medium-sized companies
are between the 25th and 75th percentile, and the subsample of large companies consists of
the remaining top 25th percentile of total assets. I choose these cut-off points as there is a
clearer distinction between small and big companies compared to subsamples with an equal
distribution. In absolute terms, the first subsample consists of all companies that have total
assets below 9.899 million GBP. The second subsample inherits all those companies that have
total assets between 9.899 million GBP and 63.027 million GBP. Large companies are those
observations whose total assets are above 63.027 million GBP. Per construction of the dataset,
most likely the analysed PBOs are smaller than the subsequent SBOs, as the total assets should
increase on average along the time during the observation period.
Table 2.8 shows the results of the regression using size subsampling. First, the difference in
expansion performance between PBO and SBO is mostly observed for small and medium-sized
companies. These results are very similar for both the normal and the excess measurement. As
the business life cycle suggests, smaller and developing companies firstly need to expand and
generate revenues, thus reaching a certain market share. Not surprisingly, PBOs then perform
better for small companies as, most likely, they have more experience on how to handle early
company growth. Assuming a general company growth during a buyout, as can be inferred from
the summary statistics, a portfolio company will grow during the PBO so much that it will not
belong anymore to the small company group by the time of the SBO. If the company is still
considered small, it probably is relatively hard to expand the business, which is resembled by
the missing expansion during the PBO. Therefore, PE firms that invest in small companies via
an SBO may run the risk of picking a bad company if total asset growth is considered as a good
performance indicator. Interestingly, also after the expansion PBO investors perform better
at turning the portfolio company into profitable and efficient operations. This insight may be
inferred from the profitability analysis as the significant underperformance of SBOs for medium-
sized companies conforms to the results of the full sample regression. First, the subsample size
is the largest and is, thus, the most representative part of the full sample. Second, and more
importantly, the companies may move into the next stage of the business life cycle and, thus,
companies need to be turned into profitable operations and generate greater cash flows. For
the same reason, as for small companies, PBO investors may have a superior experience and
thus perform better. Interestingly, SBO investors are able to develop the number of employees
more strongly in large companies than PBO investors. In accordance with this finding the
development of EBITDA per employee is significantly worse during the SBO than during the
PBO.
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Table 2.8: SBO Coefficients of Size Subsampling
Normal Excess
Full Sam-
ple
1 2 3 Full Sam-
ple
1 2 3
Valuation -0.035 -0.156 -0.077 0.083 -0.042 -0.175 -0.104 0.130
(0.45) (0.11) (0.27) (0.42) (0.40) (0.10) (0.16) (0.24)
Sales -0.053* -0.103* -0.087** 0.097 -0.069** -0.116* -0.101** 0.088
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.10)
Total Assets -0.062** -0.116* -0.058* 0.049 -0.078*** -0.142** -0.070* 0.023
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.29) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.67)
Equity -0.019 -0.096* 0.009 0.022 -0.012 -0.112* 0.019 0.034
(0.27) (0.02) (0.73) (0.48) (0.49) (0.01) (0.47) (0.32)
Employees -0.014 0.005 -0.035 0.103* -0.015 -0.016 -0.029 0.094
(0.42) (0.90) (0.14) (0.01) (0.46) (0.72) (0.28) (0.05)
EBITDA margin -0.047*** -0.045 -0.059*** -0.031 -0.047*** -0.041 -0.061*** -0.023
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.43)
EBIT margin -0.030** -0.037 -0.040** 0.011 -0.029** -0.032 -0.039** 0.019
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.39)
Profit margin -0.027* -0.038 -0.041** 0.002 -0.026* -0.040 -0.037* 0.010
(0.02) (0.15) (0.00) (0.94) (0.03) (0.17) (0.01) (0.74)
Return on Equity -0.047 0.069 -0.043 -0.140 -0.059 0.076 -0.065 -0.142
(0.13) (0.29) (0.27) (0.11) (0.06) (0.26) (0.11) (0.10)
Return on Assets -0.006 0.017 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 0.017 -0.017* -0.015
(0.32) (0.25) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.04) (0.16)
EBITDA/ Employee -2.791** -1.746 -1.760 -6.737** -2.709* 0.038 -2.555 -7.794*
(0.00) (0.35) (0.22) (0.01) (0.03) (0.99) (0.17) (0.01)
Current Ratio 0.021 -0.100 0.097 -0.075 0.048 -0.048 0.084 0.003
(0.61) (0.21) (0.11) (0.43) (0.30) (0.60) (0.23) (0.98)
Cash Ratio -0.004 0.048 -0.022 -0.020 -0.002 0.054 -0.033 -0.007
(0.77) (0.11) (0.24) (0.47) (0.93) (0.17) (0.19) (0.85)
Inventory Sales Ratio -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.71) (0.76) (0.15) (0.53) (0.41) (0.31) (0.59) (0.39)
Receivables Turnover Ratio 0.156 0.636* -0.171 0.179 0.072 0.179 -0.060 0.094
(0.25) (0.04) (0.40) (0.55) (0.68) (0.63) (0.82) (0.80)
Working Capital -0.016 -0.004 -0.021 -0.033 -0.018 -0.013 -0.022 -0.037
(0.07) (0.81) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.58) (0.14) (0.06)
Leverage -0.571 -0.896 -0.676 0.447 -0.608 -0.507 -0.769 0.226
(0.23) (0.17) (0.24) (0.76) (0.22) (0.46) (0.20) (0.88)
Net Leverage -0.624 -1.011 -0.710 0.335 -0.662 -0.681 -0.790 0.112
(0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.82) (0.17) (0.34) (0.16) (0.94)
Operative Leverage -1.463 1.581 -1.567 -3.973 -1.450 1.196 -1.413 -3.576
(0.06) (0.22) (0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.42) (0.30) (0.19)
Net Operative Leverage -1.562* 0.944 -1.326 -3.853 -1.537 0.960 -1.013 -3.981
(0.03) (0.42) (0.20) (0.06) (0.10) (0.52) (0.44) (0.13)
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the SBO coefficient of the panel regressions. The various speci-
fications show the different measures representing all analysed variables with respect to the full sample and its
subsamples. Specification 1 considers the smallest 25 percent in terms of total assets. Specifcation 2 considers
the 25th to 75th size percentile. The third specification considers the largest 25 percent of this sample. Sub-
sampling is done for the normal measure and the excess development. The estimates shown in this table are
the coefficients of the SBO dummy. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients.
The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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2.4.6 SBO Improvement over Time
The results of the base regressions and the intial robustness checks still do not fully explain
the popularity of SBOs. Either the performance is not statistically different or PBOs perform
significantly better than SBOs. Although, all the analyses account for time effects, there might
be a change in the performance of SBO investors over time. By construction of the consecutive
deal structure, SBOs are more likely to occur after the financial crisis than PBOs. For that
reason, it is possible that the SBO coefficients may be biased by a better PE market environment
before the financial crisis. Therefore, I perform time subsampling leading to regressions with
subsamples both before the financial crisis and after the financial crisis. Whereas the first
subsample considers all buyouts with an entry before 2008, the second subsample considers all
buyouts with an entry in or after 2008. The first subsample consist of about two thirds of the
total sample.
Table 2.9 shows the results for the time subsampling regressions. The post crisis subsample
does not experience any significant coefficients, whereas the coefficients of the pre-financial crisis
regression perfectly coincide with the coefficients of the full sample regression. These results
show that the significance of the full sample results is strongly driven by the observations that
happened before the financial crisis. This is partly due to the fact that a higher proportion
of buyout entries is done before the financial crisis. However, as can be seen by the slightly
stronger coefficients for the pre-crisis subsample compared to the full sample, it is reasonable
to say that the performance difference between PBO and SBO has diminished over time. To
back up this finding, it is even possible to recognise a slight outperformance of SBOs compared
to PBOs, though not being statistically significant. Assuming different value drivers across
PBOs and SBOs (Eschenro¨der & Hartmann-Wendels (2019)), PE firms first need to understand
the new value drivers to exploit the full value creation. Thus, PE firms surely developed
a better know-how to handle SBOs over time and could, therefore, reduce the difference in
performance between PBO and SBO. Once GPs are more familiar with the process of SBOs
and the possibilities on how to handle the investments with a foregoing buyout round, they
may on average perform as well with SBOs as they do with PBOs if not better. At least from
a performance perspective, this finding may partially explain why SBOs became increasingly
popular over time. Especially, when considering lower screening and transaction costs, the
return on SBOs may be significantly higher compared to PBOs.
2.4.7 Robustness Checks
The initial regressions used Huber-White-sandwich estimates of variance in order to prevent
the regression to suffer from heteroscedasticity. To further prove the robustness of the results,
I rerun the same initial regressions with conventional variance estimators. The results of these
regressions confirm the previous findings.
Winsorizing is not only used to treat the initial data set but also as a method to further test
the robustness of the results. For that purpose, I repeat the regressions with winsorization
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Table 2.9: SBO Coefficients of Time Subsampling
Normal Excess
Full Sample 1 2 Full Sample 1 2
Valuation -0.035 -0.052 0.082 -0.042 -0.056 0.069
(0.45) (0.28) (0.59) (0.40) (0.28) (0.68)
Sales -0.053* -0.055* -0.058 -0.069** -0.072** -0.054
(0.02) (0.02) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49)
Total Assets -0.062** -0.074*** 0.072 -0.078*** -0.090*** 0.048
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50)
Equity -0.019 -0.027 0.058 -0.012 -0.020 0.032
(0.27) (0.11) (0.34) (0.49) (0.28) (0.62)
Employees -0.014 -0.010 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 0.011
(0.42) (0.59) (0.77) (0.46) (0.48) (0.87)
EBITDA margin -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.021 -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.041
(0.00) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31)
EBIT margin -0.030** -0.036*** 0.004 -0.029** -0.034** -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90)
Profit margin -0.027* -0.033** 0.003 -0.026* -0.033** -0.012
(0.02) (0.00) (0.93) (0.03) (0.01) (0.76)
Return on Equity -0.047 -0.058 -0.018 -0.059 -0.075* 0.004
(0.13) (0.07) (0.86) (0.06) (0.02) (0.97)
Return on Assets -0.006 -0.009 0.017 -0.008 -0.011 0.019
(0.32) (0.15) (0.40) (0.18) (0.06) (0.34)
EBITDA EMPLOY -2.791** -3.178** -0.050 -2.709* -3.189* -3.436
(0.00) (0.00) (0.98) (0.03) (0.02) (0.38)
Current Ratio 0.021 0.017 0.030 0.048 0.049 0.036
(0.61) (0.67) (0.85) (0.30) (0.31) (0.83)
Cash Ratio -0.004 -0.000 -0.029 -0.002 0.005 -0.038
(0.77) (0.99) (0.55) (0.93) (0.79) (0.53)
Inventory Sales Ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.006
(0.71) (0.76) (0.38) (0.41) (0.29) (0.18)
Receivables Turnover Ratio 0.156 0.185 -0.103 0.072 0.132 -0.551
(0.25) (0.20) (0.82) (0.68) (0.47) (0.35)
Working Capital -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.028
(0.07) (0.10) (0.57) (0.07) (0.14) (0.42)
Leverage -0.571 -0.344 -2.102 -0.608 -0.369 -2.119
(0.23) (0.50) (0.12) (0.22) (0.49) (0.14)
Net leverage -0.624 -0.416 -2.001 -0.662 -0.450 -1.960
(0.18) (0.41) (0.12) (0.17) (0.39) (0.15)
Operative Leverage -1.463 -1.643 -1.290 -1.450 -1.787 -0.313
(0.06) (0.05) (0.60) (0.13) (0.07) (0.92)
Net Operative Leverage -1.562* -1.675* -1.567 -1.537 -2.002* 0.981
(0.03) (0.03) (0.49) (0.10) (0.04) (0.76)
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the SBO coefficient of the panel regressions. The various spec-
ifications show the different measures representing all analysed variables with respect to the full sample and
its subsamples. Specification 1 considers all buyouts that occured before the financial crisis. Specifcation 2
considers all buyouts that happened after the financial crisis. Subsampling is done for the normal measure and
the excess development. The estimates shown in this table are the coefficients of the SBO dummy. The p-values
are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are
***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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levels at the 10th and 90th percentile and the 20th and the 80th percentile, respectively. The
significance of the coefficients stays more or less the same and thus the dataset seems to provide
a robust basis for analysis. When using these strong winsorization levels, I get similar results.
When analysing datasets, and especially smaller datasets, it is questionable how to treat out-
liers. Throughout the analyses, different levels of winsorization are used to move away from
arbitrary data adjustment. However, most of the used methods do not incorporate rational
thresholds on how to determine sensible cut-off points for outlier treatment. In terms of rec-
ognizing outliers and giving them less weight, robust regressions are superior to traditional
regressions. Thus, as another robustness check for the winsorization level, I rerun the regres-
sions with a MM-estimation, as this method is superior to other robust regressions when it
comes to detecting outliers (Susanti et al. (2014)). The results are very similar in general and,
therefore, serve very well to provide further robustness to this study.
2.5 PBOs versus SBOs - a Nuanced Picture
The findings mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2 argue that the SBO performance is not better than
the PBO performance. However, this paper shows that the underperformance has vanished
after the financial crisis and, therefore, SBOs are not as bad-performing as previously assumed.
Generally, if there still was an underperformance, or at least a not significantly differing perfor-
mance between PBOs and SBOs, the reason to invest in SBOs up to such a high degree remains
in question. Degeorge et al. (2013) argue that ”’secondary buyouts’ are costly for institutional
investors”. This claim only holds if there is a perfect choice between investing into PBOs or
SBOs. In the past, before the deal volume and the number of PE deals has reached such a high
level, this might have been true. Recently, higher fund raising, larger funds, and significant
amounts of dry powder arose. The greater availability of capital forces GPs to find investments.
However, the dry capital indicates that GPs struggle to find good targets. Thus, it seems that
the supply of potentially attractive targets does not increase as much as the available capital
enlarges. Axelson et al. (2013) show that GPs are incentivised to spend the raised capital in
order to collect fees on invested capital. Even when considering this incentive, GPs do not fully
invest their raised capital, pointing out how severe the investment problem actually is. The
shortage of targets is especially reflected in the availability of potential PBOs. The number
of new companies that have not yet been discovered as buyout targets, does not grow as fast
as the demand for those companies, especially considering the high levels of multiples. Ac-
cording to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2019), 72 percent of GPs claim the scarcity of investment
opportunities, i.e. the supply of portfolio companies, to be a top three key issue of the PE
industry.
Per definition, it is possible that the quantity of SBOs is equal to the number of PBOs, assuming
that PBOs do not default. Therefore, the introduction and growth of SBOs may provide a
solution to further increase the supply of potential targets. Given that GPs quickly take good
companies off the market, only potentially worse-performing targets stay in the market. This
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assumption may also be true for SBOs, but to a much lower degree. First, the supply during
recent times is bigger, which is also indicated by the high share of SBOs. Second, GPs may still
be reluctant to invest through SBOs as previous studies generally found an underperformance.
As the first analyses of this paper show that this finding is not necessarily true in recent times,
the GP’s caution to invest in SBOs is arbitrary. Considering the current market environment,
I analyse whether good performing SBOs are better than the remaining, potentially worse,
PBOs.
I analyse whether choosing a good SBO is superior to choosing a bad PBO in terms of various
performance measures. Therefore, I run regressions that consider the subsample of the top 50
percent performing SBOs and the subsample of the bottom 50 percent performing PBOs for the
respective measures. This subsampling approach clearly indicates the difference in performance
given the current market environment. The variables to measure performance are the same as
the ones used in previous regressions.
Table 2.10 shows the estimates of the regressions considering the company growth. Many of
the expansion variables now turn positive and significant compared to the previous regressions.
Not only did those variables that have been insignificant before now have a positive coefficient,
also significantly negative coefficients of the previous analysis are now significantly positive.
The growth of the valuation, the sales, and the total assets are much better for top-performing
SBOs compared to worse performing PBOs. Especially the difference in the growth of the
valuation and the growth of sales is economically large. The difference in the development of
equity and number of employees is not statistically different, neither for in the normal nor the
excess specifications. The missing significance indicates that the development of equity and the
number of employees does not behave differently across buyouts. This finding may be traced
back to a slower pace to strongly influence those performance measures within the short holding
period.
The estimates of the regressions concerning the profitability are shown in Table 2.11. Also in
these regressions, at least in the normal specifications, many SBO coefficients are positive and
statistically significant. The difference between PBO and SBO is significant and positive for
the development of the EBITDA margin, the EBIT margin, the return on assets, the return
on equity, and the EBITDA employee ratio. Interestingly, the difference in the development
of the profit margin between PBO and SBO is neither significant in the normal nor the excess
specification. Following classical valuation techniques, GPs may be more interested in creating
free cashflows rather than profits. Further, due to financial leverage the profit margin may be
strongly reduced for both PBO and SBO as well.
Table 2.12 shows the results for all regressions that consider other operational measurements.
In this cluster, two variables are significant for both specifications, namely the cash ratio and
the working capital. Whilst these coefficients are also positive now, the other three variables
are not significant in neither of the specifications. The cash ratio’s coefficient indicates that
the deviation in the difference of liquidity is mainly driven by cash and cash equivalents rather
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Table 2.10: Development of Growth Variables Bottom PBOs vs Top SBOs
Normal Excess
Valuation Sales Total As-
sets
Equity Employees Valuation Sales Total As-
sets
Equity Employees
SBO 1.600* 0.781* 0.318*** 2.375 0.773 1.656* 0.744* 0.289*** 2.376 0.877
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.20) (0.08)
log(Total Assets) -0.104 -0.050 -0.029** 1.143 0.027 -0.090 -0.049 -0.025* 1.150 0.025
(0.49) (0.80) (0.01) (0.12) (0.77) (0.55) (0.80) (0.04) (0.12) (0.78)
log(Holding Period) -0.909 -0.419 -0.050 1.633 -0.550 -0.823 -0.415 -0.041 1.635 -0.535
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20) (0.28) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07) (0.31) (0.28) (0.18)
log(Company Age) 0.351 -0.004 -0.018 -0.046 0.055 0.368 -0.010 -0.017 -0.050 0.051
(0.31) (0.98) (0.07) (0.90) (0.69) (0.30) (0.95) (0.13) (0.89) (0.72)
log(PE Firm Age) -0.359 0.003 0.014 0.132 -0.060 -0.348 0.003 0.012 0.137 -0.071
(0.07) (0.98) (0.28) (0.81) (0.36) (0.08) (0.98) (0.42) (0.80) (0.28)
Leverage Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.52) (0.30) (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.47) (0.32) (0.90) (0.32) (0.30)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 4.379 1.818 1.429*** -15.876 1.840* 3.106 0.841 0.376* -16.093 0.798
(0.08) (0.31) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.22) (0.64) (0.04) (0.18) (0.29)
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.047 0.297 -0.010 0.051 0.079 0.043 0.191 -0.010 0.051
N 295 295 295 295 269 295 295 295 295 269
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the regression, comparing the best 50 percent performing SBOs to the worst 50 percent performing PBOs within all
individual variables. The various specifications show the different measures representing the expansion of the underlying company. The p-values are reported in
parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Table 2.11: Development of Profitability Variables Bottom PBOs vs Top SBOs
Normal Excess
EBITDA
Margin
EBIT
Margin
Profit
Margin
RoE RoA EBITDA/
Employee
EBITDA
Margin
EBIT
Margin
Profit
Margin
RoE RoA EBITDA/
Employee
SBO 0.464* 0.727* 0.391 2.640* 0.152* 16.360* 0.455* 0.704 0.388 2.592* 0.146 11.974
(0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
log(Total Assets) -0.121 0.172 0.192 -0.531 -0.073 2.731 -0.119 0.177 0.197 -0.529 -0.074 2.286
(0.79) (0.78) (0.72) (0.43) (0.46) (0.31) (0.79) (0.78) (0.71) (0.43) (0.46) (0.39)
log(Holding Period) 0.176 0.492 0.447 0.233 0.004 -1.188 0.192 0.514 0.496 0.257 0.006 0.341
(0.58) (0.39) (0.29) (0.56) (0.93) (0.78) (0.55) (0.37) (0.24) (0.52) (0.90) (0.94)
log(Company Age) 0.329 0.334 0.432 0.652 0.118 -2.045 0.331 0.333 0.435 0.663 0.117 -0.979
(0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.54) (0.25) (0.24) (0.16) (0.12) (0.19) (0.79)
log(PE Firm Age) 0.098 0.189 0.036 0.042 0.031 -2.198 0.093 0.186 0.042 0.217 0.030 -1.292
(0.41) (0.27) (0.84) (0.82) (0.23) (0.43) (0.44) (0.28) (0.82) (0.28) (0.25) (0.65)
Leverage Ratio -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 -1.310* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* 0.016*** 0.000 -1.325*
(0.09) (0.42) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.11) (0.45) (0.03) (0.00) (0.45) (0.01)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.352 -3.846 -3.792 -3.951 -1.083 -10.080 -1.440 -3.954 -3.951 -2.127 -1.072 -37.006
(0.72) (0.51) (0.46) (0.44) (0.51) (0.71) (0.70) (0.50) (0.44) (0.67) (0.52) (0.23)
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.051 0.398 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.051 0.051 0.372
N 295 295 295 294 294 269 295 295 295 294 294 269
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the regression, comparing the best 50 percent performing SBOs to the worst 50 percent performing PBOs within all
individual variables. The various specifications show the different measures representing the profitability development of the underlying company. The p-values are
reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Table 2.12: Development of Operational Measurements Bottom PBOs vs Top SBOs
Normal Excess
Current
Ratio
Cash Ra-
tio
Inventory
Sales
Ratio
Receivables
Turnover
Working
Capital
Current
Ratio
Cash Ra-
tio
Inventory
Sales
Ratio
Receivables
Turnover
Working
Capital
SBO 9.822 0.286*** 0.007 14.508 0.196*** 9.822 0.284*** 0.005 14.423 1.040***
(0.17) (0.00) (0.59) (0.19) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.72) (0.19) (0.00)
log(Total Assets) -1.085 0.029 0.012 -8.806 -0.008 -1.052 0.030 0.016 -8.820 -0.138
(0.27) (0.14) (0.32) (0.36) (0.18) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22) (0.36) (0.07)
log(Holding Period) -4.232 0.021 0.007 4.155 0.000 -4.181 0.124 0.011 3.947 3.503***
(0.43) (0.44) (0.39) (0.38) (0.98) (0.43) (0.26) (0.18) (0.40) (0.00)
log(Company Age) 0.729 -0.023 0.002 9.347 -0.001 0.714 -0.026 0.000 9.313 0.056
(0.53) (0.30) (0.75) (0.22) (0.83) (0.54) (0.40) (0.99) (0.23) (0.50)
log(PE Firm Age) -3.987 0.007 0.006 1.813 0.005 -4.002 0.003 0.005 1.854 0.028
(0.42) (0.62) (0.29) (0.44) (0.47) (0.42) (0.92) (0.44) (0.43) (0.75)
Leverage Ratio 0.005 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000* 0.005 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000*
(0.34) (0.67) (0.46) (0.94) (0.02) (0.35) (0.39) (0.63) (0.94) (0.05)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 26.835 -0.373 -0.495 51.434 0.000 26.550 -0.601* -0.519 51.908 -0.573
(0.43) (0.06) (0.23) (0.49) (1.00) (0.44) (0.02) (0.21) (0.49) (0.56)
Adjusted R2 -0.025 0.122 0.019 0.066 0.247 -0.025 0.020 0.027 0.067 0.232
N 294 294 295 292 294 294 294 295 292 294
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the regression, comparing the best 50 percent performing SBOs to the worst 50 percent performing PBOs within all
individual variables. The various specifications show the different measures representing other developments for efficiency of the underlying company. The p-values are
reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Table 2.13: Development of Leverage Variables Bottom PBOs vs Top SBOs
Normal Excess
Leverage
Ratio
Net Lever-
age Ratio
Operative
Leverage
Net Opera-
tive Lever-
age Ratio
Leverage
Ratio
Net Lever-
age Ratio
Operative
Leverage
Net Opera-
tive Lever-
age Ratio
SBO 32.993 26.883 15.351* 13.853* 32.790 26.641 14.345* 12.878*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.03)
log(Total Assets) -3.409 -3.201 4.728 5.008 -3.336 -3.086 5.676 5.899
(0.72) (0.74) (0.43) (0.43) (0.73) (0.75) (0.34) (0.35)
log(Holding Period) 6.552 6.644 2.565 2.820 6.563 6.658 0.688 1.066
(0.17) (0.21) (0.72) (0.63) (0.17) (0.21) (0.92) (0.86)
log(Company Age) -0.798 -1.007 4.311 3.987 -0.739 -0.951 4.170 3.946
(0.81) (0.72) (0.38) (0.41) (0.82) (0.74) (0.39) (0.41)
log(PE Firm Age) -1.875 -1.067 1.480 0.813 -1.899 -1.086 1.630 0.865
(0.40) (0.61) (0.55) (0.72) (0.39) (0.61) (0.52) (0.70)
Leverage Ratio -0.303* -0.304* 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.303* -0.304* 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macroecomic Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 101.955 99.226 -61.893 -67.575 101.385 98.089 -69.061 -73.994
(0.27) (0.26) (0.41) (0.37) (0.27) (0.27) (0.35) (0.33)
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.310 0.015 0.001 0.308 0.310 0.020 0.008
N 295 295 294 294 295 295 294 294
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the regression, comparing the best 50 percent performing SBOs to the worst 50 percent performing PBOs within all
individual variables. The various specifications show the different measures representing the leverager development of the underlying company. The p-values are reported
in parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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than other current assets. This finding is further backed by the fact that the inventory sales
ratio does not develop differently among PBO and SBO. Similar to the previous reasoning,
the difference in the development of working capital is especially important to GPs aiming to
sell their portfolio company, as the free cash flows can be strongly increased by improving the
working capital ratio.
Lastly, Table 2.13 shows the results for all regressions that consider the various measurements
of leverage. Interestingly, the financial leverage is still not statistically different between PBOs
and SBOs. This finding further shows that the leverage may be increased in PE but both PBO
and SBO use a similar degree of financial engineering to create value throughout their holding
period. The operative leverage and the net operative leverage are significant, both net in cash
and for the normal specification. This finding aligns with the significance of the EBITDA
margin, and hints that the significance is mainly driven by the operative earnings rather than
the amount of debt.
At least for the majority of the analysed variables, SBOs now perform much better than PBOs.
These results question the initial claim and show that GPs should look for reasonably perform-
ing SBO rather than desperately investing in the remaining, comparatively bad performing
PBO targets. In the analysed market environment SBOs may not be costly as there may
simply be less good PBOs available. Thus, carefully chosen SBOs are sensible solutions for
generating sufficient returns.
2.6 Conclusion
The literature more or less agrees on the outperformance of PE-backed companies compared to
non PE-backed companies. However, the ongoing growth of SBO transactions is still puzzling as
the reasons to invest are not quite clear. Generally, there could be two alternative explanations
for that growth. First, the performance is becoming increasingly better over time. Second,
the PE industry is missing alternatives to invest in and, thus, choose SBOs as a fall back,
consequently with a lower level of returns. With a dataset consisting of 295 UK companies that
went through consecutive PBOs and SBOs, this paper analyses the operational and financial
performance of both PBOs and SBOs and examines whether SBOs actually perform as poorly
as commonly assumed. I analyse a more up to date data set compared to other papers on
SBOs, which is becoming increasingly important due to the recent strong growth of SBO share.
Furthermore, the relevant sample size is much bigger and inherits a lot more detail, which also
enables a more robust analysis. The subsampling approach generates new insights, which have
not been covered yet. Up to date, this is the first paper that aims to put the performance in
relation to its economic environment.
The summary statistics of this study indicates a slight underperformance of SBOs compared to
PBOs in many relevant fields. These measures, however, only consider the absolute development
rather than considering the economic environment and the performance of its peer group. Many
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SBOs occur before and around the financial crisis and, thus, they might have a disadvantage
to begin with. During the financial crisis investments were locked in because GPs paid much
more for portfolio companies before the crisis than during the crisis. Therefore, they might
have been forced to hold investment slightly longer compared to buyouts that did not have
their investment period throughout the crisis.
Using multivariate regressions, I find that SBOs are generally worse at expanding the portfolio
company, in terms of sales and total assets, but do not perform statistically different in terms
of company valuation. As expected, PBOs perform better at improving the profitability of
the portfolio companies. However, it seems that PBOs require comparatively more assets and
equity to achieve the profitability improvement. Interestingly, there is no evidence for any
difference in the usage of financial leverage, however, PBOs in absolute terms have a lower
growth of operative leverage compared to SBOs.
The performance difference in expansion is strongly driven by the development in small and
medium-sized companies, i.e. PBOs perform better at expanding small and medium-sized
companies, but do not perform differently for large companies. The performance difference in
profitability measures is mainly driven by medium-sized companies. This indicates that there
may be a sequence of operational improvements done by PBO investors very similar to the con-
cept of the business lifecycle. Further and more importantly, subsampling for time shows that
the performance of SBOs has improved strongly over time, resulting in no significant difference
in any performance measure during the time after the financial crisis compared to PBOs. This
development has a huge impact on the investor perspective on the SBOs’ quality and explains
why there is such a strong demand for SBOs. In combination with lower transaction costs,
SBOs present a worthwhile investment nowadays.
Due to the increasing level of dry powder and the resulting investment distress, PE firms need
to find suitable targets. Obviously, the supply of good PBOs is not sufficient anymore, leading
to the question whether to invest into a rather good SBO or a worse than average PBO. There
is a clear evidence that for almost all expansion and profitability performances, well performing
SBOs are much better than bad performing PBOs. Considering the lack of PBO targets, SBOs
are even more attractive than before. Therefore, SBOs are not at all means of last resort but
prove as rational investment decision. This finding explains the increasing share of SBO on
total buyouts.
Future research should focus on two follow ups to this study. First, as SBOs are a genuinely good
alternative to PBOs from a performance point of view, further research needs to analyse whether
the performance is still satisfying when considering the underlying risk of the investment.
Second, it may be interesting to see whether this study applies only to SBOs, or also to further
buyout rounds after the SBO. It is questionable whether the use of skillsets is cyclical, i.e. that
further financial buyouts reverse to the skillsets of the PBO.

Chapter 3
Performance Dependency of Secondary
Buyouts on Primary Buyouts
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3.1 Introduction
After the downturn of the private equity (PE) market during the global financial crisis, PE is
growing significantly ever since. PE funds are getting bigger and large amounts of committed
money is available. This success, however, puts general partners (GPs) in a conflict. On the
one hand, GPs are facing a shortage of attractive investment targets. On the other hand, GPs
are forced to exit their portfolio companies within the lifespan of the tendered fund. Due to
this market design, secondary buyouts (SBOs) seem to represent a solution to the scarcity of
investment opportunities as their share of total buyouts is steadily growing. SBOs are leveraged
buyouts (LBOs) in which one PE investor sells his portfolio company to another PE investor.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the share of the SBO transaction volume on the total PE transaction
volume grew since 2010 and reaches 52 percent in 2018, both in the EU and the US market.
Figure 3.1: Buyout Exits
Source: Based on PitchBook (2018a) and PitchBook (2018b).
During an LBO the PE investor creates value by using financial and operational engineering.
After closing the deal, the agenda of GPs is to optimise the portfolio company with respect to
short-term and mid-term time horizons. Thus at first glance, a second investor should not be
able to achieve abnormal investment returns as the value creation potential is already captured
by the first PE investor (e.g. Jenkinson & Sousa (2015), Wang (2012), Bonini (2015)). However,
PE investors may decide to acquire companies directly from other financial investors. There
are several attempts on explaining the investment rational of SBOs. For example, Jenkinson &
Sousa (2015) mention complementary skill sets of the GPs, time pressure to sell the portfolio
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company early, marketing the successful sale of portfolio companies for future fund raising, and
usage of favourable debt market conditions as possible explanations. Another used argument is
that both the primary buyout (PBO) and the SBO are successful as the organisational structure
of PE is superior to non-PE organisational structures (Jensen (1989)) and, thus, SBOs may still
provide sufficient returns to investors. Nevertheless, the dependency between the two buyout
rounds may further prove the advantages of SBOs. These analyses may provide criteria on how
to achieve successful SBOs.
Following these findings, we provide empirical guidance for investing into successful SBO in-
vestments. First, we analyse the value drivers in PBOs and SBOs to understand how the total
value creation is composed and whether value is driven differently amongst the individual buy-
out rounds. Second, after the identification of value drivers, we are able to study dependencies
of value drivers across the buyout rounds. Do any value drivers during the PBO have an impact
on the value creation during the SBO? Answering this question leads to certain characteristics
that are favourable for the engagement in an SBO, thus identifying selection criteria for poten-
tially successful SBOs. Third, once selection criteria are identified, a GP needs to understand
what to focus on during the SBO based on the development during the PBO. Thus, we analyse
the value drivers dependent on the identified selection criteria.
We find that the value drivers partially differ among buyout rounds. PBO investors primarily
focus on company growth, profitability improvement, and boosting innovation to create value.
In contrast, SBO investor focus more on increasing profitability and efficiency gains. We are
able to identify five selection criteria for target selection that drive value creation during the
SBO. Companies with a lower value creation during the PBO compared to its close peers are
generally preferred for SBOs. Portfolio companies with a great company growth and prof-
itability development, in terms of EBITDA margin, are favoured. On the other hand, good
SBO targets demonstrate weak efficiency during the PBO and, consequently, also an inferior
development of return on assets compared to its close peers. The value drivers dependent on
these selection criteria differ quite substantially. We confirm the findings of Jenkinson & Sousa
(2015) that complementary skill sets exist, i.e. that GPs focus on something completely differ-
ent across buyout rounds. Exemplary, the SBO investor improves profitability after the PBO
investor has focussed on company growth. However, we also find that this is not the only way
to create value in SBOs. SBO investors also do something similar as the previous PBO investor
but with a different approach than the PBO investor. For example, the PBO investor works
on profitability by improving the EBITDA margin, whereas the SBO investor also focusses
on profitability but rather works on the improvement of return on assets. However, an SBO
investor does not simply apply the same mechanics as it was done during the PBO.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. Most studies about PE perfor-
mance and SBO performance consider PBO and SBO autonomously (e.g. Achleitner & Figge
(2014), Degeorge et al. (2016)). In our opinion, for a rigorous analysis it is crucial to con-
sider two consecutive deals rather than any two independent deals because the dependencies
are measured between two back-to-back buyouts rather than individual, independent buyouts.
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Otherwise, the underlying data may suffer from a random selection of individual PBOs and
SBOs. To our knowledge, only Bonini (2015) analyses the operating performance of two sequen-
tial deals and aims to find reasons for investing into consecutive private equity transactions.
This paper does not suffer as much from selection bias as others. By using both public data
providers and private data from a large fund of fund manager, we make sure that unsuccessful
PE deals are also included. Furthermore, the full length of the holding period of back-to-back
buyouts is considered. Most importantly, based on fundamental data it is the first paper that
identifies selection criteria and company profiles that are suitable for successful SBOs. We are
able to give advice on what to do during SBOs dependent on the individual selection criteria
to make the buyout successful.
This paper is structured as follows. The following chapter describes the dataset and its prepa-
ration in detail. Chapter 3.3 presents the summary statistics of the dataset. The following
three chapters explain the hypotheses of the three consecutive research questions, the underly-
ing methodology for the analyses, and present the empirical findings of this study. Finally, the
conclusion can be found in the last chapter.
3.2 Data Sample
3.2.1 Explanation of the Data Sample, the Peer Group and the Un-
derlying Variables
Many studies about PE, and especially about SBOs, face tremendous problems gathering suf-
ficient observations for reasonable analyses. Firstly, compared to other transactions, PE deals
cover relatively fewer deals. Secondly, many PE transactions are taken privately, which does
not require the financial investor to disclose financial information in many countries. Thirdly,
due to the construction of PE and the underlying holding periods of portfolio companies, many
transactions during the last few years cannot be considered as the financial investor has not
yet exited the investment. This is especially critical for our study as we use two consecutive
PE deals and thus we can only consider PBOs with an early exit. Lastly, data providers are
strongly dependent on financial investors publishing the news of acquiring and exiting their
investment, which is also not always the case.
Our original dataset consists of PE portfolio companies, which are located in the United King-
dom (UK). The UK is a very active PE market and, therefore, provides a significant amount of
observations. In contrast to the USA, most of the companies in the UK need to publish their
full financial accounts, which enables operative analyses on a more detailed level.
We used several data providers to retrieve an initial list of all buyouts that are labelled as “sec-
ondary buyout” and “financial buyout”. These data were collected from Capital IQ, Thomson
Reuters Eikon, Prequin, Mergermarket and private information from a large fund of fund man-
ager. The list of SBOs includes the names of the portfolio companies that the PE companies
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invested in and the date of the investment entry and most of the time the investment exit.
We eliminated all buyouts that are in fact tertiary buyouts or any other financial buyouts
that occurred after the SBO. Most data providers start the portfolio company search in 1996
and companies need at least one year to publish their financial accounts in a timely manner.
Therefore, the portfolio companies had their PBO no earlier than 1996 and their SBO exit no
later than 2017. We chose those dates as the time horizon needs to be as large as possible to
guarantee a sufficient number of observations. Per definition of the consecutive deal analysis,
the PBO investment exit date is equal to the SBO investment entry date. After matching for
company keys and company name, only few companies had the full information for the first
transaction date (at PBO entry), for the second transaction date (at PBO exit/at SBO entry),
and for the third transaction date (at SBO exit). However, for most companies at least one
out of the three dates was still missing. Thus, we hand-collected the missing dates, if available,
from the financial investor’s websites or other official transaction publications.
We, then, retrieved accounting information for the underlying portfolio companies for the fiscal
years which are the closest to the first, second, and third transaction date, respectively. On the
one hand, collecting data only for the fiscal year before the entry date and for the fiscal year
after the exit date covers the full time span of the deal but, if the entry date and the respective
fiscal year are too far apart, mayor early improvements of the GP may not be recognized in
the analysis. On the other hand, collecting data for the fiscal year after the entry date and for
the fiscal year before the exit date may not cover the full value creation of the specific buyout.
We assume that using the closest fiscal year to the transaction date provides the lowest bias
possible. For most private companies in the UK, only the balance sheet and the P&L are
published and for some rarer cases the cash flow statement is also published. The reason to
track both of those financial statement’s items is to combine the static view of the balance sheet
with operative, dynamic measures of the P&L statement. Furthermore, we retrieved the number
of fulltime employees, if available. Table 3.1 provides an overview of all the retrieved financial
information. Ideally 23 variables and ratios have been retrieved, however, that strongly depends
on the availability and depth of the financial information. Even if not the full information were
available, the observation was kept in the sample. Multicollinearity for the observed variables
should not be a problem as can be inferred from the low correlations in Table 3.2.
The final sample consists of 295 companies. We were able to collect accounting data at the
three transaction dates within the setting of consecutive PE deals. This means that we collected
information about 590 investments, thus having access to a maximum of 885 transactions per
variable. Obviously due to the depth of the available information, the number of observations
for individual variables may differ significantly.
As explained in the following section a peer group is needed for both calculating the relevant
performance measures and the valuation of our sample companies. The peer group consists of
public companies from the UK and the USA. Obviously for our UK sample, it is reasonable to
use a UK peer group. Due to the fact that we apply an accurate matching procedure over a large
time horizon, our potential peer group needs to be very large. The peer group’s quality can be
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Table 3.1: Variable Overview
Name Description
Company Specific
Valuation Growth The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate in valuation. The calculation of this variable is described in Chapter 3.2.2. This
variables is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Growth
Sales Growth The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate in total sales. This variables is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Equity Growth The portfolio company’s compound annual growth rate of equity. This variables is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Profitability
EBITDA Margin
Growth
The development of the EBITDA margin between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. This
variables is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Profit Margin
Growth
The development of the profit margin between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. This
variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Return on Equity
Growth
The development of the return on equity between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. Return
on equity is defined as profit over equity. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Return on Assets
Growth
The development of the return on assets between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. Return
on assets is defined as EBITDA over total assets. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Leverage Ratio
Growth
The development of the leverage ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. The
leverage ratio is defined as liabilities over equity. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Liquidity
Cash Ratio
Growth
The development of the cash ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. The cash ratio
is defined as cash over current liabilities. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Current Ratio
Growth
The development of the current ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. The current
ratio is defined as receivables over current liabilities. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
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Table 3.1 Variable Overview – continued from previous page
Name Description
Efficiency
Inventory-Sales
Ratio Growth
The development of the inventory sales ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. This
variable is defined as stocks over sales. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Receivables-
Turnover Ratio
Growth
The development of the receivables turnover ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
The receivables turnover ratio is defined as sales over debtors. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Intangible Asset
Growth
The development of the intangible asset ratio between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period.
The intangible asset ratio is defined as the proportion of intangible assets of total assets. This variable is winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Altman Z-Score
Development
The development of the Altman Z-score between the investment exit and investment entry divided by the years of the holding period. It is
defined as: Altman Z-Scorei,t = 0.717∗Working Capitali,tTotal Assetsi,t +0.847∗
Profiti,t
Total Assetsi,t
+3.107∗ EBITi,tTotal Assetsi,t +0.420∗
Equityi,t
Liabilitiesi,t
+0.998∗ Salesi,tTotal Assetsi,t
Control Variables
SBO Dummy Dummy variable that indicates whether the deal is a secondary buyout. Variable is equal to one when the underlying deal is a secondary buyout.
Total Assets The portfolio company’s total assets including all fixed assets and current assets at the time of the respective transaction. This variables is
winsorised at 1% and 99%.
Start Year Dummy Dummy variables that indicate the entry year of the underlying deal.
Holding Period The time (in years) the investors holds the portfolio company during the first and second buyout, i.e. the time difference between the first and
second transaction date and the time difference between the second and third transaction date.
GICS Dummy Dummy variables that indicates the industry classification of the portfolio company. The classification is based on the 8-digit sub-industry
GICS code.
Market-Based
Inflation Rate The annual inflation rate at time of entry and exit of the underlying deal.
Credit spreads Difference between Moody’s BAA bond index (corporate bond index) and the risk-free UK government bond (risk-free rate)
Employment Rate The yearly employment rate in the UK; Employed Working People/Working People
GDP Index GDP Index Development with 1996=100
Note: The table above presents all variables and ratios that are used in the analysis of this paper. All development measures are calculated for both the PBO and
the SBO. When applicable, the absolute excess development compared to the close peer group is considered (see section 3.2.2.). The table includes company specific
information, deal-specific, and economic data.
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Table 3.2: Cross Correlation Table
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Valuation 1.000
Sales 0.422 1.000
EBITDA 0.421 0.466 1.000
Profit 0.223 0.229 0.588 1.000
Equity 0.086 -0.221 0.041 0.059 1.000
Total Assets -0.088 -0.217 -0.113 -0.049 0.102 1.000
Holding Period -0.194 -0.214 -0.022 0.036 0.076 -0.049 1.000
Intangible Asset 0.105 0.131 0.099 0.029 -0.221 -0.130 -0.018 1.000
Leverage Ratio -0.047 0.009 0.049 0.028 -0.003 0.100 -0.064 -0.033 1.000
Current Cash 0.027 -0.057 0.015 0.043 0.012 -0.005 0.087 -0.025 -0.002 1.000
Return on Equity 0.071 -0.012 0.010 0.150 -0.005 -0.055 0.000 0.006 0.045 0.015 1.000
Return on Assets 0.238 0.127 0.327 0.412 0.023 -0.073 0.067 0.001 0.021 0.078 0.279 1.000
Receivables Sales 0.040 0.185 0.224 0.338 0.000 -0.053 -0.028 -0.011 -0.032 -0.040 0.240 0.196 1.000
Inventory Sales -0.280 -0.201 -0.193 -0.295 -0.003 -0.030 0.029 0.001 -0.001 -0.046 0.047 -0.044 -0.044 1.000
Credit Spreads 0.078 0.008 0.005 -0.006 0.033 0.049 -0.190 0.016 0.003 -0.025 0.002 -0.074 0.008 -0.004 1.000
Employment Rate -0.069 -0.025 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.029 0.023 0.008 -0.001 0.018 0.022 -0.002 0.014 0.067 -0.353 1.000
Inflation Rate -0.006 -0.043 -0.003 -0.028 0.034 0.047 -0.018 0.023 0.040 0.026 -0.038 -0.042 -0.078 0.004 0.286 -0.528 1.000
GDP Index 0.059 -0.053 0.049 0.023 0.015 0.048 -0.179 0.063 0.000 -0.034 0.014 -0.046 0.056 0.001 0.170 0.164 0.460 1.000
Note: The table above shows the correlation matrix of the variable developments used in this paper. The highest positive correlation is 0.588 between EBITDA
development and profit development. On the opposite the highest negative correlation is -0.528 between inflation rate and employment rate. None of these variables
should cause concern about multicollinearity.
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improved by enlarging the dataset with data of other countries that share similar investment
characteristics. Especially for bigger companies, such as buyout companies, other countries
that share a similar investment market should suffice for an improved comparison (Schreiner
(2009)). The American market should therefore serve well as an enlargement of the UK peer
group as the PE markets are quite similar. We used Compustat database to retrieve data for all
companies that were listed from 1996 to 2017 on the UK and US equity markets. Additionally,
we were able to retrieve the same accounting information as for the sample firms.
3.2.2 Preparation of the Dataset
Valuation of Sample Companies
The analysis aims to identify the value drivers of the intrinsic value creation. Thus, the equity
valuation needs to be considered. For several reasons, we chose to value the equity of our sample
companies ourselves by using multiple valuation techniques. For most PE transactions the deal
values are not published or at least the value at either entry or exit is missing. Only using
those deals, for which deal values are available, would decrease the total number of observations
drastically. From our point of view the pricing of transaction values is determined by many
factors that do not directly inherit the private equity core activity. Such factors include price
influencers, e.g. negotiation skills of the PE firms (Achleitner et al. (2011)) or random shifts in
the demand and supply of potential target companies. In fact, we have been trying to isolate
the operational value creation and, thus, created a fair market value of the sample’s companies
using public market data. We assumed that the success of a buyout is a combination of
several drivers and, thus, analysed the combined effect of those drivers, expressed as multiple
valuations on certain key accounting information. The multiple valuation has the advantage
that the observed companies’ valuation seems to be more homogenous throughout time, which
enables good comparability as small unobservable, firm specific drivers may be included over the
time period of the two consecutive deals. Lastly, multiple valuation shares the same fundament
as comprehensive valuations and thus provide a good groundwork for deal values (Liu et al.
(2002)). Although these market values may differ slightly from actual deal values, they serve
well as tendencies of the actual price and are assumed to be quite accurate.
Accordingly, we used trading multiples rather than transaction multiples for the valuation of
our sample companies. Most importantly, using transaction multiples would again provide
us with price distortion, e.g. in form of transaction fees, possible synergy effects between
the target and the acquiring firm and liquidity premia. Thus, for determining purely the
operational success, transaction multiples do not seem to provide a reasonable valuation basis.
Choosing transaction multiples, we would need to use PE transaction to truly capture all the PE
mechanics. A lack of suitable observations may be a problem in that case, too. We, therefore,
favoured trading multiples in our study. Within the category of trading multiples several studies
analyse the differences between forecasting multiples, trailing multiples, and the combination of
both of them. Forecasting multiples are those multiples that are based on forecasted accounting
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information, such as the consensus of broker reports’ forecasts. Those forecasting multiples lead
to the lowest valuation error (Liu et al. (2002)). Unfortunately, broker reports are not available
in the necessary quantity for private companies. We decided to not forecast the financial
information ourselves, as we feel that such a forecast would lead to a too subjective outcome.
As a result, trailing multiples seem to be the right choice for valuing the sample’s companies.
Trailing multiples are those multiples that are based on past fundamental data. Several studies
aim to identify both the stand-alone accuracy of the multiple valuations and of the combination
of several multiple valuations. Amongst others sales, EBITDA, earnings, and equity book value
multiples perform the best. Liu et al. (2002) find that those multiples perform very well and
are not much weaker than forecasting multiples. They analyse the effects of cash flow multiples
and find that they perform significantly worse than the above mentioned multiples. For some
observations it may be reasonable to implement industry-specific multiples. However, due to
the various and detailed industry specifications of our sample, it would not be feasible as most
companies do not publish the necessary information. Therefore, sales, EBITDA, earnings and
book equity multiples seemed to be the best choice for a sufficient multiple valuation.
The identification of the best possible peer group is a crucial process for optimising the valuation
accuracy. Therefore, our identification process and the underlying matching process underwent
a complex and detailed structure. The matching procedure followed the LBO matching proce-
dures of Guo et al. (2011) to apply a pre-performance matching, i.e. finding suitable matches
before the activity of the PE investor begins. Generally, we matched our sample portfolio com-
panies with the listed companies by the peer group. The pre-performance matching was done
twice, before the PBO as well as before the SBO. With this process we reset the benchmark of
the underlying observations. Many other studies apply an industry-size-year matching as this
process is supposed to identify the most similar companies available (Barber & Lyon (1996)).
However, we assumed that sometimes matching for industry, size, and year as proposed is not
enough. Ceteris paribus, a company that is very profitable should perform differently compared
to a company that is specified as a loss company, and thus develop differently. Therefore, we
followed the idea of Bhojraj & Lee (2002) and included a measure of profitability, namely the
EBITDA margin, in our matching process. For every sample company, the matching process
results in the five closest peer companies. First of all, the sample company’s year of transaction
has to be the same as the trading year of the peer company in order to eliminate time effects.
Secondly, as we track the development of both the sample and peer group companies, the peer
firm still needed to be listed at the end of the PE firm’s buyout. Thirdly, the companies needed
to have a similar size at the beginning of the buyout as a proxy for a similar development within
the business lifecycle (Alford (1992)). Thus, a peer group company may not deviate more than
50 percent in total assets from the sample firm. Fourthly, the companies should have a similar
profitability. The peers do not deviate more than 25 percentage points in EBITDA margin and
should have the same sign of the EBITDA margin. Both of these cut-off points were chosen
to represent a reasonable comparison. The profitability interval is slightly lower compared to
the size interval because the margin is usually centered around an industry average anyways,
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whilst the size is not necssarily bound to an industry benchmark. Lastly, the companies needed
to be in the same industry for all the other premises to be comparable. Out of the standard
industry classification codes, GICS codes perform the best for a reasonable valuation (Bhojraj
et al. (2003)). We followed Alford (1992) as we matched by the most detailed industry code at
the beginning. If there were less than five matches per sample firm, we reduced the depth of
the industry codes until every PE portfolio company has at least five matches. If there were
more than five matches per portfolio company, the five peers which had the most similar size
were selected. A good peer group should have enough observations to smoothen the results,
but too many observations may distort the results. Pereiro (2002) and Schreiner (2009) show
that a peer group should consist of 2 to 10 peers. We followed Bhojraj & Lee (2002) and
find the five most similar peers, as this is in accordance with the leading literature. Due to
the nature of the dataset and the corresponding possible peer group, the geographic matching
occured between the UK and the US. A single country-matching would be superior but usually
the number of similar companies in each year and industry is very limited, thus there is no
harm to increase the potential comparable companies by comparing to similar economies as
well (Schreiner (2009)).
After the identification of the correct peers for each sample company, the peer group multiples
needed to be estimated. First of all, we extracted the accounting data of the peer group which
are matched with the three transaction dates of the sample companies. The accounting data for
the peer group have the same fiscal year as in the sample data collection, i.e. the closest fiscal
year to the transaction date. For every match we calculated the multiples of sales, EBITDA,
earnings, and equity book value based on the market capitalisation of the respective companies.
After the calculation of the individual value for all peer group companies, these values needed
to be aggregated. Herrmann & Richter (2003) find that using the arithmetic mean would
lead to an overestimation of the valuation and thus distort the valuation. They as well as
Baker & Ruback (1999) instead propose that the median is a very good way to aggregate these
valuations. Thus, we chose to use the median values. Ultimately, we got the median values for
sales, EBITDA, earnings and book equity multiples of the portfolio companies that we wanted
to value.
The actual valuation was simply done by multiplying the peer group’s multiple values with
the sample company’s respective accounting data. This process provided four company values
as each multiple valuation was done independently of each other. As the companies are quite
similar by the nature of the matching process, we applied an arithmetic mean to find the average
company equity value among all the multiple valuations.
After the valuation of our sample companies’ equity we retrieved as many actual deal values as
possible for those sample companies in order to validate the valuation. We were able to retrieve
136 actual transaction values of our underlying sample companies. A mean test between the
actual observation and the valuations was performed. The valuation of the sample companies
and the actual deal values were not significantly different from each other, already indicating
that our valuation is not too far off, and is a very good approxmiation of the actual value.
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Further, we regress the value of the self-valued companies on the actual transaction prices in
order to see whether our estimates performed well at predicting the actual transaction price.
With a coefficient of 0.9333 and a R-squared of 0.85 the company valuations seem to be a very
good fit and thus may be used for further analysis. The results do not change drastically when
only considering PBOs and SBOs individually, indicating that the companies are valued equally
well.
Variable Calculation
Our study focusses on the development of both the overall company growth, but also the growth
of all the observed financial information. Generally, when calculating growth two categories of
measures arise. Those variables that always stay positive can be calculated with the compound
annual growth rate (CAGR),
CAGRi,t(X) = (
xi,t
xi,t−k
)1/k − 1 (3.1)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the holding period
of the investment.
As the nominator and denominator will always be positive, it is possible to distinguish a positive
growth from a negative growth. In the underlying analysis the growth of the company value,
total assets, equity, number of full-time employees, and sales are calculated with the CAGR.
Other variables may become negative over the investment period. For these values the CAGR
is mathematically not feasible. For that reason, we chose to calculate the yearly growth ratios
by dividing the total change in the underlying ratio by the length of the holding period in years.
Growthi,t(X) = (
xi,t − xi,t−k
t− k ) (3.2)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the holding period
of the investment.
Winsorising is a commonly used method in the related literature to adjust the underlying
data for thorough and generally applicable studies. All the relevant fundamental data were
winsorised at the 1 percent and 99 percent level as only a few observations strongly distorted
the results. This approach is in accordance with other studies in the research field of PE (e.g.
Achleitner & Figge (2014)).
We further chose to use the absolute excess development rather than simply analysing the
companies’ performance isolated. Especially, for investment purposes it is more important how
a company performs in comparison to its peers and the industry it operates in. Although
a certain performance indicator may be high in absolute terms, it does not mean that the
company is well managed as it may underperform its close peer group. Therefore, similar to
Bonini (2015), we calculated the difference between all variables of the underlying portfolio
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company and the corresponding variables of its peer group as follows.
di,p = (xi −mp) (3.3)
where xi is the performance indicator x for company i, and m being the median of the perfor-
mance indicator of peer group p.
3.2.3 Variable Selection
This chapter presents the variables that were used in this paper. In the following, the mea-
surement of growth, profitability, financial engineering, liquidity, efficiency, and innovation are
explained.
The growth of a portfolio company is measured in two ways, namely total sales and equity
growth. The analysis of total sales growth is necessary for two reasons. Increasing sales either
represents a sufficient market share on the total market or it may indicate a growing industry.
Further, the growth of equity is analysed as it is a balance sheet position and, thus, provides a
more stable view on the development throughout the holding period compared to positions of
profit and loss statement.
The profitability is defined by four variables, namely the EBITDA margin, profit margin, re-
turn on equity, and return on assets. The first two variables measure the operating earnings
in comparison to the total sales. The EBITDA margin clearly identifies the operating earnings
without considering any financing and accounting effects. Complementary to this measure, we
use the profit margin because it also inherits the depreciation, amortization, interest payments,
and taxes. Usually, GPs are not able to strongly reduce the tax liabilities of the portfolio com-
pany, but due to high leverage, interest payments may be very high. The other two profitability
variables rather measure the earnings in contrast to the input of capital. They are also crucial
to analyse because they are more stable compared to pure profit and loss profitability measures.
Within this category of variables, we need to measure both asset and equity returns because
the amount of total assets and equity usually differ strongly in buyouts due to the financial
leverage.
The capital structure and financial engineering is measured by the development of the financial
leverage. The financial leverage is measured as the ratio of liabilities to equity. It serves both
well as explanatory variable and control variable of the capital structure.
Liquidity is measured by two variables, namely the cash ratio and the current ratio. The cash
ratio is measured as cash and cash equivalents over current liabilities. Especially for high risk
investments, such as buyouts, the availability of cash to pay off current liabilities directly, seems
to be a valid proxy for liquidity. The current ratio is defined as the current receivables over
current liabilities. This ratio measures a similar degree of liquidity but also considers other
assets, which shows how solvent a company is in the short-term.
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This paper uses two proxies as part of the portfolio company’s efficiency. The inventory sales
ratio, which is defined as sales over inventory, measures the efficiency on how the inventory is
used to achieve certain sales. Generally, companies may aim to reduce the necessary inventory
whilst always having just enough inventory to keep the business running smoothly. The receiv-
ables turnover ratio represents the efficiency of a company to ultimately collect its money owed
by its business partners. It is defined as sales over receivables outstanding.
Innovation and asset structure are represented by the intangible asset ratio, which is the pro-
portion of intangible assets to total assets. It shows the degree of innovation and brand value,
as mostly patents and goodwill are incorporated in intangible assets. Also, it can serve well as
a control variable for asset structure, which may be important especially when considering the
recent development of digitalisation.
The control variables are manifold. First, we use credit spreads, the employment rate, inflation
rate, and GDP index as macroeconomic control variables. Second, as we consider the growth
of variables, we need to control for the length of the holding period to differentiate between
short-term and long-term value drivers. Third, total assets are used to control for the size of
the company. Fourth, we control for the risk of financial distress of the portfolio company.
As portfolio companies are not listed, a market price and its underlying volatility cannot be
observed. For that purpose, we choose to measure the risk of a company by analysing its
fundamental data as well. The Altman Z-score is a well-established measure to predict financial
distress and thus serves well as control variable of risk for private companies (Altman (1968)).
Lastly, we apply time and industry dummies.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.3 displays the summary statistics for the final dataset of 590 investments. For infor-
mational purposes, all the statistics are split into three categories: the total sample, primary
buyouts and secondary buyouts. Mean T-tests and nonparametric equality-of-medians tests
are performed to recognise the differences in characteristics between PBOs and SBOs. The
statistics are divided into two panels: the company information at entry and the development
of company information during the buyouts. The observations are relatively well balanced, i.e.
for most information the full number of potential observations are available so that only few
observations go missing in further analysis.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Company Information at Entry
Total PBO SBO
Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs
Valuation at Entry 60,801 98,030 26,432 590 52,784 98,481 19,979 295 68,818∗ 97,083 36,143∗∗∗ 295
Sales at Entry 58,253 87,979 27,684 590 47,813 83,215 19,800 295 68,693∗∗ 91,452 36,056∗∗∗ 295
EBITDA at Entry 7,926 16,954 3,412 590 6,588 17,988 2,288 295 9,263 15,771 4,958∗∗∗ 295
Profit at Entry 3,079 7,922 1,492 590 1,740 7,082 745 295 4,418∗∗∗ 8,483 2,423∗∗∗ 295
RoA at Entry 0.156 0.198 0.139 590 0.153 0.226 0.138 295 0.16 0.166 0.141 295
Total Assets at Entry 82,872 176,586 26,966 590 65,562 145,864 19,987 295 100,182∗∗∗ 201,478 36,442∗∗∗ 295
Equity at Entry 2,4116 61,813 5,442 590 19,029 54,307 3,491 295 29,204∗ 68,217 9,271∗∗∗ 295
Leverage at Entry 2.35 52.3 1.601 587 1.441 58.6 1.816 293 3.36 45.3 1.389 294
Panel B: Company Information Development
Total PBO SBO
Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs
Valuation CAGR 1.320 0.917 1.161 589 1.293 0.769 1.170 294 1.346 1.045 1.148 295
Sales CAGR 1.245 0.617 1.112 589 1.289 0.613 1.162 294 1.2 0.62 1.088∗∗∗ 295
EBITDA Margin
Growth
0.111 0.556 0.018 588 0.125 0.507 0.031 294 0.098 0.601 0.008∗∗∗ 294
Profit Margin Growth 0.086 0.412 0.014 589 0.09 0.387 0.022 294 0.082 0.436 0.005∗∗∗ 295
Return on Assets
Growth
-0.005 0.115 -0.001 587 -0.002 0.117 0.001 294 -0.009 0.113 -0.003 293
Total Assets CAGR 1.202 0.388 1.133 588 1.268 0.455 1.179 294 1.136∗∗∗ 0.0291 1.094∗∗∗ 294
Equity Growth 0.125 0.29 0.06 589 0.152 0.323 0.074 294 0.099∗ 0.251 0.055 295
Leverage Ratio Growth 2.766 32.41 -0.055 585 3.734 37.166 -0.06 292 1.801 26.877 -0.047 293
Holding Period 4.102 2.550 4 590 4.054 2.445 4 295 4.149 2.654 4 295
Note: The table above presents the dataset of 295 companies from the UK that have been tracked throughout the two consecutive buyouts, i.e. the PBO and the SBO.
For most of those companies we were able to collect the balance sheet and P&L fundamental data at time of the transactions, speaking before the PBO, after the PBO,
and after the SBO. The variables used in this study are defined in Table 3.1 . Absolute data are presented in thousands GBP. Panel A displays the valuation and the
operative and financial characteristics of the buyouts at time of the investment entry. These fundamental data and ratios represent the basic data of the underlying
portfolio company. Panel B illustrates the development of the valuation and the key characteristics throughout the holding period. The calculation of the respective
development is also presented in Table 3.1 . The significance levels for the mean difference and median difference test between PBO and SBO are ***0.1%, **1% and
*5%.
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The first panel covers the valuation, some fundamental data, and selected ratios to display
the operative and financial characteristics of the portfolio companies at the beginning of the
investment. Figure 3.2 provides an overview on the investment entry year. The valuation at
entry for the total sample has a mean of 60.8 million GBP. This is slightly lower than the
deal values in other studies (e.g. Achleitner & Figge (2014)). The size difference may arise
from the specific country focus. Large deals are also less likely to be bought twice by financial
investors as those deals are quite rare anyway. Thus, in this setting it is less likely to include
those large companies twice. The valuation at entry of SBOs is significantly greater in its
mean with a weak significance compared to entry valuation of PBOs, indicating that value is
created throughout the primary buyout. The medians of the two buyout types are significantly
different from each other which clearly shows that value is created in PBOs. As shown by the
valuation CAGR, the total sample develops positively over time the mean of the fundamental
data should be higher at the entry of the SBO. However, the mean differences of the three
ratios at entry of PBOs and SBOs, namely return on equity, return on assets and the leverage,
are not significantly different from each other. Both return measures are very similar both in
mean and median. Although the operative earnings increase, the equity and assets invested
to achieve this return grow proportionally the same. Surprisingly, the mean leverage ratios at
entry are not significantly different from each other. The standard deviations of both means
are extremely high which clearly indicates that there are different approaches on how to use
leverage as a tool for value creation. The median tests show roughly the same results and thus
do not require further interpretation.
Figure 3.2: Start Year Density
Note: This figure shows the density of the sample’s investment entry year.
The second panel shows the excess development of the valuation, the aforementioned fundamen-
tal data, and their ratios. Most variables’ means are not significantly different from another.
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This suggests that neither investment type generally performs better or worse than the other.
This brings up the question which deal, PBO or SBO, outperforms in the respective fields.
The valuation CAGR is positive for both buyout types indicating that both buyouts create
excess value compared to its peer group. However, neither the mean nor the median are dif-
ferent from another, showing that in this sample PBOs do not necessarily perform better than
SBOs. The mean growth of total assets and equity are significantly different from another
which shows that GPs may bloat the balance sheet more during the PBO. Interestingly, the
medians of developments of sales, the EBITDA margin, the EBIT margin, the profit margin,
and total assets are significantly different from each other and higher in PBOs, showing that for
many deals the development of the selected performance indicators are better during the first
investment round. The holding period for the total sample on average is 4.1 years. The mean
holding periods are not significantly different from another which might indicate that SBOs on
average do not follow the idea of having buying and selling pressure more than PBOs. Figure
3.3 represents the deviation of holding periods according to PBOs and SBOs.
Figure 3.3: Holding Period by Buyout
Note: This figure shows the densitiy of the holding periods in years during the PBO and SBO,
respectively.
3.4 Differing Value Drivers Across Buyout Rounds
Throughout the history of PE, portfolio companies generally faced two phases of buyout activity.
The first phase focussed on value creation through financial engineering. The second phase
made use of operational engineering. Nowadays, both financial and operational engineering are
applied to maximise the value creation within a buyout.
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Jensen (1989) states that a buyout structure with high leverage allows the PE investors to align
management incentives, and to create efficient and lean organisational structures. Other studies
further show that a high leverage reduces agency costs due to a high powered incentive system
(e.g. Jensen & Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986)). Korteweg (2010) finds that during the early
investment stages, PE investors often prefer high leverage as their optimal capital structure.
The evidence about leverage as value driver in SBOs is rather mixed. Achleitner & Figge (2014)
propose that all GPs may use similar skill sets for operational improvements and, therefore,
the only way to create additional return is by increasing the leverage. On the other hand,
Wang (2012) states that a successful PBO usually relies on an almost optimal capital structure
and, therefore, the second PE buyer should not change the leverage. For these partially mixed
reasons, we expect leverage to have at least a small positive effect on value creation in both
buyout rounds of our sample.
After a downturn in the debt markets, financial investors had to reinvent their business model
and focused on operational performance enhancement rather than simply implementing finan-
cial engineering (Matthews et al. (2009)). GPs are more focussed on strategic and operative
decision-making and, thus, trying to improve the efficiency and profitability of the underlying
investment companies (De Fontenay (2014)). Operational engineering may come in form of im-
provements in production, cost structures, marketing, human resource management, inorganic
growth, repositioning in the market, or restructuring (Acharya et al. (2012), Lee et al. (2001),
Wright et al. (2001)). According to Perembetov et al. (2014), operational engineering and its
underlying improvements comprise about 51 percent of the total value creation in PE, whereas
financial engineering and multiple effects explain 31 percent and 18 percent, respectively. Gen-
erally, SBOs inherit some theoretical problems with respect to operational engineering. The
idea of PE is that either GPs are good at identifying and selecting strong performing companies
or they are able to optimise portfolio companies throughout the investment period. After the
completion of the holding period, there should not be any or only little value creation poten-
tial left. Thus, after the PBO, the SBO should not be able to achieve a significantly more
additional value compared to the first buyout round. Achleitner & Figge (2014), however, find
that financial buyouts still offer potential for operational performance, such as sales growth and
margin expansion, which have not been developed during the PBOs. Therefore, SBOs do not
develop differently compared to PBOs.
Growth and expansion as value drivers should be relevant in buyout rounds, but probably more
during the PBO because a lot of capital is invested into the portfolio company to gain high
market shares and expand quickly. Although SBO investors may also try to grow the portfolio
company, further market growth may be more difficult to achieve as marginal costs to achieve
the growth are higher, resulting in a lower expected effect of growth on value creation.
GPs do not only make use of expansive growth but also ultimately turn the previous growth
into profitable cashflows. Thus, we expect that an improvement in profitability has a positive
influence on value creation during both buyout rounds. However, this effect could be more
relevant during the SBO because the portfolio company is older and thus potentially further
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developed in the business life cycle. After the growth period during the PBO, the SBO may
aim on streamlining the business as a following step.
PE investments belong to the illiquid investment class and, therefore, do not suffer from any
short-term goals from shareholders. The portfolio companies do not need to provide a huge
degree of liquidity, just enough to run the business smoothly. Shortages in liquidity may also
be covered by further capital injections by the financial sponsor. Thus, we expect that financial
sponsors focus less on the portfolio companies’ liquidity and, therefore, that there is a negative
effect of liquidity on value creation during the buyout rounds.
The growth and expansion of companies during buyout rounds leads to inflated balance sheet
positions (e.g. assets and equity). Consequently, efficiency ratios suffer as the input variables
may increase more than the output variables. The portfolio company is possibly streamlined
with respect to those measures during the SBO as part of the “fine-tuning” after the imple-
mentation of main value drivers during the PBO. We, therefore, expect a positive correlation
with value growth during the SBO but an insignificant effect during the PBO.
During a PBO the PE firm may aim to invest heavily to foster growth, which may also come
in form of growth in intangible assets, representing mainly innovation and brand value. The
SBO investor can either make use of the increased level of innovation or even further invest in
research and development. Due to superior negotiation skills of PE firms and the accompanying
high exit price of the portfolio company (Achleitner et al. (2011)), it is reasonable to assume an
above average development of goodwill in PBOs. Assuming similar negotiation skills between
PBO and SBO investors, the amount of goodwill should not change a lot during the SBO.
Thus, we expect a stronger increase of innovation and brand value during the PBO and, thus,
a greater effect on value creation.
3.4.1 Methodology
We analyse which determinants are related to value growth of the portfolio companies. As the
SBOs directly follow the PBOs, we are able to construct a determinant analysis in form of a
panel analysis. The model is defined as:
yit = α + β ∗Xit + γ ∗ Yt +  (3.4)
where X describes the firm-specific variables and Y describes the macroeconomic variables for
firm i at transaction date t.
The potential main value drivers are commonly used by other papers and serve well as a start of
a determinant analysis (e.g. Achleitner & Figge (2014), Bonini (2015), Achleitner et al. (2011)).
For that purpose, we include growth, profitability, leverage, liquidity, eifficiency, and innovation
in this model. However, as we were able to retrieve the whole profit and loss account and balance
sheet we improve the analysis by including more detailed performance measures. We analyse
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the excess growth of the individual characteristics compared to its predefined peer group of
public companies. We use a random-effects model, as the Hausman-test estimates between
random and fixed effects are not significantly different from another (Hausman (1978)). We
assume that we control for most of the relevant characteristics and the unobservable effects are
rather small. Therefore, a random-effect model is also sensible from an economic point of view.
Afterwards, we apply an OLS regression for both PBOs and SBO separately. This helps to iden-
tify if value drivers are different between both buyout rounds. The variables and specification
are the same as in the panel regression.
3.4.2 Results
The determinant analyses consist each of three specifications which are displayed in Tables
3.4-3.6. The base case specifications only consider the four multiples that were used to perform
the valuation of the observed company. Afterwards, in the second specifications, we further
include controls for the size, the holding period, the macroeconomic environment, the time,
and the main industry the company operates in. In the third specifications, we complete the
regressions by adding more detailed firm characteristics that should serve as value drivers.
The determinant analysis for all buyouts is a combination of the following two determinant
analyses about PBOs and SBOs. Table 3.4 shows the results of all buyouts for comparison.
The results are not further discussed as we rank the importance of the value drivers in PBO
and SBO separately higher than for all buyouts in general. We can confirm that the results for
all buyouts align with the PE literature.
Table 3.5 displays the determinant analysis of PBOs. The growth of a portfolio company is
a significant value driver for primary buyouts, as both sales CAGR and equity growth have
positive and significant coefficients. Companies that expand their total sales and improve the
operative earnings margin are likely to increase their operative cash flows and, thus, create
higher value. Higher equity is equal to a greater intrinsic book value of the company. Fur-
ther, those companies that are able to increase their equity over time indicate a positive past
performance and higher stability, thus increasing the company value.
Profitability seems to play various roles for value drivers in PBOs. The EBITDA margin is sig-
nificant for all specifications and the profit margin for the last, most relevant, specifications as
well. The coefficient of the EBITDA margin is in line with the previous finding that ultimately,
and in combination with sales increase, operative earnings, and operative cash flows may be
increased. Interestingly, the profit margin coefficient is not significant for the first two speci-
fications but becomes weakly significant and negatively correlated to the company’s valuation
for the third specification. This observation indicates that portfolio companies aiming to have
a great profit margin, without considering the other value drivers, may have a bad overall value
development. Portfolio companies that intend to increase their profit margin seem to perform
worse at other value drivers, e.g. sacrificing the growth in sales for a higher profitability margin.
Furthermore, due to a strong leverage, portfolio companies tend to pay high interest and, thus,
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Table 3.4: Determinant Analysis: Total Buyouts
(1) (2) (3)
Growth
SalesG 0.885
∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EquityG 0.018
∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability
EBITDA marginG 0.788
∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profit marginG -0.040 0.008 -0.192
∗
(0.61) (0.93) (0.04)
Return on equityG 0.058
(0.08)
Return on assetsG 2.007
∗∗∗
(0.00)
Leverage ratioG -0.002
(0.06)
Liquidity
Cash ratioG -0.056
(0.59)
Current ratioG 0.044
(0.29)
Efficiency
Receivables Turnover RatioG -0.002
(0.27)
Inventory Sales RatioG -0.195
∗∗∗
(0.00)
Altman Z-scoreG 0.008
(0.57)
Intangible asset ratioG 0.403
∗
(0.02)
log (total assets) 0.006 0.016
(0.80) (0.54)
log (holding period) -0.120 -0.147∗
(0.06) (0.02)
Macro controls NO YES YES
Time Dummy NO YES YES
Industry Dummy NO YES YES
Constant 0.095∗∗ 708.192 979.980∗
(0.01) (0.14) (0.04)
Overall R2 0.264 0.396 0.467
Number of Observations 590 590 572
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel random-effects regression. For all three specifications,
the dependent variable is the excess company value growth. The first specification represents the base case
which includes the variables used in the valuation of the company. The second specification adds time controls,
industry controls and selected macroeconomic variables. The third specification adds more company-specific
variables that influence the company value. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the respective
coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%. The lower case G indicates
whether the variable is a measure of excess growth.
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Table 3.5: Determinant Analysis: Primary Buyouts
(1) (2) (3)
Growth
SalesG 0.877
∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗ 0.730∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
EquityG 0.019
∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability
EBITDA marginG 0.851
∗∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.922∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Profit marginG -0.185 -0.288 -0.325
∗
(0.15) (0.09) (0.04)
Return on equityG 0.072
(0.25)
Return on assetsG 0.543
(0.60)
Leverage ratioG -0.001
(0.58)
Liquidity
Cash ratioG -0.036
(0.73)
Current ratioG 0.029
(0.55)
Efficiency
Receivables turnover ratioG -0.003
(0.05)
Inventory sales ratioG -0.035
(0.41)
Alman Z-score 0.116
(0.32)
Intangible asset ratioG 0.511
∗
(0.02)
log (total assets) 0.039 0.037
(0.27) (0.31)
log (holding period) -0.002 -0.017
(0.99) (0.89)
Macro controls NO YES YES
Time Dummy NO YES YES
Industry Dummy NO YES YES
Constant 0.005 83.267 80.230
(0.90) (0.05) (0.06)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.361 0.356 0.380
Number of observations 294 294 290
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the OLS regression for all PBOs. For all three specifications,
the dependent variable is the excess company value growth. The first specification represents the base case
which includes the variables used in the valuation of the company. The second specification adds time controls,
industry controls and selected macroeconomic variables. The third specification adds more company-specific
variables that influence the company value. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the respective
coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%. The lower case G indicates
whether the variable is a measure of excess growth.
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portfolio companies may have negative net earnings. The return on assets and equity are not
significant, indicating that the necessary capital may work against the increase in earnings.
In this sample, financial engineering does not seem to be relevant as the coefficient is not
statistically significant. However, this development of the financial leverage may be explained
because GPs aim to reduce the leverage towards the end of the holding period as can be inferred
as well from the summary statistics. Therefore, this explanation may be a reason why there is
not an effect on the value creation of a PBO portfolio company.
As expected, the excess developments of liquidity and efficiency do not influence the value
creation during the PBO. These findings, however, need to be treated with caution because
due to the construction of this dataset, SBOs are the follow-up investors. Assuming that PE
investors care less about the underlying liquidity of companies compared to strategic buyers,
PBO investors do not focus as much on this measure because SBO investors simply may not
regard these developments as valid selection criteria.
PBOs seem to benefit from early innovation and improvement of goodwill. Portfolio companies
that increase the share of intangible assets in total assets have a stronger value growth. This
might be explained by the fact that those younger companies tend to focus more on intellectual
property generation or goodwill growth than companies with older and traditional mind-sets.
This finding needs to be treated with caution as well. The result can be heavily driven by the
increase from goodwill after the exit of the PBO when there was a comparably lower goodwill
before the PBO.
The results of the SBO value driver analysis are presented in Table 3.6. Growth seems to
be less important in SBOs than in PBOs. The sales CAGR is only significant for the first
specifications with a positive coefficient. The coefficient is slightly higher than in specifications
of the PBO, which may indicate that during the PBO the expansion of the business probably
comes at lower costs as low hanging fruits can easily be collected.
The focus of profitability changes during SBOs compared to PBOs. The development of excess
EBITDA margin is weakly significant and positive for the first and the third specification with
a slightly lower coefficient than in the PBO analysis. This finding meets the expectation, as
companies with a positive development of a profitability experience superior operative earn-
ings, which contributes to a higher company value. However, the weaker effect of the excess
EBITDA margin development on value creation for SBOs compared to PBOs indicates that
the improvement comes along with higher opportunity costs during the SBO than during the
PBO. The return on assets is positively correlated and significant with a very high coefficient,
showing that the return on assets is extremely important in SBOs. It seems that portfolio
companies may become cost efficient, in terms of EBITDA margin, during the PBO but lack
the asset efficiency in order to achieve that certain profitability. As shown in the t-test, total
assets increase strongly during the PBO. This increase in assets seems to be higher in compar-
ison to the improvement in operative earnings. During an SBO the GP increases total assets
significantly less than during a PBO, indicating that total assets are not build up unnecessarily
66 CHAPTER 3. PERFORMANCE DEPENDENCY OF SECONDARY BUYOUTS
Table 3.6: Determinant Analysis: Secondary Buyouts
(1) (2) (3)
Growth
SalesG 0.932
∗∗ 0.786 0.636
(0.00) (0.10) (0.22)
EquityG -0.002 -0.007 -0.000
(0.82) (0.64) (1.00)
Profitability
EBITDA marginG 0.788
∗ 0.733 0.863∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Profit marginG 0.069 0.155 -0.126
(0.75) (0.53) (0.28)
Return on equityG 0.085
(0.41)
Return on assetsG 3.829
∗∗
(0.01)
Leverage ratioG -0.003
(0.29)
Liquiditiy
Cash ratioG -0.051
(0.82)
Current ratioG 0.138
∗
(0.03)
Efficiency
Receivables turnover ratioG 0.026
(0.11)
Inventory Sales RatioG -0.265
∗∗∗
(0.00)
Altman Z-score -0.208
(0.09)
Intangible asset ratioG -0.307
(0.67)
log (total assets) -0.035 -0.044
(0.43) (0.32)
log (holding period) -0.202 -0.267∗
(0.10) (0.05)
Macro controls NO YES YES
Time Dummy NO YES YES
Industry Dummy NO YES YES
Constant 0.186∗∗∗ 1251.213 1917.697
(0.00) (0.37) (0.14)
Adjusted R-Sqaured 0.216 0.183 0.287
Number of observations 294 294 282
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the OLS regression for all PBOs. For all three specifications,
the dependent variable is the excess company value growth. The first specification represents the base case
which includes the variables used in the valuation of the company. The second specification adds time controls,
industry controls and selected macroeconomic variables. The third specification adds more company-specific
variables that influence the company value. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the respective
coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%. The lower case G indicates
whether the variable is a measure of excess growth.
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during an SBO, which goes along with a better return on assets.
Similar to the finding for PBOs, financial engineering does not have a statistically significant
effect on value creation during the SBO. This absence of significance is probably driven for the
same reason as for PBOs that the leverage is reduced towards the end of the holding period
anyways and therefore the full effect cannot be observed.
In contrast to PBOs, in SBOs it is rather important to focus more on liquidity. One of the two
possible measures for liquidity, namely the current ratio, is significant with a positive coefficient.
This result indicates that financial sponsors should hold sufficient current assets to cover all
outstanding short-term payables. This is increasingly important when the SBO exits via a
strategic sale or through an IPO as liquidity is reasonably more important to non-PE buyers.
This reason also explains the difference between PBOs and SBOs for liquidity as value driver
during the holding period.
Efficiency gains throughout the SBO holding period also become increasingly important. The
inventory sales ratio is highly significant and negatively correlated, as expected. GPs pursue
inventory management and indicate that they can sell off their inventory quickly or find ways of
using the inventory more efficiently. This measure is also amplified through the former analysis
of the return on assets metric, as good inventory management reduces the amount of necessary
current assets to achieve a certain level of sales and ultimately operative earnings.
The excess development of innovation is not significant for value creation during SBOs. As
expected, innovation does not play a role in value creation for SBOs. As the overall value
creation is not superior for SBOs compared to PBOs an above-average development of goodwill
will not be achieved at time of the exit. Further, total assets increase significantly less during
the SBO compared to the PBO. This indicates that probably less growth in intangible assets
can be recognized.
3.5 Selection Criteria for SBOs
The previous analysis shows that the value drivers differ across buyout rounds, but still do have
some similarities. The differences may be explained by two factors. First, the typical GP of
an SBO may prefer to implement other measures than the GP of a PBO. Second, and more
importantly, different action needs to be taken considering the state of the company at the
time of the investment entry. Whereas PBOs stem from a less specialised and less streamlined
field of business, i.e. the non-PE backed background, SBO investors acquire companies that
have been in the hand of a GP before. Having the same PE driven mindset can serve beneficial
for SBOs because the business structures are very similar and many of the favourable traits
(such as governance engineering) are already implemented in the business. On the contrary,
the potential for value creation might be closed and only little or no potential to create value
exists.
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Achleitner & Figge (2014) argue that SBOs are able to exploit gaps of value creation if the
optimisation process during the PBO could not been completed. The remaining potential for
SBOs may occur for several reasons. For example, there may not be enough time in the lifespan
of the funds and the portfolio company must be sold early before the GP could cover the whole
potential of value creation (Jenkinson & Sousa (2011)). For marketing purposes during the
fund raising, some investments will be exited early to illustrate good performance to potential
investors (Wang (2012) Jenkinson & Sousa (2011)).
As this paper aims to identify the dependency of value creation, we take a closer look at
the value chain. As a first step, a good potential target needs to be identified. Identifying
good investment targets based on past performance indicators is also done in non-PE areas
of corporate finance (e.g. Capron & Shen (2007)). The selection of targets should not differ
between PE and non-PE in the way how the analysis is conducted. Therefore, we analyse
the effect of the portfolio company’s development during the PBO on the excess value creation
during the SBO. This approach helps to identify individual good traits of an SBO. The academic
findings on target selection from a PE perspective are unusually silent. Whereas Jenkinson &
Sousa (2015) describe in which situations SBOs are the best choice of exit, there is only little
evidence on the characteristics of the process from a buying perspective.
Growth during the PBO may be a very important selection criteria. Usually during the PBO,
GPs aim to scale the portfolio company. The odds to sufficiently expand the company during
the SBO are reasonably low if the PBO investor was not able to do so, assuming a similar
ability to implement growth strategies. Thus, it might be worth looking at strongly growing
companies which represent a good acceptance of the market and an increasing market share.
Therefore, we expect that the portfolio company’s expansion during the PBO has a positive
effect on the value creation during the SBO.
Consistent with the argument that targets of SBOs are further progressed in the business life
cycle, improving the portfolio company’s profitability during the SBO might be the consequent
step forward. As seen in the previous analyses, the EBITDA development is positively and
the development of the profit negatively correlated to the value creation within the buyout.
Thus, the portfolio company may already be quite profitable and further improvement of the
profitability is rather difficult. Due to the mixed explanations, on average we do not expect
that the profitability development during the PBO has a significant effect on the value creation
during the SBO.
The probability that the portfolio company is exited via SBO is higher when the underlying
company has a great debt bearing capacity (Achleitner et al. (2014)), indicating that leverage
seems to be important to potential financial acquirers. Although leverage is not a significant
value driver in our sample, it may be possible that the optimal capital structure has already
been found during the PBO. When the leverage is relatively low after the PBO or the portfolio
company is able to absorb additional debt, leverage may very well be a value driver for SBOs.
Therefore, we expect leverage development during the PBO to have a negative effect on value
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creation during the SBO.
Liquidity does not seem to be important to GPs, as they can cover shortages in liquidity by
providing more capital to the portfolio company. On the other hand, GPs do not intend to
inject unnecessary capital into the company and, thus, a low level of liquidity is not desired.
Therefore, on average, whether the investment becomes more liquid during the PBO should
not matter for the decision of investing in an SBO as long as the liquidity is acceptable from a
buyer’s point of view.
As can be inferred from the previous analysis, efficiency gains are made in SBOs to create value.
SBO investors may focus on this area in a second step because the implementation of efficiency
gains may not belong to the category of low-hanging fruits. The less efficient companies are
during the PBO in contrast to their peers, the more attractive they become as potential targets
for SBOs because there is simply more space for improvement. Thus, we expect that the
efficiency improvement during the PBO is negatively correlated to the value creation during
the SBO.
Innovation during the PBO may indicate strongly growing companies and thus align with the
growth hypothesis. At the same time, SBO investors may wish to invest in companies that
are not as innovative yet. Investments may foster the value growth more in less innovative
companies compared to high-end developed companies. Due to these mixed explanations, we
do not expect a significant effect of the degree of innovation during the PBO on the development
of the company value during the SBO.
3.5.1 Methodology
After understanding which value drivers are generally important to control, we analyse if and
how the success in the second investment round is dependent on the development of the per-
formance drivers during the PBO. We calculate the possibility of an SBO being successful
depending on the success of the PBO. A deal is defined as successful when it produces a su-
perior company value development compared to its predefined peer group. Those companies
that have an above average development are assigned a ”1” in a binary variable setting. Due to
the assignment in the binary variable setting, we are able to estimate probabilities whether an
investment is going to be successful conditional on the outcome of the prior investment. This
overview provides a first idea whether there might be dependencies between the two buyout
stages. The conditional probabilities for each case are estimated as follows:
P (SBO|PBO) = P (SBO ∩ PBO)
P (PBO)
(3.5)
In addition, we use an OLS regression to determine whether the development during the PBO
has any influence on the value creation during the SBO. This analysis determines which compa-
nies are suitable for an SBO. We regress the excess valuation development during the secondary
buyout conditional on the excess developments of the value drivers during the PBO. We use
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the same value drivers as in the determinant analysis following this model specification:
yit(SBO) = α + β ∗Xit(PBO) + γ ∗ Yt +  (3.6)
where y describes the company value growth of company i at time t during the SBO, X de-
scribes devlopment of the firm-specific variables during the PBO and Y describes the economic
variables.
3.5.2 Results
The probability tree in Figure 3.4 shows the success probabilities for all buyout rounds and the
conditional probabilities for all four cases after the SBO. In our sample there are more deals
that outperformed their peer group than deals that underperformed compared to their peer
group.
Figure 3.4: Conditional Probability
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Note: This figure shows the (conditional) success probabilities during the PBO and SBO.
The conditional probabilities of the SBO being successful are rather similar with 64.9 percent
and 67.3 percent for a successful and unsuccessful PBOs, respectively. Thus, it seems that PE
investors themselves may perform superior compared to other shareholders and, thus, on average
foster the companies’ growth more than their peer group. However, after any development of
the PBO there are evidentially some small differences between outperforming the market and
underperforming the market. The conditional probabilities show that there are slight differences
for the success of the SBO conditional on how the PBO performed. However, the differences
are not very big and, thus, we may need a more detailed analysis on how to engage in a
successful SBO. Possibly, SBO investors need to adjust their stategy according to the company
development during the PBO. Therefore, in the following we analyse which companies are
especially suitable for good SBOs.
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Table 3.7 summarises the results of the OLS regression. The evidence about dependency of
growth and expansion during the PBO is rather mixed. In all specifications the value growth
during the PBO has a negative influence on the value growth during the SBO with a high
significance. Those companies, which develop a higher company value during the PBO than
their competitors, perform worse during the SBO. This result follows the idea that most of value
creation potential is already used up during the PBO. This result corroborates the finding from
the conditional probabilities, but its extent is weaker as the conditional probabilities for success
are only in a binary variable setting and, thus, inherit less variation. This theory aligns with
the partially significant and negative coefficients in equity development during the PBO as a
measure of intrinsic value growth. The sales CAGR is at least for the last specification weakly
significant with a positive coefficient. Companies that grow rapidly represent great market
acceptance and, therefore, may promise potential further growth in the future. These results
indicate that it is beneficial when the intrinsic value of the company developed rather weakly
during the PBO, whilst the market participation, measured in sales, grows.
The results for SBO value creation based on the excess profitability development during the
PBO is also mixed. The development of the excess EBITDA margin during the PBO is sta-
tistically significant and positively correlated to the value growth during the SBO. GPs should
invest into companies having a good operative margin. Companies that could not be improved
into more efficient companies during the PBO may not improve the EBITDA margin during
the SBO either as some businesses are not possible to streamline further. In contrast to the
EBITDA-margin, the return on assets ratio is negatively and significantly correlated. We ob-
serve that it is important to find companies that have a suboptimal usage of their assets. This
finding aligns with the previous regression that return on assets is a very strong value driver
for SBOs. Therefore, it seems that portfolio companies should have great operating earnings
but require further fine-tuning according to asset usage. This finding is further backed by the
inventory sales ratio. According to this variable, PE firms should acquire companies that are
bad at selling off and managing their inventory, i.e. using parts of their assets inefficiently.
Potentially, during an SBO the GP can sell off the excessive inventory, thereby reducing its
working capital and, thus, improving its profitability with respect to the invested assets.
The coefficient of the financial leverage is not significant as expected. Leverage does not seem to
be a value driver neither in the PBO nor in the SBO. Thus, it would be highly abnormal if the
development of the leverage during the PBO had an impact on value creation during the SBO.
Interestingly, the current ratio is not significant in this regression, following the significance as
SBO value driver. This can be due to the fact that this metric works a little different compared
to other measures. It is assumed that low-hanging fruits can be collected for measures such
as the EBITDA margin, i.e. with increasing marginal costs to improve. The liquidity measure
may have a more linear function of marginal improvement and, therefore, does not need a bad
development during the PBO anyway.
Interestingly, the intangible asset’s coefficient is statistically not significant. As the overall value
creation during the PBO is negatively correlated, we would have expected a similar result, solely
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Table 3.7: Target Selection
(1) (2) (3)
Growth
ValuationPBO,G -0.345
∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SalesPBO,G 0.222 0.276 0.394
∗
(0.06) (0.14) (0.04)
EquityPBO,G -0.474
∗ -0.422∗ -0.330
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Profitability
EBITDA marginPBO,G 0.164
∗ 0.145∗ 0.189∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Profit marginPBO,G -0.088 -0.025 -0.052
(0.35) (0.68) (0.60)
Return on assetsPBO,G -0.295
∗∗∗
(0.00)
Return on equityPBO,G -0.001
(0.85)
Leverage ratioPBO,G -0.000
(0.51)
Liquidity
Cash ratioPBO,G 0.069
(0.09)
Current ratioPBO,G -0.041
(0.07)
Efficiency
Receivables turnover ratioPBO,G 0.001
(0.60)
Inventory Sales RatioPBO,G 0.543
∗∗∗
(0.00)
Altman Z-scorePBO,G 0.010
(0.73)
Intangible asset ratioPBO,G -0.062
(0.66)
log (holding period)PBO -0.132 -0.123
(0.07) (0.12)
log (total assets)SBO -0.020 -0.040
(0.46) (0.10)
Macro controls NO YES YES
Time Dummy NO YES YES
Industry Dummy NO YES YES
Constant 0.266∗∗∗ 2.773 4.570
(0.00) (0.59) (0.37)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.062 0.136 0.292
Number of observations 295 294 290
The table above shows the estimates of the OLS model regressing the excess valuation growth during the SBO
on the excess variable developments during the PBO. The first specification represents the base case which
includes the variables used in the valuation of the company. The second specification adds time controls,
industry controls and selected macroeconomic variables. The third specification adds more company-specific
variables that influence the company value. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the respective
coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%. The lower case G indicates
whether the variable is a measure of excess growth.
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from the perspective of a goodwill creation. It seems that SBO investors do not seek companies
that develop the degree of innovation during the holding period of the PBO. Thus, the growth
in sales during the SBO does not necessarily depend on the products and services’ degree of
innovation.
3.6 SBO Value Drivers are Conditional on PBO Devel-
opment
Knowing the fundamental selection criteria for value creation in superior SBOs, raises the ques-
tions how to exploit the further potential of value creation in the acquired portfolio company.
Considering the previous development of the portfolio company, the value drivers should differ
slightly from the first analyses in which the average effect of value drivers in SBOs is measured.
Certain developments during the PBO may force the GP of the SBO to act in a way that
the GP would not do otherwise. Generally, there should be three potential ways on how to
generate further value. First, the second GP takes exactly the same action as the first GP
because there is still value creation potential left. Second, the SBO investor works on a similar
measure but is better performing or takes a different approach. Third, as Degeorge et al. (2016)
finds, the GP takes different actions and works on other areas of interest, i.e. complementary
skill sets. Their study argues from another perspective than we do. They try to categorize the
GPs considering their skillset and analyse the effect on value creation during the SBO. Our
paper claims that the skillsets of GPs belongs either to the category of expansion or to the
category of a margin grower, thus, possibly oversimplifying the skillsets of GPs. In our view, it
is very likely that the GPs have multiple skillsets to act accordingly to very different companies.
Thus, we do not categorize the GPs but rather observe what has been done during both buyout
rounds. Observing the development in value drivers clearly shows what the particular GP is
capable of doing. Authors like Achleitner & Figge (2014) also argue that the main value drivers
have already been implemented during the investment period of the PBO and, therefore, the
remaining potential value gap supposedly is relatively small. This explanation indicates that
new measures need to be taken to exploit other gaps of value creation. Possibly, a mixture
of all three aforementioned explanations might work in SBOs. Therefore, we expect differing
value drivers depending on the various selection criteria.
3.6.1 Methodology
After identifying the characteristics for suitable targets it is crucial to know what to do with
the investment once it is acquired. During the analysis of the target selection we identified five
company specific characteristics that make the acquisition of the portfolio company reasonable.
These characteristics are lower company growth, strong sales growth, superior EBITDA margin
development, weaker development in return on assets, and improved inventory sales ratio. We
perform subsampling for all identified value drivers during the regressions for target selection,
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e.g. if we identified a negative value driver in the previous question, we construct a subsample
consisting of all observations that underperform in that specific value driver compared to its
peer group. We are able to analyse what to do with a portfolio company if one of the previous
selection criteria is met. We may be able to recognise similarities in the required actions of
the different subsamples to finally identify which performance drivers increase the portfolio
companies’ valuation as much as possible. In this analysis, we look at those individual selection
criteria separately. Thus, we apply an OLS regression for all SBOs with different subsamples:
yit(SBO) = α + β ∗Xit(SBO) + γ ∗ Yt +  (3.7)
where y describes the company value growth of company i at time t during the SBO, X describes
the firm-specific variables development during the SBO and Y describes the economic variables.
3.6.2 Results
The results are summarised in Table 3.8. The five specifications represent the subsamples ac-
cording to the significant variables from the previous question, namely valuation growth, sales
growth, EBITDA margin development, return on asset development and inventory sales ratio
development. The first specification considers the subsample of all companies that underper-
formed in terms of valuation growth during the PBO. It is hard to analyse this subsample of 106
companies are characterised, as there are several value drivers during the PBO. The coefficient
of the profit margin is significant with an economically relevant effect. The other specifications
provide a better insight how the acquired companies are characterised and are more interesting
to this study.
The second specification analyses the subsample for those companies that had a superior sales
development compared to its peers. Interestingly, the coefficient for sales is not significant,
although, we found some significance in the SBO determinant analysis. This observation may
indicate that GPs neglect the further excessive expansion of sales when a company grew strongly
in the past. On the other hand, the equity growth has a positive and significant coefficient, indi-
cating that successful SBOs are able to channel their earnings into equity. The return on assets
is both significant and also highly positive, indicating that it is highly important to improve
the effective usage of the portfolio company’s assets in order to realise strong value growth.
Thus, GPs should focus to redirect the previous strong sales growth into a profitable operation
in relation to its invested assets. The leverage ratio development is significant with a negative
coefficient indicating that the proportion of liabilities to equity should decrease. It confirms
that financial engineering is less relevant when the underlying company has strongly expanded
before and probably does not need further capital to generate additional value. Furthermore,
it has the effect to reduce the amount of total assets which aligns well with the reasoning about
the improvement in return on assets.
The third specification focuses on those companies whose excess EBITDA margin development
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Table 3.8: SBO Value Drivers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Valuation Sales EBITDA RoA Inventory
Growth
SalesSBO,G 0.004 0.413 0.980
∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EquitySBO,G 0.780 0.474
∗ 0.335 0.362 0.170
(0.10) (0.02) (0.30) (0.05) (0.61)
Profitability
EBITDA marginSBO,G 0.047 0.075 -0.128 0.564
∗∗ 0.208
(0.84) (0.81) (0.26) (0.01) (0.18)
Profit marginSBO,G 0.202
∗∗ 0.496 0.251 0.020 0.024
(0.01) (0.19) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49)
Return on assetsSBO,G -0.713 1.918
∗ 2.243∗∗ 0.057 0.005
(0.70) (0.02) (0.01) (0.96) (1.00)
Return on equitySBO,G -0.010 0.026 0.003 0.023 0.011
(0.66) (0.25) (0.79) (0.25) (0.50)
Leverage ratioSBO,G 0.001 -0.004
∗ -0.003 0.000 -0.001
(0.84) (0.03) (0.18) (0.91) (0.62)
Liquidity
Cash ratioSBO,G 0.028 0.085 0.034
∗∗∗ -0.042 0.188
(0.06) (0.32) (0.00) (0.64) (0.34)
Current ratioSBO,G -0.001 -0.013 0.000 -0.029 -0.038
(0.66) (0.52) (0.86) (0.47) (0.41)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratioSBO,G -1.621 -0.211 -0.118 -2.886 -3.147
(0.55) (0.74) (0.83) (0.07) (0.06)
Receivables turnover ratioSBO,G 0.010 -0.058 -0.055 0.011 -0.039
(0.30) (0.06) (0.09) (0.22) (0.07)
Altman Z-score 0.088 -0.054 0.118 0.099 -0.281
(0.23) (0.60) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08)
Intangible asset ratioSBO,G -0.083 0.084 0.002 -0.769
∗∗ -0.124
(0.54) (0.31) (0.99) (0.00) (0.63)
log (holding period)SBO,G -0.296 -0.071 -0.025 -0.084 -0.051
(0.11) (0.28) (0.72) (0.31) (0.58)
log (total assets)SBO -0.000 -0.000 0.000
∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.94) (0.56) (0.02) (0.56) (0.49)
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.581 7.520 3.729 2.002 -5.672
(0.95) (0.11) (0.50) (0.80) (0.30)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.358 0.405 0.456 0.490 0.503
Number of observations 106 205 171 135 141
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the OLS model regressing the excess valuation growth during the
SBO on the excess variable developments during the SBO. All specifications include the base variables, time
controls, industry controls, macroeconomic variables and additional company-specific variables. The specifica-
tions are subsamples that represent the target selection criteria identified in the second research question. The
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the respective coefficients. The significance levels for all specifi-
cations are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%. The lower case G indicates whether the variable is a measure of excess
growth.
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was positive, i.e. the company developed its operative earnings margin better than its peer
group during the PBO. The coefficient for sales growth is significant and positive, meaning that
GPs should rather concentrate on expanding the portfolio company’s sales when the operating
structures already became leaner. The portfolio companies may benefit strongly as for every
additional unit in sales the operative earnings are relatively high. The company should aim
to improve the effective utilisation of assets as the significant coefficient for return on assets
is very high positive. The size of the company at entry of the SBO, measured in total assets,
is significantly and positively correlated to value growth, but the coefficient is too small to be
economically relevant. Furthermore, the cash ratio is highly significant and positive, showing
that the GPs need to use their profitable situation to build up cash, which may be used either
to repay the high amount of debt or to invest.
The fourth specification includes those companies whose return on assets has not developed as
well as their peers. These companies need to consider the growth of the company and turn
the company into a more profitable organisation with an increased operating cash flows. It
seems that the inferior return on assets is driven by lower operative earnings. Interestingly, the
intangible asset ratio is significant and negatively correlated to value creation. It seems that
counteracting the inferior return on assets is achieved by the reduction of intangible assets.
They seem to be less effective in generating earnings, at least in the short-run and, therefore,
SBO investors reduce the level of intangible assets on total assets.
The last specification concerns those companies that developed the inventory sales ratio stronger
than their close competitors during the PBO, i.e. being worse at inventory management than
the peer group. In this specification, only the sales growth coefficient is significant and positive.
This indicates that rather than reducing the inventory for a certain level of sales, higher sales
should be targeted.
Very interestingly, companies are not only successful when they have additional skillsets as
previously assumed. First, they do apply additional skillsets, e.g. improving return on assets
during the SBO after sales growth during the PBO. Thereby they do something different to
create further value in a consecutive buyout. Second, SBO investors work on a similar area of
value drivers, e.g. increasing profitability by improving return on assets, although profitability
was already focussed on during the PBO as the EBITDA margin has been improved strongly.
However, it seems that SBO investors do not simply continue with the previous strategy by
doing the same over again in the second buyout round.
Generally, there are different types of characteristics that make PBO portfolio companies inter-
esting for an SBO. Our analysis shows that there is not just a single value driver for SBOs but
rather a combination of reactions to the operational development during the PBO. Often the
reasons for acquiring a company in an SBO are manifold. However, the different indicators give
a good first insight on how to handle portfolio companies in different economic and operational
situations. The investors may decide to which category the investment belongs, test whether
the significant value drivers can be implemented, and then decide accordingly.
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3.7 Conclusion
With a dataset of 295 companies undergoing consecutive PBOs and SBOs this paper answers
three research questions. First, we analyse whether PBOs and SBOs have differing value
drivers. Second, we answer the question how a company should have developed during the
PBO to be suitable for an SBO. Third, we investigate the separate value drivers dependent
on the previous development of the portfolio company. Our paper contributes to the existing
literature in many ways. The dataset is different from most papers, as it considers consecutive
deals rather than PBO and SBO separately. Up to our knowledge this dataset is the largest
and most detailed one with this specific construction of back-to-back buyouts. The dataset
thus enables a more sensible way to analyse different sets of value drivers. Furthermore, as we
hand-collect many data items, we are able to analyse other characteristics that have not been
properly examined yet. It is also the first paper which does not only investigate the differences
between the two buyouts but rather looks at the dependency between the two buyout rounds
based on a fundamental analysis.
The descriptive summary indicates different value creation profiles of PBO and SBO. Like many
other studies, we see that the portfolio companies develop operationally well compared to its non
PE-backed peers. Interestingly, the mean differences between PBO and SBO are not significant
for most of the applied measures. However, the median differences of the same measures are
often significantly different from another, mostly with better medians for the PBO. The mean
for the valuation CAGR is greater for SBOs than for PBOs, whilst the median value is greater
in PBOs than in SBOs. This is the first indication that it is possible to create more value
during an SBO than during PBOs but there is simply much more volatility in the operational
success of an SBO. Thus, we look closer into the value creation of buyouts and especially of
SBOs. The dependency analyses help to identify mechanisms that promote successful SBOs.
We find that dependencies between the operational performance of PBOs and the operational
performance of SBOs exist. We identify five developments during the PBO that influence the
value creation during the SBO and thus serve well as selection criteria. The more value was
created during the PBO, the less attractive it becomes as potential target for an SBO. However,
SBO investors should seek to invest into strongly expanding companies as these companies
represent promising markets and, by this, stronger pertinence. When a portfolio company’s
profitability developed well during the PBO it becomes favourable for SBO acquisitions. An
inferior return on assets on the other hand is favourable as it allows further fine-tuning during
the SBO. Lastly, the less a portfolio companies improves its efficiency during the PBO, the
higher the value creation during the SBO.
The required action taken by the SBO investors differs among the identified selection criteria.
Generally, two types of value drivers exist which are conditional on certain selection criteria.
First, we find supporting evidence that complementary skillsets exist, e.g. when sales are
developed strongly during the PBO, SBO investors tend to improve the profitability of the
portfolio companies. Second, the SBO investors also work on similar measures as the PBO
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investors but do it differently, e.g. although profitability is focussed on PBO, in terms of
EBITDA margin, the SBO investor still aims to work on the profitability, but rather focuses on
the improvement of the return on assets. SBO investors either need to set different objectives
for their performnce management compared to PBO investors or they concentrate on the same
objectives with a different approach. However, a simple continuation of the PBO strategy does
not create value during the SBO.
Future research may expand this study by further analysing the combination of these effects.
Whilst our study provides an initial overview on which companies to acquire and what to do
once they are acquired, these findings solely focus on individual effects. Usually, companies
are acquired for several reasons rather than just one. This directly effects the combination of
what to do with the portfolio company and may differ from what we found. Further, up to this
point, it is not clear which of the proposed dependencies provides the greatest success.
Chapter 4
Risk of Financial Distress in Secondary
Buyouts
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4.1 Introduction
Especially in recent times of extremely low interest rates, financial investors are facing a difficult
time. There is plenty of money available to be invested in different asset classes but in most asset
classes the possible return is quite small. The asset class Private Equity (PE) has presented an
outperformance compared to other asset classes (e.g. Kaplan (1989), Guo et al. (2011)). The
attractiveness to invest in PE is demonstrated by the continuously growing flow of capital into
this asset class. In 2018 more than 450 billion euro were raised in Europe alone (PitchBook
(2018a)). However, PE faces challenges to find attractive targets as the investment of the dry
capital to achieve excess market returns is very competitive. This problem reveals the question
whether PE firms are willing to take on more risk considering the pressure to invest.
By 2018, more than 50 percent of all financial buyouts are done by Secondary Buyouts (SBOs),
which means that General Partners (GPs) sell portfolio companies of the Primary Buyouts
(PBOs) to other financial investors (PitchBook (2018a)). Investors as Limited Partners (LPs)
criticise this development as these deals are seen as too costly and potentially underperforming
because the value creation might already be done in the PBOs. On the other hand, Degeorge
et al. (2016) argue that under certain situations SBOs do not perform worse than PBOs and,
thus, may also outperform their non-PE backed peers. However, both the huge demand to find
attractive buyout targets and the increasing share of SBOs on the total deal volume, possibly
driven by the incentives of the GPs, scrutinize the attractiveness of these financial buyouts. If
the SBO performance is not necessarily as good as the PBO performance, the high share of
SBOs is highly questionable. This dilemma leads to the question whether SBOs are less risky
than their preceding PBOs.
GPs acquire a portfolio company and create value by financial and operative improvements.
They use a substantial amount of debt to improve the portfolio company’s governance structure,
to create tax shields on debt and, thereby, increasing the return on the invested equity. Several
studies find that an increased leverage improves the performance of the portfolio company
(e.g. Achleitner et al. (2010), Kaplan & Stro¨mberg (2009), Wright et al. (2009)). However,
these beneficial features of debt might come at a high cost of a greater risk of financial distress
(henceforth, risk of financial distress and risk are used interchangeably). If the capital structure
is composed of too much debt, additional costs of financial distress may be created (Kaplan &
Stein (1993)). Not only financial engineering, but also the operational development during the
holding period may lead to a higher risk, e.g. liquidity risk or default risk, as GPs may use
different strategies compared to the management of non PE-financed companies.
The issues about risk creation and value transfer from other stakeholders to GPs is widely
discussed, yet only sparsely analysed in empirical studies (e.g. Guo et al. (2011), Robinson
& Sensoy (2013)). For example, GPs are able to initiate the payout of exceptional dividends
to themselves. Sometimes the amount of these dividend recapitalisation may even exceed the
initial equity investment of the GP, thus, eliminating the investment risk by transfering the
risk of the GP to other stakeholders. Furthermore, the usage of high leverage, used for example
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to pay out dividend recapitalisation or make add-on acquisitions, among others can lead to
a liquidity drain of the company and the incapacity to settle outstanding payables. On the
contrary, GPs do have an incentive to avoid financial distress in their portfolio companies, as
financial distress reduces their return and, ultimately, the return to the limited partners (LPs).
Furthermore, GPs usually need a decent deal track record for future fund raising. If it comes
to a situation of significant distress, on the fund level, GPs often have unspent capital that
can be injected to help turn around a distressed portfolio company. Keeping companies out of
financial distress builds a reliable reputation both with banks and LPs. A good reputation is
substantial to receive favorable credit conditions in upcoming investment rounds.
Whilst we know that the return to the PE sponsors is high compared to non-PE investments,
we know only little about the risk of PE investments. Although some of the investments do
not actually default due to the PE-backing, the risk of financial distress may still be high in
these portfolio companies.
Since literature merely agrees that SBOs do not outperform PBOs, a lower risk of SBOs com-
pared to PBOs, could make the follow-up investment worthwhile. The steady increase of SBOs
makes it necessary to understand whether the risk level of SBOs changes compared to the
PBO. Based on a dataset of 590 back-to-back buyouts, we, therefore, analyse the risk of finan-
cial distress in PE transactions, and specifically in SBO transactions. The aim of this paper is
to provide an in-depth analysis, whether risk of financial distress is higher in SBOs and what
factors drive the risk in PE transactions. We, thereby, aim to contribute to find explanations
of the spectacular growth of the SBO share on the total buyout volume and demonstrate which
financial ratios to focus on in the buyout rounds to control risk and avoid the associated higher
costs of financial distress.
The results of this study indicate that the buyouts’ risk of financial distress is not different
at investment entry, showing that neither PBO nor SBO investors necessarily specialise on
investing in distressed companies. However, SBO investors tend to improve the risk profile of
their portfolio companies significantly more than PBO investors. In contrast to Kaplan & Stein
(1993), we find that leverage does not have an impact on the risk of financial distress in the full
sample regression. If the company is considered as financially distressed, the leverage at entry
increases the risk of financial distress during the buyout. The development of leverage during
the buyout predominately increases risk during SBOs rather than during PBOs. Furtheron,
the higher the risk level is at the beginning of the investment the more pressure is put on the
GPs to improve the risk during the holding period. However, this effect is primarily observed
for companies that are considered as non-risky.
Most of the literature focuses on the outperformance compared to their non-PE peers (e.g.
Guo et al. (2011), Kaplan (1989)). Only a few papers consider the probability of bankruptcy
in PE (e.g. Wilson & Wright (2013), Hotchkiss et al. (2014), Hammer et al. (2015)), whereas
Tykvova´ & Borell (2012) consider the general risk of PE transactions. Degeorge et al. (2016)
measure the risk in SBOs that have been executed late in the fund life time. This paper puts
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the performance of SBOs and its increasing attractiveness in the PE market into context of its
underlying risk.
The approach of our paper is to consider SBOs in general and to show the difference in risk of
financial distress among the buyout rounds. It identifies how the risk is driven and recognises
how risk has developed according to firm-specific and economic situations. The focus of the
analysis is not to look at actual defaults but rather display the intrinsic risk of the investments
with respect to financial distress. Thus, it is the first paper that analyses the difference in risk
across PBOs and their consecutive SBOs and identifies the specific drivers of this risk.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The Chapter 4.2 presents the literature on risk in
private equity and the theoretical reasoning about risk in PE. Afterwards, in Chapter 4.3,
the dataset is explained. Chapter 4.4 displays alternative measures of risk and presents the
analyses and its resuluts of this paper, which will be followed by robustness checks in Chapter
4.5. Chapter 4.6 summarises the paper and provides an outlook for further research.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Risk in Private Equity
Empiricial Evidence
There are only few empirical studies that analyse the risk in PE investments, although it is
widely discussed in the media. The limited number of studies can be traced back to the low
data availability. However, there are still several attempts that either try to capture actual
defaults and bankruptcies of investments or to measure the general business risk.
Stro¨mberg (2008) lays the groundwork of risk in PE. He questions the claim that PE ownership
leads to short-termism and financial failure. However, he does not find support to this claim.
Tykvova´ & Borell (2012) continued to properly analyse the company risk in the area of PE
financing. They analyse the effect that PE financing has on the rate of bankruptcy and the
financial distress. Whereas they find that GPs invest in companies with lower risk profiles
compared to non PE-backed companies, they observe that risk of financial distress increases
during the investment period of the GP. Although the risk of the portfolio company increases,
the default rate is not significantly higher compared to non-PE backed companies. Even more,
GPs with greater investment experience are able to reduce bankruptcy rates compared to the
rates of comparable non PE-backed peers.
Wilson & Wright (2013) use an insolvency hazard model to observe the risk profiles of PE-backed
companies. They find that PE-financed buyouts are more likely to default compared to non-
buyouts. However, the default risk is lower than expected given the company’s characteristics
before the buyout. Interestingly, the leverage does not necessarily drive the risk within PE
investment defaults. This finding is in contrast to the initial finding of Axelson et al. (2013)
who find that too much leverage is used in PE financed companies. Their evidence indicates
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that a suboptimal capital structure is the major driver of financial distress.
Hotchkiss et al. (2014) study the default probabilities using a hazard model with time-varying
covariates and follow-up with analyses on how GPs resolve financial distress. First, they find
that PE-financed companies do not default more often than comparable non PE-backed com-
panies with a similar capital structure. If a company is financially distressed, PE backed
companies are better at restructuring and require less time to resolve the distress. They justify
the superior handling of financial distress partly with the possibility of GPs to inject unspent
capital of the fund into the portfolio company when more capital is needed.
Hammer et al. (2015) also use a hazard model to analyse the effect of PE financing on the
probability of default of the portfolio company. The authors aim to analyse the heterogeneity of
the PE strategies. They find that generalist experience a lower probability of default compared
to specialised GPs. However, if specialists invest in their specialised field, the probability of
default is lower compared to generalists. Whereas, SBOs have higher default probabilities than
PBOs, deal syndication of several GPs reduces the default risk. They also find that portfolio
companies using inorganic growth strategies have a lower bankruptcy risk.
Lastly, Degeorge et al. (2016) aim to answer the question whether underperforming SBOs
(compared to PBOs) are less risky, which would explain the popularity of these buyouts. They
measure risk by looking at the companies’ probability of bankruptcy and capital loss, its lever-
age, and its beta. They do not find significant results with respect to the risk in SBOs. This
paper, however, does not use regression models and, thus, does not fully close the research gap
for risk in SBOs.
Theoretical reasoning
This paper analyses both how risk of financial distress differs among buyout rounds and how
the risk of financial distress is composed. There are several arguments why the risk of PE-
backed companies, and especially SBOs, should behave differently compared to their public
peers. Ultimately, the risk of financial distress depends on several other risk factors such as
liquidity risk, operational risk, and leverage.
The main argument brought forward for higher risk of financial distress is financial engineering,
and the accompanying high leverage. A greater leverage should theoretically increase the risk
in buyouts since capital costs are enhanced. Kaplan & Stein (1993) postulate that too much
leverage causes higher financial distress. Axelson et al. (2013) state that leverage depends
on credit markets conditions, and that leverage is especially high when credit markets boom.
Thus, leverage is more dependent on the economic conditions rather than on firm-intrinsic
effects. However, leverage contributes to lower risk by establishing superior governance struc-
tures (Jensen (1989)). Managers are incentivised to perform well, since they would not be
able to repay the company’s debt obligations and the interest payments. Further, Guo et al.
(2011) describe the value transfer from taxpayers to GPs by tax shields, which can improve the
operational earnings of the portfolio company.
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On the one hand, Wang (2012) argue that during SBOs the leverage stays the same as during
the PBO and value is created solely through operational improvements. On the other hand,
Achleitner & Figge (2014) ascertain that value can only be created by increasing leverage as
the operational value creation potential is already used up during the PBO. Consistent with
these two findings, we expect that leverage drives risk in both buyout rounds. As the additional
debt in SBOs may drive the leverage too high, we further expect that leverage increases the
risk more strongly in SBOs than in PBOs.
PE compensation schemes may incentivise GPs to increase the share of debt in their invest-
ments. GPs may tend to invest in more risky companies and to overinvest as risk is shifted
in the principal-agent dynamism. The carried interest, which GPs earn on excess investment
returns, rewards successful buyouts, whereas underperforming buyouts do not penalise the GP
as much. The downward risk is primarily shifted from the GP to the LP, whereas the upward
risk is shared amongst both parties (Robinson & Sensoy (2013)). On top of the carried interest,
dividend recapitalisations represent another possibility of value transfer from LPs to GPs. Div-
idend recapitalisations are additional dividends paid out directly to the GP. The volume of the
dividend can even exceed the initial equity investment of the GP. Consequently, the dividend
puts the company in a financially more risky situation, due to reduced equity and worse level
of liquidity. Harford & Kolasinski (2013), however, find that dividend recapitalisations do not
increase default probabilities. This finding may indicate that GPs only pay out dividends if
the portfolio company has sufficient funds. GPs do not only take out capital from the portfolio
company, but they can also inject additional capital of the funds into the company. During
financial distress, such an injection can help to avoid the break of covenants or even bankruptcy.
Especially, when GPs are specialised in restructuring, they can handle higher risk better com-
pared to non-specialised GPs (Hotchkiss et al. (2014)). Injecting capital and taking money out
of the company leads to changes in the liquidity of the company. We assume that the degree of
liquidity lowers the risk of financial distress in buyouts. Similar to Hotchkiss et al. (2014), we
expect that more investment experience of GPs decreases risk in PE transactions, especially
when those companies are distressed.
As Tykvova´ & Borell (2012) suggest, risk in buyouts is increased. Hence, we assume that SBOs
are more likely to start their investment with a higher intrinsic risk. As higher risk of financial
distress at entry needs to be handled more cautiously, we expect that risk of financial distress
at investment entry has a stronger influence on the risk development in SBOs than in PBOs.
Bonini (2015) finds that GPs optimise their inventories and improve their liquidity management,
by aligning outstanding payables and receivables. According to his study, the effect is less severe
in SBOs as they aim to squeeze out liquidity from portfolio companies to increase the effective
return. He finds that PBOs generate more cash compared to SBOs. Therefore, cash generation
seems to be more important in PBOs than in SBOs. Amongst others, cash generation improves
the liquidity of the portfolio company. Liquidity helps to keep the company’s operations running
and, thus, we expect that the risk of financial distress is reduced by higher liquidity. Thus, we
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further expect that liquidity measures reduce risk more in PBOs than in SBOs.
The limited lifespan of a fund of up to 12 years can lead to a value transfer. The time-
wise limitation can incentivise GPs to sacrifice long-term value creation for short-term gains.
However, the claim of suboptimal short-term orientation has not been confirmed (Cao & Lerner
(2009)). In addition to this, GPs may not only be interested in short term gains. As GPs
usually aim to raise consecutive funds, extraordinary risk profiles in previous investments are not
supportive to convince investors to further invest in their funds. Also, the business relationships
to other stakeholders, such as banks, benefit from lower risk profiles. Demiroglu & James (2010)
show that GPs with a good reputation pay lower interest rates and are able to build a higher
leverage compared to companies with worse reputation. Therefore, GPs have an incentive to
reduce risk.
Several studies find that SBOs, generally, do not perform better in terms of company growth,
profitability, and efficiency compared to PBOs (e.g. Achleitner & Figge (2014), Bonini (2015)).
However, the stronger the performance of the company, the lower the risk of financial distress
should be. Although some actions can come at a cost (e.g. cost-cutting to improve profitability
may involve a costly reduction of the workforce), we have no reason to expect that good
performance increases risk of financial distress. Thus, we expect that superior operational
performance reduces risk of financial distress.
As most papers do not find a better overall performance of SBOs compared to PBOs (e.g.
Achleitner & Figge (2014)), we expect risk of financial distress develops more strongly during
SBOs than during PBOs.
On the other hand, If the average performance of SBOs is not better than the PBO’s per-
formance, it is questionable why SBOs have become increasingly popular throughout the last
years. Whereas, it may partly be driven by missing investment opportunities and high levels of
dry capital, the underlying risk may make it attractive to invest in SBOs. Therefore, it might
also be that SBOs have a lower risk of financial distress compared to PBOs to compensate
for the outperformance of PBOs. Thus, we analyse whether the risk of portfolio companies
develops differently between buyout rounds.
4.3 Dataset
4.3.1 Explanation of the Dataset
The empiricial research in PE faces the problem of data availability. First, the size of the data
sample in PE studies is often small. Compared to other studies, for example on capital markets,
the actual total number of deals is relatively low. Furthermore, the data availability of these
deals is comparably weak. This problem is omnipresent for all studies considering fundamental
data since private companies do not necessarily have to publish their financial accounts in most
countries. Hence, many studies rather analyse non-fundamental data, such as cashflows to the
86 CHAPTER 4. RISK OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN SECONDARY BUYOUTS
fund, transaction values or filed bankruptcies. Second, when analysing SBOs in comparison to
PBOs in a panel setting, fundamental data both for the PBO and SBO are necessary, which
further reduces the number of total observations. Third, PE studies tend to suffer from a
survivor bias because GPs do not want to publish unsuccessful buyouts. This bias may alter
the results especially in regard of risk of financial distress.
To counteract to the aforementioned problems we build a comprehensive dataset. We retrieved
data from Capital IQ, Thomson Reuters Eikon, Prequin, Mergermarket, and a large fund of
fund manager. These databases do not only provide information about a high quantity of
transactions but also include the full spectrum of higher to lower performing buyouts as well.
The analysed sample consists of UK-based buyouts. We chose the UK as the sample market for
two reasons. First, the geographic spread of buyouts across many countries can be problematic.
Many other studies claim to have a worldwide sample, whereas most deals stem from the UK or
the USA (e.g. Stro¨mberg (2008)). To avoid any accounting related distortions in our a sample,
we looked for a representative PE market. We believe that the PE market in the UK serves well
as a representative market for the overall PE industry in developed countries. The UK market is
the second biggest PE market in terms of volume and number of deals (PricewaterhouseCoopers
(2019) and does not have heterogenous business cultures compared to other western countries.
Second, and most importantly, in the UK it is mandatory to publish the financial accounts,
which leads to a much greater data availability compared to other countries.
With the transactions’ entry date earliest in 1996 and the exit latest in 2017, we use a large
and current dataset. Most of the databases start their data base for PE deals in 1996. The year
2017 is the last year of observation because a company usually requires at least a year to publish
their financial accounts, and we conduct analyses that also consider the financial statements
at the time of the exit. We searched the databases for all UK transactions that were labelled
“secondary buyout” or “financial buyout”. Afterwards, all those financial buyouts, which are
not an SBO, i.e. later buyout rounds, such as tertiary buyouts, are eliminated from the sample.
The initial list of buyouts only contained the entry dates of the SBOs, and as we analyse the
consecutive buyout round, per definition, the exit date of the PBO. We further searched for the
entry date of the PBOs and the exit date of the SBOs in the same databases. In most cases,
the timeline of buyouts was still incomplete, as at least one date was missing. In these cases,
we hand-collected the missing transaction dates from the website of the portfolio company, the
GP’s website, newspaper articles or other official transaction publications. Those companies,
for which at least one transaction date could not be found, were deleted from the sample.
We, then, retrieved the fundamental data at the time of the entry and the exit of the PBO
and the associated SBO. Generally, there are three options on how to retrieve the fundamental
data. The first one is to use the fundamental data before the entry date and after the exit
date to fully capture the treatment effect of PE financing. However, the disadvantage is that
also unwanted, non-treatment effects, such as the time before the PE-financing, are included.
These effects must not be neglected when the time difference between the transaction and
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the financial statement is too long. The second option is to retrieve the fundamental data
after the entry and before the exit in order to isolate the treatment effect. The downside of
this approach is that some PE mechanics, such as the usage of leverage, experience stronger
changes at the beginning or at the end of the investment. For instance, Phalippou & Gottschalg
(2009) find that leverage is increased at the beginning of the investment to directly operate
at the optimal capital structure and that it is reduced towards the end of the investment.
Using this second measurement approach may not be able to capture these changes. Thus,
in PE studies this approach is not sensible. The third possibility is a combination of both
approaches. The financial statement is retrieved, which is the closest to the transaction date.
As we do not differentiate between any of the two aforementioned measurement errors, we
aim to minimise the time between the transaction and the financial statement. On average,
this procedure should measure the treatment effect across the sample in the most efficient way
possible. Consequently, we collected the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement of the
portfolio companies at entry and exit of the respective buyout rounds. We eliminated those
companies, for which both statements were not available. By this data selection we were able to
build a comprehensive dataset of 295 companies, which underwent consecutive buyout rounds.
Thus, 590 buyouts and 885 transactions were used in the analyses of this paper.
4.3.2 Variable Calculation
In this paper, the risk and its explaining variables are measured both statically, i.e. at entry and
exit of the investment, and dynamically, i.e. the development throughout the holding period.
Whereas the static view is easily observed, the development needs to be calculated based on the
observations at entry and exit of the investment, considering the length of the holding period.
To capture the development of the relevant variables, either the compound annual growth rate
(CAGR) or the average annual change of the variable is calculated. Those variables, which
have both a positive nominator and a positive denominator throughout the holding period, are
calculated with the CAGR, which is defined as follows.
CAGRi,t(X) = (
xi,t
xi,t−k
)1/k − 1 (4.1)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the length of the
holding period of the investment.
The development of the other variables is calculated with the average annual change of the
respective variable. This calculation has the advantage that a change from a positive value to
a negative value, and vice versa, can clearly be recognized as positive and negative movements
compared to the CAGR approach. The average annual change is calculated as follows.
Annual Changei,t(X) = (
xi,t − xi,t−k
k
) (4.2)
with xi,t being the variable of interest at time t of company i, and k being the holding period
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of the investment.
4.4 Differences in Risk of Financial Distress between
PBO and SBO
4.4.1 Variable Selection
Target Variable
The prediction of bankruptcy has become an increasingly important topic, especially after
economically challenging times such as the financial crisis. Within the category of overall risk,
this paper focusses on the risk of financial distress and indirectly on some of the associated
risks, e.g. liquidity risk. The risk of financial distress in this paper is defined as the risk that a
company cannot operate anymore due to the incapacity of paying its financial obligations. The
literature widely discusses on what the best measurement for risk of financial distress is (e.g.
Balcaen & Ooghe (2006)). Thereby, all the measurements ultimately predict the upcoming
event of bankruptcy within a certain time horizon.
Generally, the literature distinguishes between two strings of measurements for financial dis-
tress. The first type of measurement is a market-based approach that considers publicly avail-
able data, such as stock prices (e.g. Bharath & Shumway (2008)). Due to the nature of PE,
almost all investments are taken private, and, therefore, such measurements are not suitable
for private equity studies. The second string is an accounting-based approach, which considers
financial ratios measuring the solvency, liquidity, collateral and profitability of the analysed
company.
Beaver et al. (2011) find that accounting-based approaches are well-suited to measure risk of
privately-held companies. Their results are robust over a time horizon of over 40 years.
Beaver (1966) pioneered the research on corporate failure prediction. His approach is a simple
univariate discriminant model that uses several financial ratios, which have been selected using
a dichotomous identification process. Whereas the calculation of this method is very easy,
it assumes a linear relationship between the corporate failure and an individual ratio, which
probably may not be realistic. Afterwards, risk index models evolved, which are the combination
of several measurements, leading to an easy point system. Tamari (1966) first allocated points,
ranging from 0 to 100, to certain financial ratios. Moses & Liao (1987) identified optimal cut-off
points for individual ratios, using an univariate regression model. If the threshold is exceeded,
the financial ratio receives a 1 in a binary variable setting.
Altman (1968) introduced a more sophisticated model by using a multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) to estimate his nowadays popular Z-score model. An MDA is a linear combination of
various variables, which ideally have explanatory power to distinguish between failing and non-
failing companies. However, it is necessary to note that the individual ratios do not necessarily
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need to provide explanatory power in an univariate setting, but rather provide significance in
the context of a multivariate setting of the MDA model (Altman (1968)). This multivariate
regression approach then provides beta coefficients for the identified variables to give individual
weighting to the respective financial ratio. Those companies, whose discriminant score is below
the pre-defined threshold, are likely to default in the short-run. Therefore, the score determines
whether the analysed company is similar to a company that has defaulted in upcoming years
(Blum (1974)). The calculation of the Altman Z-Score is as follows.
Altman Z − Scorei,t = 0.717 ∗ Working Capitali,t
Total Assetsi,t
+ 0.847 ∗ Profiti,t
Total Assetsi,t
+ 3.107 ∗ EBITi,t
Total Assetsi,t
+ 0.420 ∗ Equityi,t
Liabilitiesi,t
+ 0.998 ∗ Salesi,t
Total Assetsi,t
(4.3)
where the variables are observed for company i at time t.
A company is considered as risky or distressed when the value of the Altman Z-Score is below
1.23. Several authors further show that the coefficients of the MDA model do not represent the
relative importance of the input variables (e.g. Altman (1968), Blum (1974)).
After being the benchmark of bankruptcy prediction for several years, conditional probability
models were introduced, first, by Ohlson (1980) in form of a logit analysis and, second, by
Zmijewski (1984) as a probit analysis. These methods allow the consideration of non-linear
relationships of the variables. As all of these models have a static view and only consider the
actual event of bankruptcy, Shumway (2001) proposes the usage of a hazard model, in which also
the years of non-default are considered. Other models use option pricing theory (e.g. Vassalou
& Xing (2004)) or neural networks (e.g. Kumar & Ravi (2007)) to predict bankcruptcy .
In this paper the Altman Z-score is used to evaluate the risk of the portfolio companies. This
choice has two reasons. First, as PE transactions are often “blackboxes” throughout the holding
periods, we observe the variables at the beginning and at the end of the investment. Further,
we are not directly interested in the actual default of the buyout but rather in the portfolio
company’s risk of financial distress, i.e. the threshold when a company is endangered of going
bankrupt. Also GPs can avoid the actual default event by injecting additional capital into the
portfolio company and, thus, a hazard model would be biased. Therefore, hazard models are not
a sensible measurement of our research questions. The second reason is the strong acceptance
of the Altman Z-Score in academia to measure the risk of privately-held companies. Jackson
& Wood (2013) study how often certain prediction models are used. They find that multiple
discriminant analyses were used most often. In a review of the Altman Z-Score, Altman et al.
(2017) find that the prediction power for UK companies is sufficiently high.
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Explanatory Variables
The portfolio companies’ risk of financial distress can be driven by several factors ranging from
operational performance over capital structure to special characteristics of the GP. As potential
risk drivers we selected measures for the firm-level characteristics company size, profitability,
efficiency, liquidity, capital structure, risk at investment entry, GP’s characteristics, and several
control variables.
The size of a company is measured by total sales and equity. Whilst sales can be inflated by
strong capital expenditures and market penetration, the total sales are a common proxy of the
market acceptance. Additionally, measuring equity provides a more stable view on the true
company size. Sales can be extraordinarily high or low in one particular year of observations,
whilst equity is not as sensitive to the performance in that respective year of observation.
The profitability of the portfolio company is measured by the EBITDA margin, the profit
margin, return on assets, and return on equity. The EBITDA margin identifies the operative
earnings before interests, taxes, and depreciation and amortization in relation to the reported
sales. Additionally, we measure the profit margin, measured as profit over sales, to account
for accounting, financing, and industry effects. Due to financial engineering, both variables are
necessary to analyse. The variables return on assets and return on equity, are based on total
assets and equity rather than sales. These ratios represent a more stable view on profitability
compared to ratios based on sales figures. Due to the possible influence of leverage, returns on
assets and equity have to be analysed separately.
Efficiency of the portfolio company is measured with two proxies. The receivables turnover
ratio is measured as sales over outstanding receivables. This variable measures how efficiently
a company can collect its outstanding receivables. The second variable is the inventory sales
ratio, which measures the ability of a company to manage its inventory in relation to its sales.
It is defined as sales over inventory. The intention usually is to keep inventory as low as possible
in order to reduce operational costs, whilst not creating a bottleneck for the running business.
The degree of liquidity is measured with three variables: the cash ratio, the current ratio,
and the working capital. Whereas the cash ratio considers the cash and cash equivalents
compared to current liabilities, the current ratio is measured by all current receivables over
current liabilities. Both measures signal the ability to repay short term liability obligations.
The working capital is defined as the difference between the portfolio company’s current assets
and its current liabilities. Ultimately, all variables measure the liquidity but with a rather
different focus on the assets available to settle current obligations.
The capital structure, and thereby the degree of financial engineering of the GP, is used as con-
trol variable and explanatory variable. Both of these variables are measured with the leverage
ratio, defined as total liabilities over equity. First, the capital structure is measured at entry of
the investment to account for the exploitation of the debt capacity. Second, the development
of the leverage ratio measures the financial engineering as part of the PE value creation.
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This study considers several control variables, including deal characteristics such as the company
age at entry, signalling the maturity of the portfolio company. The age of the PE firm is used as
a rough proxy for experience of the GP. Further, we control for size, measured as total assets,
and capital structure at beginning of the investment. As the risk of the company is analysed,
we differentiate between risky and less risky companies, and thus control for risk at entry, by
introducing the Altman Z-Score at buyout entry to the regressions. Lastly, we use time and
industry fixed-effects.
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the summary statistics of the dataset. The statistics focus on the
distribution of entry years and the distribution of the financial ratios used in the analyses. The
statistics are displayed for the whole sample, as well as for PBOs and the SBOs, separately.
Table 4.1 presents the distribution of investment entries of the sample. The table illustrates
the share of annual entries to the total number of entries in this sample. Furtheron, the
total sample is split into financially distressed and non-distressed companies, i.e. they have
an Altman Z-Score of 1.23 or below at investment entry or have an Altman Z-Score above
1.23, respectively. Most of the buyouts start before and around the financial crisis with 11.4
percent of the total sample’s entries in 2007. The share of SBOs is especially high at that
point in time. The majority of PBO deals in this sample is centred around the year 2003.
Interestingly, companies with an entry in 2003 are distressed in 57.7 percent of the time. The
share of distressed portfolio companies around 2003 is more strongly pronounced for PBOs than
for SBOs. Around 2008, the number of buyouts is much lower, which confirms with the slump
in the PE activity right after the financial crisis. Contrary to the common expectation, the
share of distressed companies is very low during and right after the financial crisis with a share
of distressed companies of only 28.9 percent in 2008. Thus, it seems that GPs were careful to
invest and might have overcompensated the high market risk by investing in overly financially
stable companies.
Table 4.2 shows the selected information of the buyout at entry and the growth of several
variables. In order to recognize the initial differences of performance indicators between the
two buyout rounds, the total sample statistics are split into PBOs and SBOs. The statistical
difference of the analysed variables between PBOs and SBOs is measured with the Wilcoxon
ranksum test and nonparametric equality-of-medians test.
In the total sample, the portfolio companies are held 4.1 years on average. The holding period
of PBOs and SBOs do not show a significant difference. The analysed PE firms are on average
25 years old, which indicates that the GPs are rather experienced. The deals in this sample are
quite large with average total assets of just above 94 million GBP. Since portfolio companies
on average grow throughout the buyout, the average of total assets at entry is higher in SBOs
compared to PBOs. The average of the total sample is not considered as risky. The average
Altman Z-Score is with 2.29 much higher than the risky threshold of 1.23. However, the
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Entry Years
Total Sample PBO SBO
Total Distressed Non-
Distressed
Total Distressed Non-
Distressed
Total Distressed Non-
Distressed
Start
Year
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
1996 17 2.9% 7 41.2% 10 58.8% 17 5.8% 7 41.2% 10 58.8% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a.
1997 8 1.4% 3 37.5% 5 62.5% 8 2.7% 3 37.5% 5 62.5% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a.
1998 16 2.7% 4 25.0% 12 75.0% 15 5.1% 4 26.7% 11 73.3% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 1 100.0%
1999 23 3.9% 9 39.1% 14 60.9% 17 5.8% 8 47.1% 9 52.9% 6 2.0% 1 16.7% 5 83.3%
2000 21 3.6% 6 28.6% 15 71.4% 20 6.8% 6 30.0% 14 70.0% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 1 100.0%
2001 30 5.1% 10 33.3% 20 66.7% 22 7.5% 7 31.8% 15 68.2% 8 2.7% 3 37.5% 5 62.5%
2002 36 6.1% 8 22.2% 28 77.8% 27 9.2% 4 14.8% 23 85.2% 9 3.1% 4 44.4% 5 55.6%
2003 42 7.1% 22 52.4% 20 47.6% 26 8.8% 15 57.7% 11 42.3% 16 5.4% 7 43.8% 9 56.3%
2004 57 9.7% 21 36.8% 36 63.2% 35 11.9% 16 45.7% 19 54.3% 22 7.5% 5 22.7% 17 77.3%
2005 45 7.6% 11 24.4% 34 75.6% 25 8.5% 6 24.0% 19 76.0% 20 6.8% 5 25.0% 15 75.0%
2006 62 10.5% 17 27.4% 45 72.6% 27 9.2% 9 33.3% 18 66.7% 35 11.9% 8 22.9% 27 77.1%
2007 67 11.4% 16 23.9% 51 76.1% 25 8.5% 6 24.0% 19 76.0% 42 14.2% 10 23.8% 32 76.2%
2008 38 6.4% 11 28.9% 27 71.1% 13 4.4% 4 30.8% 9 69.2% 25 8.5% 7 28.0% 18 72.0%
2009 20 3.4% 5 25.0% 15 75.0% 4 1.4% 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 16 5.4% 5 31.3% 11 68.8%
2010 26 4.4% 7 26.9% 19 73.1% 11 3.7% 3 27.3% 8 72.7% 15 5.1% 4 26.7% 11 73.3%
2011 26 4.4% 4 15.4% 22 84.6% 3 1.0% 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 23 7.8% 3 13.0% 20 87.0%
2012 22 3.7% 4 18.2% 18 81.8% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 22 7.5% 4 18.2% 18 81.8%
2013 19 3.2% 9 47.4% 10 52.6% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 19 6.4% 9 47.4% 10 52.6%
2014 14 2.4% 2 14.3% 12 85.7% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 14 4.7% 2 14.3% 12 85.7%
2015 1 0.2% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 1 0.3% 1 100.0% 0 0.0%
Total 590 177 413 295 99 196 295 78 217
Note: The table above presents the distribution of entries on the total sample. The entries are divided into PBOs and SBOs and whether the portfolio company is distressed. A company is classified
as distressed if the Altman Z-Score at entry is below 1.23.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Total PBO SBO
Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs
Panel A: Information at buyout entry
Years Held 4.10 2.55 4 590 4.06 2.44 4 295 4.15 2.65 4 295
Start Year 2005.30 4.34 2005.50 590 2003.05 3.71 2003 295 2007.55*** 3.73 2007*** 295
PE Firm Age 25.74 32.11 19 590 28.41 36.52 20 295 23.06 26.80 18 295
Company Age 27.69 34.24 17 590 25.48 34.28 15 295 29.90*** 34.10 20*** 295
Total Assets 94496 346381 26967 590 65561 145865 19987 295 123432 466274 36442 295
Altman Z-Score 2.29 1.53 2.05 588 2.24 1.55 1.89 294 2.34 1.50 2.17 294
Excess Altman Z-Score 0.02 0.04 0.49 584 0.02 0.04 0.48 294 0.03 0.03 0.50 290
Panel B: Variable growth during buyout
Altman Z-Score 0.01 0.47 0.02 584 0.01 0.47 0.01 294 0.02 0.47 0.02 290
Sales 1.18 0.24 1.11 590 1.23 0.26 1.16 295 1.14*** 1.14 1.09*** 295
Total Assets 1.18 0.23 1.13 589 1.22 0.25 1.18 295 1.13*** 0.20 1.09*** 294
Equity Asset Ratio 0.11 0.18 0.06 590 0.12 0.18 0.07 295 0.95 0.17 0.06 295
EBITDA Margin 0.05 0.12 0.02 589 0.08 0.13 0.03 295 0.03*** 0.10 0.01*** 294
Profit Margin 0.05 0.11 0.01 590 0.06 0.12 0.02 295 0.03*** 0.11 0.01*** 295
Return on Equity - 0.19 0.30 - 0.01 588 - 0.00 0.29 0.00 294 - 0.03 0.31 - 0.01 294
Return on Assets - 0.00 0.06 - 0.00 589 0.00 0.05 0.00 295 - 0.01 0.06 - 0.00 294
Current Ratio 0.08 0.39 0.03 589 0.08 0.37 0.35 295 0.08 0.41 0.02 294
Cash Ratio - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 589 - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 294 - 0.05 0.14 - 0.01 295
Inventory Sales Ratio - 0.00 0.01 - 0.00 590 - 0.00 0.01 0.00 295 - 0.00 0.01 0.00 295
Receivables Turnover - 0.29 1.32 - 0.05 584 - 0.38 1.38 - 0.13 294 - 0.20 1.25 - 0.06* 290
Working Capital - 0.05 0.10 - 0.03 589 - 0.04 0.10 - 0.02 295 -0.07*** 0.11 - 0.04*** 294
Leverage Ratio 2.62 32.33 - 0.059 590 3.49 37.08 - 0.07 295 1.76 26.79 - 0.05 295
Note: The table above presents the summary statistics of 295 companies with their development during the PBO and the consecutive SBO. The summary statistics
shows the data distribution of the whole dataset, and of the PBO and SBO, seperately. It also presents the difference for all analysed variables between the PBO and
SBO, measured by Wilcoxon ranksum and non-parametric median tests. The significance levels for the mean difference and median difference test between PBO and
SBO are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Table 4.3: Cross Correlation Table
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Altman Z-Score 1.000
2 SBO 0.009 1.000
3 Total assets 0.007 0.207 1.000
4 Company age -0.058 0.192 0.138 1.000
5 PE firm age -0.036 -0.083 0.060 0.040 1.000
6 Leverage ratio -0.025 0.035 -0.072 0.023 0.022 1.000
7 Sales 0.180 0.019 -0.084 -0.064 -0.051 0.002 1.000
8 EBITDA margin 0.107 -0.007 -0.195 -0.042 -0.006 0.004 0.233 1.000
9 Profit margin 0.228 -0.053 -0.240 -0.053 -0.014 0.005 0.335 0.568 1.000
10 Return on assets 0.089 0.052 -0.058 0.044 0.009 -0.000 0.565 0.655 0.559 1.000
11 Cash ratio 0.102 0.014 0.080 -0.013 0.006 -0.008 -0.062 -0.039 -0.033 0.046 1.000
12 Current ratio 0.092 0.054 -0.013 0.021 -0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.008 1.000
13 Working capital 0.158 -0.085 -0.002 -0.079 0.026 0.014 0.060 0.021 0.002 0.043 0.353 0.044 1.000
14 Inventory sales ratio -0.136 -0.054 -0.027 0.002 0.056 -0.001 -0.402 0.051 -0.040 0.013 -0.008 0.001 -0.019 1.000
15 Receivables sales ratio 0.058 0.051 -0.049 0.049 0.007 0.003 0.626 0.314 0.569 0.848 0.051 -0.002 0.006 -0.042 1.000
Note: The table above shows the correlations of all relevant variables used in this study. The relevant correlations do not raise concern about
multicollinearity.
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the Altman Z-Score’s standard deviation of 1.53 already indicates that several companies are
distressed, especially as the median of 2.05 is also slightly lower than the arithmetic average.
The development of performance indicators draws a nuanced picture. Whereas the Altman
Z-score on average is higher during the SBO than during the PBO, the development is not
statistically different from another. On average, PE-financed companies slightly reduce their
risk during the holding period. The risk development in comparison to the close peer group is
very similar as shown by the excess Altman Z-Score. Although SBOs and PBOs do not develop
risk differently during the holding period, both buyouts, on average, reduce risk more than
comparable non PE-financed companies. This excess development of the risk is measured as
the difference between the development of the Altman Z-Score in buyouts compared to their
public peers. The peers include the five most similar companies in terms of size, profitability,
industry and time of the investment. The development of key performance indicators such as
sales, total assets, EBITDA margin and profit margin are significantly better during PBOs than
during SBOs. These first insights consequently lead to the question, why the risk profile does
not develop differently in an univariate statistical test. If the risk of financial distress was the
same and the performance better in PBOs, the investment rational for SBOs would be invalid.
4.4.3 Methodology
To analyse the difference in risk across the back-to-back buyout rounds, we regress company
risk on several determinants. As we analyse consecutive buyout rounds, we can perform a panel
regression model, which is defined as follows.
Riskit = α + δ ∗ SBO + β ∗Xit +  (4.4)
where α is the y-intercept, δ is the coefficient of the SBO dummy, β is the coefficients of the
firm-specific variables X for firm i at transaction date t.  is the error term of the regression.
The explanatory variables of this regression model are described in Section 4.4.1. We reject the
claim of strong multicollinearity for the used variables. Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix
for all regressions of each regression specification. None of the correlations is alarmingly high.
Also, the variance inflation factors do not raise any concern. The Hausman-test suggest to use
a random-effects model for our panel data as the estimates between fixed and random effect
models are not statistically different (Hausman (1978)). To get a more detailed view on the
risk composition, we run the regression at entry, at exit, and for the development during the
holding period.
4.4.4 Results
The three analyses at entry, at exit, and for the development are shown in Tables 4.4-4.6.
These determinant analyses of the risk identify a potential difference in risk between PBOs and
SBOs. In the following, we apply three specifications. We regress the univariate effect of the
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SBO dummy on the Altman Z-Score. In the second specification, we add time and industry
fixed-effects. Lastly, in the third specification, we add further determinants of company’s risk
profile. Table 4.4 identifies the determinants of risks in portfolio companies at the point of
entry. The risk of financial distress is not statistically different between PBOs and SBOs. This
result holds for all three specifications. Adding industry and time effects to the regression
model strongly increases the overall fit of the regression. The third specification provides the
strongest explanatory power as several financial ratios explain the risk profile according to
the Altman Z-Score. Most of the variables’ coefficients are intuitive, such as the increased
total sales and the decreasing risk. Interestingly, risk does not seem to be driven by other
profitability measures such as EBITDA or profit margin. The operative earnings in relation to
total assets are rather important, indicating that the efficiency of asset usage is more important
compared to solely generating sufficient cashflows. In line with this rather unexpected finding,
the coefficient of total assets is statistically and negatively correlated to the Altman Z-Score.
Rather than believing that total assets serve well as collateral for liquidation, it seems that
larger companies, at least in PE transactions, are more risky than smaller companies. On the
other hand, as expected, the portfolio companies manage to preserve a minimum of liquidity
and efficiency, as the coefficient of the current ratio and the inventory ratio indicate. Table 4.5
shows the results of the same regression specifications, but at the exit of the investment. The
results are very similar compared to the regressions at the entry of the investment. This time,
the experience of the GP has a positive, yet small effect on the Altman Z-Score. Interestingly,
the leverage ratio is statistically and positively correlated to the Altman Z-Score. Thus, in
contrast to the initial claim that leverage is one of the main drivers for the risk of financial
distress, leverage actually reduces the risk of financial distress at the end of the investment.
The results indicate that the leverage in PE transactions may be increased towards the end of
the investment as the improvement of the governance structure outweighs the costs of financial
distress (Jensen (1989)). In contrast to the previous set of regressions, the current ratio and
the working capital ratio are not significant at the time of the exit. The absent significance
indicates that the portfolio company’s exit of a PBO does not require good liquidity measures,
as the SBO investor can bridge the liquidity needs by capital injections.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the main analysis of this paper. The development of the risk profile
is regressed on the development of the aforementioned performance indicators. Additionally,
this specification also controls for the company’s capital structure and its size. We control for
the level of risk at investment entry since we assume that distressed companies at entry are
handled differently during the holding period than less risky companies. The reason being that
endangered companies may need to focus more on the generation of solid cash flows to repay
its debt.
Apart from the univariate regression, the risk is reduced significantly more during SBOs com-
pared to PBOs. From previous regressions, we find that the Altman Z-Score is not statistically
different at the entry of the investment across the buyout rounds, thus the GPs have a similar
risk profile to work with from the beginning of the holding period. Therefore, the statistical
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Table 4.4: Risk at Entry
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
SBO 0.101 -0.082 -0.037
(0.22) (0.51) (0.68)
Size
log(sales) 0.751∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(equity) 0.239∗∗∗
(0.00)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.129
(0.10)
Profit margin 0.000
(0.97)
Return on assets 0.383∗∗∗
(0.00)
Return on equity 0.005
(0.46)
Leverage ratio -0.000
(0.87)
Liquidity
Cash ratio -0.027
(0.56)
Current Ratio 0.111∗∗∗
(0.00)
Working capital 0.888∗∗∗
(0.00)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.929∗∗∗
(0.00)
Receivables turnover ratio 0.022∗∗
(0.03)
log(total assets) -0.963∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(company age) 0.052
(0.29)
PE firm age -0.000
(0.96)
Time Effects NO YES YES
Industry Effects NO YES YES
Constant 2.238∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Overall R-squared 0.001 0.348 0.779
N 588 588 526
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications
show the influence on the Altman Z-Score at entry. The p-values are reported in parenthesis
below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1%
and *5%.
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Table 4.5: Risk at Exit
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
SBO 0.025 0.091 0.046
(0.75) (0.44) (0.65)
Size
log(sales) 0.737∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(equity) 0.505∗∗∗
(0.00)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.106
(0.16)
Profit margin 0.003
(0.72)
Return on assets 0.698∗∗∗
(0.00)
Return on equity -0.007
(0.42)
Leverage ratio 0.002∗
(0.09)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.018
(0.92)
Current ratio 0.001
(0.48)
Working capital -5.492
(0.77)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio 0.857∗
(0.08)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.007∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(total assets) -1.272∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(company age) -0.075
(0.18)
PE firm age 0.002∗
(0.10)
Time Effects NO YES YES
Industry Effects NO YES YES
Constant 2.344∗∗∗ 2.251∗∗∗ 2.996∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Overall R-squared 0.000 0.332 0.695
N 584 584 520
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications
show the influence on the Altman Z-Score at exit. The p-values are reported in parenthesis
below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1%
and *5%.
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Table 4.6: Risk Development
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
SBO 0.008 0.088∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.08) (0.01)
Size
Sales 0.522∗∗∗
(0.00)
Equity 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.026
(0.19)
Profit margin -0.005
(0.70)
Return on assets 0.133∗∗∗
(0.01)
Return on equity 0.254∗∗∗
(0.00)
Leverage ratio -0.000
(0.47)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.139∗∗
(0.02)
Current ratio 0.001∗
(0.07)
Working capital 0.268∗∗
(0.04)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.073∗∗∗
(0.00)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.000
(0.82)
Altman Z-Score -0.035∗∗∗
(0.00)
log(total assets) 0.012
(0.41)
log(company age) -0.010
(0.64)
PE firm age 0.000
(0.65)
Leverage ratio entry -0.000
(0.26)
Time Effects NO YES YES
Industry Effects NO YES YES
Constant 0.006 0.053 -0.416
(0.83) (0.78) (0.11)
Overall R-squared 0.000 0.123 0.348
N 584 584 575
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions. The various specifications
show the influence on the development of the Altman Z-Score. The p-values are reported in
parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are
***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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significant difference in the development of the risk profile indicates that SBO investors are
superior at reducing the risk of financial distress during their holding period. In this sample,
there are no PBOs that are exited via other means than SBOs. The improvement of the risk
profile may be less important for PBO investors compared to those transactions that are exited
via trade sales or initial public offerings. As the SBOs in our sample may possibily be exited
via other means than another financial buyout, the risk profile needs to be improved in order to
find potential buyers of the portfolio company. In line with this assumption, the coefficient of
the Altman Z-Score at entry of the buyout and its development are negatively correlated with
a statistical significance. When the risk of financial distress is higher at the beginning of the
investment period, the GPs are able to increase the Altman Z-Score more than in comparable
less risky buyouts. The higher the risk of financial distress, the higher is the need to reduce it
in order to preserve a healthy financial business structure.
The development in the performance measures explain the change in the portfolio companies’
risk profiles well. The sales and equity growth are statistically significant and positive. Espe-
cially sales has an economically large coefficient, indicating the importance of sales expansion
for GPs to reduce the risk of financial distress. The return on assets and return on equity are
almost equally important to reduce the risk of financial distress. Interestingly, also in these
specifications the profitability measures based on the total revenue do not have an impact on
the development of the Altman Z-Score. As expected, the better the efficiency and liquidity
management of the portfolio company, the lower is the risk of financial distress. The financial
leverage does not have an impact on the risk of the portfolio company, neither at investment
entry nor during the development during the holding period. Generally, this result indicates
that the additional costs of debt balance with the benefits of the leverage.
4.5 Robustness
4.5.1 Difference between PBO and SBO
As we identify a difference in the risk development among buyout rounds, we further analyse
whether there are differences on how the risk is driven in PBOs and SBOs. The identification
of separate risk drivers allows investors to prioritise certain operational decisions to control the
risk in the portfolio. We run regressions with the same specifications, subsampled to PBOs
and SBOs with an OLS regression model. As the dataset is not handled as a panel data model
anymore, the coefficients of the results may behave slightly different to the initial random-effects
model.
Table 4.7 shows the results of the subsample regressions according to the individual buyout
rounds. In SBOs, the leverage ratio at entry is negatively correlated to the development of
the Altman Z-Score. In contrast to the full sample regression, this shows that the portfolio
company’s capital structure influences the risk profile of SBOs. When analysing the develop-
ment of the leverage during the holding period, the coefficient is also significant in SBOs and
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Table 4.7: Subsample Buyout
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
Total PBO SBO
SBO 0.129∗∗∗
(0.01)
Size
Sales 0.522∗∗∗ 0.256 0.599∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.20) (0.00)
Equity 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.026 0.037 -0.173
(0.19) (0.26) (0.13)
Profit margin -0.005 0.039∗ -0.018
(0.70) (0.06) (0.32)
Return on assets 0.133∗∗∗ 0.053 0.393
(0.01) (0.46) (0.17)
Return on equity 0.254∗∗∗ 0.064 0.328∗∗
(0.00) (0.68) (0.02)
Leverage ratio dev -0.000 0.000 -0.002∗
(0.47) (0.69) (0.07)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.139∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.205∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.07)
Current ratio 0.001∗ 0.041 0.001∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.34) (0.00)
Working capital 0.268∗∗ 0.142 0.072
(0.04) (0.72) (0.77)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.073∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.181∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.003
(0.82) (0.03) (0.53)
Altman Z-Score -0.035∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Leverage ratio entry -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗
(0.26) (0.95) (0.06)
log(total assets) 0.012 0.010 -0.013
(0.41) (0.72) (0.57)
log(company age) -0.010 -0.037 0.004
(0.64) (0.22) (0.92)
PE firm age 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.65) (0.83) (0.69)
Time Effects YES YES YES
Industry Effects YES YES YES
Constant -0.416 -0.310 0.569
(0.11) (0.44) (0.12)
Overall/ Adjusted R-squared 0.348 0.137 0.310
N 575 292 283
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regression and the OLS regressions
of the subsamples according to the number of the buyout round. The various specifications
show the influence on the development of the Altman Z-Score. The p-values are reported in
parenthesis below the individual coefficients. The significance levels for all specifications are
***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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not significant in PBOs. Both, existing leverage and the development of the leverage, bring
burden to the SBO investor, yet being a small effect. Whereas leverage is used as a disciplinary
structure in PE, a high leverage does not bring any advantage in an SBO as the management is
already PE-minded. Further, in case of a non-financial exit, leverage at exit should not be too
high, as the capital structure of PE portfolio companies is usually not compatible with capital
structures of non PE-financed companies. Therefore, SBO investors aim to reduce the leverage
to control the overall risk in their portfolio company.
The risk profile at entry is relevant in both buyout rounds. As expected from former analysis,
the effect is more predominant in SBOs as the risk level may be more important when the
portfolio company is exited to a non-PE owner and, therefore, the risk of financial distress
needs to be lower at time of the exit in SBOs compared to PBOs.
Breaking down the performance measures, PBOs and SBOs differ in how risk of financial
distress is composed. In terms of expansion, the risk in PBOs reacts to equity growth, without
a significant influence of sales growth, whereas SBOs’ risk is more driven by both sales and
equity. The equity growth in SBOs is even negatively correlated to the development of the
Altman Z-Score. SBOs improve the return on the existing equity rather than building up
equity to reduce the risk of financial distress. It seems that during SBOs, the investors build up
equity without equally improving their operational earnings. In order to reduce risk, the PBO
investors prefer the route of margin improvement, as the development of the profit margin
positively correlates with the development of the Altman Z-Score only in PBOs, but not in
SBOs. Whereas efficiency gains are important in both buyout rounds to reduce risk, liquidity
management is more important during SBOs compared to PBOs. These results can be inferred
from the economically larger effect of the cash ratio on the risk development and the significance
of the current ratio. In case of an exit to a non-financial investor, liquidity problems may be
more severe compared to a sale to another PE investor, as PE investors can cover liquidity
needs in the short run. Other than that, the performance measures behave very similar in
PBOs and SBOs compared to the full sample regression.
4.5.2 Distressed Companies
The base regression indicates that lower risk of financial distress at investment entry leads to
an increase of the Altman Z-Score during the holding period. As the level of risk seems to
be rather important in the development of risk, we analyse the value drivers depending on
the initial level of risk. Specifically, we analyse whether the risk of financial distress is driven
differently among companies considered as risky and non-risky. To do so, we rerun the initial
regression with subsamples that either consider all risky companies, i.e. those companies that
have an Altman Z-Score below 1.23, or non-risky companies, which are those companies with an
Altman Z-Score of above or equal 1.23 at investment entry. The results of the Altman Z-Score
subsample regression are shown in Table 4.8. The difference in the development of the Altman
Z-Score between PBOs and SBOs has partly vanished. Using subsamples, the difference in
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Table 4.8: Subsample Altman
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
Total High Risk Low Risk
SBO 0.129∗∗∗ 0.101 0.139∗∗
(0.01) (0.13) (0.03)
Size
Sales 0.522∗∗∗ 0.090 0.559∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.55) (0.00)
Equity 0.008∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.026 -0.010 0.457∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.33) (0.00)
Profit margin -0.005 -0.011∗ 0.566∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.05) (0.00)
Return on assets 0.133∗∗∗ 2.325∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on equity 0.254∗∗∗ -0.163 0.422∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
Leverage ratio -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.10) (0.00)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.139∗∗ -0.259∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Current ratio 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.22) (0.00)
Working capital 0.268∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.274
(0.04) (0.00) (0.37)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.073∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.000 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.82) (0.00) (0.40)
Altman Z-Score -0.035∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.019∗
(0.00) (0.39) (0.09)
log(total assets) 0.012 0.007 0.033
(0.41) (0.72) (0.17)
log(company age) -0.010 -0.058 0.020
(0.64) (0.13) (0.45)
PE firm age 0.000 0.000 0.001∗
(0.65) (0.92) (0.08)
Leverage ratio at entry -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.002
(0.26) (0.06) (0.28)
Time Effects YES YES YES
Industry Effects YES YES YES
Constant -0.416 0.226 -0.906∗∗
(0.11) (0.51) (0.02)
Overall R-squared 0.348 0.641 0.267
N 575 172 403
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions of the subsamples according
the level at risk at entry. The various specifications show the influence on the development of
the Altman Z-Score. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients.
The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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risk development is only prevalent in portfolio companies with a high Altman Z-Score. The
investment round does not affect companies that are endangered of entering financial distress.
Companies that are considered as not risky at investment entry are much better managed
in terms of risk development by SBO investors. The risk in risky companies requires great
management attention in both buyout rounds. The SBO investor, in this sample, may focus on
the risk improvement of low-risk companies more than the PBO investor, as the potential exit
to non-PE owners needs to be prepared. Thus, this subsample seems to drive the coefficient
in the base regression. Interestingly, the experience of the GP only has an influence on the
risk development for companies with a high Altman Z-Score. Whereas additional experience
would have been expected for distressed companies, the coefficient is not significant in the risky
subsample.
The base regression does not show an overall effect of leverage on the risk of financial distress
of the portfolio company, thus rejecting the commonly assumed main risk driver in PE. Sub-
sampling with respect to the initial risk level, reveals that leverage at entry is only relevant in
companies that are already risky at the beginning of the investment period. The coefficient
for the leverage ratio at entry in the subsample with a high Altman Z-Score is negatively and
significantly correlated to the risk development of the portfolio company. Whilst being a small
effect, high leverage may lead to unnecessarily high interest payments, which ultimately in-
creases the risk of financial distress. In contrast, companies that are not considered as risky
may have less problems absorbing the higher interest payments and, thus, do not experience
greater risk of financial distress. The negative and significant coefficients of the development
of leverage confirm this reasoning.
Whereas the Altman Z-Score is significant in the full sample regression, it is driven by the
subsample with a high Altman Z-Score, i.e. the risk of financial distress at entry is more
relevant for those companies that are considered as non-risky. This means that when a company
is considered as risky according to the Altman Z-Score it does not matter how low the Altman
Z-Score is. Thus, a company with an extremely low Altman Z-Score does not experience a
higher risk of financial distress compared to a company that is just on the verge of being risky
according to the threshold of the Altman Z-Score. For non-risky companies, it may be more
important to have a reasonable risk profile because the lower the Altman Z-Score is the more
they move towards the cluster of risky companies.
Both growth variables are predominately positive and significant for the non-risky subsample.
Risky companies behave differently, such that sales growth does not have an effect and equity
growth even has a negative effect on the development of the Altman Z-Score. Companies should
not aim to grow equity directly but rather focus on running the business smoothly. Especially
in the case of PE, the generation of equity is not necessarily important as capital needs can be
covered through additional capital injections by the fund. In terms of profitability, all variables
behave as expected for non-risky companies, such that a higher profitability reduces the risk of
financial distress. The development of the Altman Z-Score in risky companies reacts strongly
and positively to the improvement of return on assets, being the only positive influence in terms
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of profitability. In contrast, the other profitability variables are not significant and the profit
margin is even negatively correlated to the development of the Altman Z-Score. The result
of the profit margin aligns with the finding about equity growth, as profits directly influence
the level of upcoming year’s equity as well. Rather than aiming to directly streamline the
profit margin, risky companies should aim to establish a solid company structure. This finding
can be backed up by the negative relationship of cash ratio and the positive relationship to
the development of the Altman Z-Score. Whilst the generation of the necessary cash can be
covered by the PE fund, it is more relevant for the GP to improve the working capital structure
of the company in order to run the business smoothly. In contrast, non-risky companies do not
need to build the fundament of the business by working on the working capital to influence the
risk level but rather generate sufficient cash through operations, as shown by the positive and
significant coefficient of the cash ratio.
4.5.3 Time Effects
As the initial analysis about risk development in all buyouts improved significantly with the
introduction of time-fixed effects, we perform subsampling regarding the time periods of the
investment. Especially, when considering the risk of an investment, the financial crisis may play
a crucial role to explain the development of risk of financial distress in portfolio companies.
For that purpose, we perform two subsamples to illustrate the structural break of the financial
crisis. Whereas the first subsample consists of all companies that had their investment entry
before the year 2008, the other subsample considers all companies that had their investment
entry after 2008. Table 4.9 shows the results of the subsample regressions considering the time
effect before and after the financial crisis. The difference in the risk of financial distress between
PBOs and SBOs is not driven particularly from the period before or after the financial crisis.
Although the SBO coefficient is positive in both subsample regressions, it is not statistically
significant.
Interestingly, the leverage ratio at entry is only significant for those buyouts that had their entry
after the financial crisis. The leverage ratio at entry is negatively correlated to the development
of the Altman Z-Score. As portfolio companies have taken a hit through the financial crisis
in terms of risk of financial distress, as can be inferred from Figure 4.1, especially close to the
financial crisis, companies needed action taken for strong and quick recovery. This finding hints
that companies with a high leverage at times of the financial crisis had problems to compensate
the interest payments given the difficult economic environment. The higher the leverage ratio
at entry is, the harder it is for GPs to take on additional debt to restructure the company
and manoeuvre it through the economic downturn. Therefore, the development of the leverage
is also negatively and significantly correlated to the development of the Altman Z-Score. In
contrast to the full sample regression, unnecessarily high leverage makes the company more
risky, as debt markets and the market environment are difficult. In line with this reasoning,
the Altman Z-Score at entry is negatively correlated to the development of the Altman Z-Score,
both before and after the financial crisis. This effect is more predominant for the time after
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Table 4.9: Subsample Time
(1) (2) (3)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
Total Before crisis After crisis
SBO 0.129∗∗∗ 0.065 0.075
(0.01) (0.19) (0.53)
Size
Sales 0.522∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Equity 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.026 0.044 -0.099
(0.19) (0.16) (0.15)
Profit margin -0.005 -0.047∗∗ -0.012
(0.70) (0.02) (0.59)
Return on assets 0.133∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.01) (0.00) (0.97)
Return on equity 0.254∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Leverage ratio development -0.000 -0.000 -0.007∗∗
(0.47) (0.78) (0.05)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.139∗∗ 0.110 0.157
(0.02) (0.10) (0.21)
Current ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.000
(0.07) (0.05) (0.84)
Working capital 0.268∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.367
(0.04) (0.00) (0.26)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.073∗∗∗ -2.598∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.000 0.000 0.004∗
(0.82) (0.85) (0.10)
Altman Z-Score -0.035∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(total assets) 0.012 0.015 -0.041
(0.41) (0.35) (0.41)
log(company age) -0.010 -0.028 0.124
(0.64) (0.19) (0.13)
PE firm age 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.65) (0.17) (0.71)
Leverage ratio at entry -0.000 -0.000 -0.003∗∗
(0.26) (0.51) (0.03)
Time Effects YES YES YES
Industry Effects YES YES YES
Constant -0.416 -0.405 0.000
(0.11) (0.14) (.)
Overall R-squared 0.348 0.468 0.606
N 575 415 160
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions of the subsamples before and
after the financial crisis. The various specifications show the influence on the development of
the Altman Z-Score. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients.
The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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the financial crisis.
Figure 4.1: Risk Development over Time
Note: The graph shows the yearly average change of the Altman Z-Score (in percent) for the observed companies
with an investment entry in a specific financial year.
Considering performance measures in these subsample regressions, two patterns arise. First,
before the financial crisis, the risk of financial distress is strongly driven by weak returns
on assets and equity, poor liquidity management, and efficiency loss. The only unexpected
relationship is the negative influence of the profit margin development on the development of
the Altman Z-Score. As the majority of the subsample’s entries was close to the financial
crisis, this finding is plausible. Portfolio companies that streamlined their business to achieve
high profits, may have taken a strong hit when the financial crisis began and, hence, the
risk of the portfolio company increased during the holding period. Second, after the financial
crisis, the return on equity is the only profitability measure that has an influence on the risk
development during the holding period. Whilst this variable is highly significant, the large effect
may partly be driven through the nearly significant and negative effect of equity development
on the development of the Altman Z-Score.
4.5.4 Size Effects
Lastly, the regression for the risk composition at entry and exit of the portfolio companies shows
that the size of the portfolio companies influences the risk level of financial distress. Thus, we
perform subsampling according to the size of the portfolio companies and rerun the regressions.
The first subsample considers the smallest 25 percent of the total sample, i.e. companies that
have 9.899 million GBP in total assets or less. The second group comprises all medium-sized
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companies with total assets between 9.899 million GBP and 63.027 million GBP. The third
subsample inherits all companies with total assets above 63.027 million GBP. Table 4.10 shows
the results of subsampling regressions considering the various sizes of the portfolio companies.
The influence of the buyout round on risk development varies among the different sizes of the
portfolio companies. Whereas the development of risk in small and medium-sized companies
benefits from SBO ownership compared to the first buyout round, there is no significant effect
on large companies. The impact on the risk development of SBOs is most prevalent for small
companies. Thus, the bigger the company, the more the effect on risk development diminishes.
Especially for small companies, the risk reduction has a higher priority, as small and young
companies are often perceived as more risky. Thus, in order to find buyers for the portfolio
company, GPs need to provide an acceptable risk profile of the target. Again, as this sample
considers back-to-back buyouts, the PBO investor does not necessarily pay too much attention
to the risk development because the follow-up investor can handle a higher risk better compared
to non PE-financing.
The leverage ratio at entry is significantly negative only for large companies. This result can be
explained by higher costs alongside the leverage, such as interest payment and cashflow reduc-
tions, outweigh the benefits that the leverage enables for mature and less dynamic companies.
Also, the development of the leverage ratio differs among sizes. Whereas, the leverage ratio
has a positive effect on the Altman Z-Score development of small companies, a higher degree of
liabilities increases the risk of financial distress for large companies. Consistent with the prior
finding, a high degree of leverage is disadvantageous for large companies, because the debt
capacity is already fully exploited in mature companies. In contrast, small and often young
companies that have a higher leverage ratio indicate strong trust from debtholders and, thus,
a strong market acceptance.
Whereas, small and medium-sized companies’ risk of financial distress is driven by liquidity
management, it does not seem to matter for large companies in terms of risk development. In
contrast to small and medium-sized companies, large companies usually have sufficient collateral
in order that liquidity needs are less important, especially when the company is PE-backed
and liquidity provision is possible at all times. Large companies need to focus on efficiency,
expressed in the receivables turnover ratio and profitability measures to control their risk of
financial distress. As such, the receivables turnover ratio is significant only for large companies.
This pattern may be reasoned with the advancement in the business cycle, such that small
companies first need to expand, then proftability follows, and, lastly, profitabilty and efficiency
is further promoted in mature companies.
4.6 Conclusion
Based on a dataset of 295 PBOs and their consecutive SBOs in the UK during 1996 und 2017 we
analyse the risk of financial risk of these buyouts. The risk profile was determined by using the
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Table 4.10: Subsample Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score Altman Z-Score
Total Small Medium Large
SBO 0.129∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.142∗∗ -0.033
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.65)
Size
Sales 0.522∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.57)
Equity 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗ -0.008 0.543∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.07) (0.37) (0.00)
Profitability
EBTIDA margin -0.026 -0.017 0.039 0.262∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.73) (0.65) (0.00)
Profit margin -0.005 -0.003 0.012 -0.212∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.92) (0.53) (0.00)
Return on assets 0.133∗∗∗ 0.022 0.910∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗
(0.01) (0.88) (0.00) (0.02)
Return on equity 0.254∗∗∗ 0.321 0.250∗∗ 0.069
(0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.39)
Leverage ratio Dev -0.000 0.016∗∗ -0.001 -0.000∗
(0.47) (0.02) (0.21) (0.08)
Liquidity
Cash ratio 0.139∗∗ 0.208 0.305∗ -0.116
(0.02) (0.11) (0.07) (0.22)
Current ratio 0.001∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.005
(0.07) (0.00) (0.03) (0.79)
Working capital 0.268∗∗ 0.699∗∗ 0.200 0.224
(0.04) (0.05) (0.32) (0.53)
Efficiency
Inventory sales ratio -0.073∗∗∗ -0.204 -1.984∗∗ -0.026
(0.00) (0.67) (0.04) (0.37)
Receivables turnover ratio -0.000 0.001 0.007 0.066∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.47) (0.31) (0.00)
Altman Z-Score -0.035∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
log(total assets) 0.012 -0.087 -0.015 0.026
(0.41) (0.19) (0.79) (0.54)
log(company age) -0.010 -0.110 0.018 -0.033
(0.64) (0.12) (0.57) (0.27)
PE firm age 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.65) (0.54) (0.23) (0.19)
Leverage ratio at entry -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000∗∗
(0.26) (0.80) (0.12) (0.05)
Time Effects YES YES YES YES
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.416 0.430 -0.121 -0.164
(0.11) (0.56) (0.86) (0.81)
Overall R-squared 0.348 0.684 0.600 0.892
N 575 145 291 139
Note: The table above shows the estimates of the panel regressions of the subsamples according
the size at entry. The various specifications show the influence on the development of the
Altman Z-Score. The p-values are reported in parenthesis below the individual coefficients.
The significance levels for all specifications are ***0.1%, **1% and *5%.
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Altman Z-Score, as a widely accepted accounting-based default prediction model, to determine
the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy of a company. We calculated the Altman Z-Score
at the entry into the PBOs and at the exit to the SBOs as well as during the holding period.
In the course of the study, we investigate risk drivers in portfolio companies and the difference
of PBOs and SBOs in handling the risk. To our knowledge this study is the only paper in PE
research that analyses the risk profile of SBOs compared to their preceding PBOs and examines
the different underlying drivers of the risk.
Risk perception is a contentious issue for investors, and especially SBOs are seen riskier than
their preceding PBOs at first glance. In general, the analysis reveals that during the holding
period GPs slightly reduce the risk of the managed portfolio companies. This finding is in
contrast to Tykvova´ & Borell (2012) who argue that the risk in PE investments increases. Our
analyses show that the buyouts are not particularly financially distressed at the entry of the
investment. The initial comparison unveils that there is no significant difference in the risk
development between PBOs and SBOs, although SBOs show a slightly higher decrease in the
risk level than PBOs. Even during the financial crisis, the risk of PBOs and SBOs was not
critical. PBOs as well as SBOs reduce the risk of financial distress during the holding period,
especially when the risk level at the investment entry is high. Furthermore, SBO investors
improve the risk profile of the portfolio companies more than PBOs. Assuming that SBOs are
sold to non-PE investors, it might be easier to sell the company with a lower risk of financial
distress. However, SBOs, in general, cannot be seen as riskier investments. SBO investors
are especially better than PBO investors at the risk reduction for companies, which are not
distressed at investment entry. The risk reduction in small and medium-sized companies benefits
more from a SBO sponsorship compared to the holding period of the PBO.
In contrast to the common belief that leverage increases the risk of financial distress in buyouts
(e.g. Kaplan & Stein (1993)), we find that leverage does not impact the risk profile of PBOs.
However, a higher leverage in SBOs leads to a higher risk level. Self-evidently, improvements
in efficiency are risk reducing in both buyout rounds. In PBOs the drivers to reduce risk
are improvements of profitability, such as a better profit margin, whereas the risk in SBOs is
controlled by better liquidity management and a reduction of leverage. These results indicate
that GPs of SBOs use different sets of drivers to reduce the risk compared to their counterpart
in PBOs. This insight guides us to the argument that the focus of risk management in PBOs
already leads to risk reduction by using the specific drivers, and SBOs, therefore, concentrate
on different drivers.
The findings of this study contribute to the discussion about the investment quality of SBOs.
While SBOs do not necessarily outperform PBOs, SBOs indicate a significantly lower risk of
financial distress compared to their preceding PBOs. This risk-adjusted view on the investment
in SBOs proposes an argument to invest in SBOs and explains their increasing share in the
total financial buyout market.
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